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ABSTRACT

This document reviews academic salaries in Australia. Chapters cover academic work value, recruitment and retention of staff, and the benefits of academic employment, salary movements in relevant occupations, comparative wage justice, recommended salary levels, sublecturer grades, several salary levels for professors, clinical loadings, and permanent review machinery. Recommendations are indicated for salaries and salary ranges, differentials and loadings for professors, clinical loadings, and permanent review machinery. (MJM)

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INQUIRY INTO ACADEMIC SALARIES

REPORT
Dated May 1973

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THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
1973—Parliamentary Paper No. 104

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INQUIRY INTO ACADEMIC SALARIES

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16 May 1973

My Dear Minister,

I have the honour to present to you my report on academic salaries.

I am indebted to both my assessors, Professor R. L. Mathews and Mr M. C. Timbs, for the assistance they have afforded me. In January 1973 Mr Timbs was appointed Secretary of the new Commonwealth Department of Property and Services and the heavy demands which this office placed upon him precluded him from taking part in the majority of our meetings and deliberations this year. I am grateful to him for such time as he has been able to devote to the task of the Inquiry and for the sound advice which he proffered. It will be appreciated that a greater load than otherwise fell upon the shoulders of Professor Mathews who gave generously of his time and energies. I cannot thank him enough for his unfailing support and the benefit of his knowledge and advice which have been invaluable in the preparation of this report.

I take full responsibility for the opinions expressed and recommendations made in the report but I have the permission of both assessors to inform you that they are in substantial agreement with those opinions and recommendations.

The Secretary to the Inquiry, Mr D. Fooks, was constantly at my side and tireless in his efforts to provide all possible aid. He arranged with considerable competence the heavy programs of travel, accommodation and numerous meetings, and dealt efficiently with the procedural matters involved in the administration of a large mass of material and in the compilation of the report. I am most grateful to him.

Finally, I thank the representatives of the Australian Government, the State Governments, the governing bodies of universities and colleges of advanced education, university and college staff associations, the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, the associations of other academic and professional persons and all others who made written or oral submissions. I have depended greatly on the advice and information which they all willingly gave me.

Yours sincerely,

W. B. Campbell

W. B. Campbell

The Honourable K. E. Beazley, M.P.,
Minister for Education,
Parliament House,
Canberra, A.C.T. 2601

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Summary of recommendations

I make the following recommendations which, for the sake of clarity and full understanding, should be read with the relevant sections of the Report.

Recommendations	*Paragraph*
Salaries and Salary Ranges	
1. The standard salary for a professor should be increased from $15,368 to $18,600 per annum.	6.12
2. The standard salary for a reader and for an associate professor should be increased from $12,697 per annum to $15,500 per annum.	6.12
3. The standard salary for a senior lecturer should be increased from $9,644 per annum to $11,900 per annum at the bottom of the scale, progressing by five annual increments of $400 each to the top of the scale, which should be increased from $11,234 per annum to $13,900 per annum.	6.12
4. The standard salary for a lecturer should be increased from $6,801 per annum to $8,400 per annum at the bottom of the scale, progressing by seven annual increments of $460 each to the top of the scale, which should be increased from $9,390 per annum to $11,620 per annum.	6.12
5. The standard commencing salary for a tutor/demonstrator should be $5,500 per annum and there should be a salary range of five steps of $250 each, rising to $6,750 per annum at the top of the range.	7.39
For the time being, a lower commencing salary of $5,100 should be retained for some tutors.	7.37
6. The standard commencing salary for a senior tutor/demonstrator should be $7,000 per annum and there should be a salary range of five steps of $280 each, rising to $8,400 per annum at the top of the range.	7.39
7. The standard salary for a principal (i.e. career grade) tutor should be $8,400 per annum at the bottom of the scale, progressing by five annual increments of $460 each to the top of the scale, which should be $10,700 per annum.	7.41
8. The salaries of existing members of the sub-lecturer academic staff in the categories of tutor/demonstrator and senior tutor/demonstrator should be increased by at least 24 per cent and the salaries of principal tutors should be increased by at least 23·5 per cent. All sub-lecturer staff should then be fitted into the recommended salary scales in such a way as to ensure that they receive at least those rates of increase.	7.42
Tables 7.3 to 7.5 should be used as transformation tables for this purpose.	7.43
9. Salary scales and incremental steps for senior lecturers, lecturers and principal tutors, and salary ranges for senior tutors/demonstrators and tutors/demonstrators should be uniform throughout all universities.	6.15 7.43

10. The recommended new salary levels should be implemented with effect from 1 January 1973, and should continue to be adjusted in accordance with national wage case decisions after that date. 6.13

Differentials and Loadings for Professors

11. It is not recommended that, for the purpose of making grants to universities, there should be established a salary range for professors. 8.16

12. The financial grants made by governments should be such as to enable those universities which now pay professorial differentials and loadings to continue the practice (and to extend it if they consider it necessary or desirable), and to enable universities which do not pay differentials and loadings to adopt the practice if they wish to do so. 8.18

13. For funding purposes, universities should be permitted to increase all existing differentials and loadings, if they wish to do so, in direct proportion to the increase in standard professorial salaries, subject to the following additional constraints in terms of absolute amounts:
(*a*) an upper limit of $2,000 per annum in respect of all non-clinical supplements for an individual professor in a State university:
(*b*) an overall upper limit of 4 per cent of total professorial salaries, calculated at the standard rate, in each State university; and
(*c*) special arrangements for the Australian National University which are consistent with the constraints to be applied to State universities. 8.28

14. Universities wishing to introduce a system of differentials and loadings, or to extend an existing system, should be eligible for supplementary funds for the purpose at a time of a general salary adjustment or at the beginning of a triennium, provided the Australian Universities Commission has approved their schemes as falling within the guidelines outlined in this Report. 8.33

Clinical Loadings

15. In full clinical departments, clinical loadings of $3,000 per annum should be paid to professors, associate professors and readers, and clinical loadings of $2,500 per annum should be paid to senior lecturers and lecturers, and in recommending recurrent grants to universities the Australian Universities Commission should make provision for such loadings to be paid. 9.24

16. Clinicial loadings should be paid to medically qualified full-time academic staff in para-clinical and pre-clinical departments who have clinical responsibilities in a teaching hospital. The amounts of such loadings for individual staff members should be determined by each university in relation to the extent of the clinical responsibility undertaken, subject to the upper limits specified in recommendation (15) for clinical staff members of equivalent grade. 9.27

17. Loadings should be paid to dentally qualified full-time academic staff in departments of dental science who have clinical responsibilities. The amounts of the loadings in the case of individual staff members should be determined by each university in relation to the extent of the

clinical responsibility undertaken, subject to upper limits of $1,500 per annum for professors, associate professors and readers, and $1,250 per annum for senior lecturers and lecturers 9.33

18. The Australian Universities Commission should base its recommendations for a university's recurrent grants on the following average clinical loadings in respect of para-clinical, pre-clinical and dental staff:

(*a*) $1,500 per annum for each medically qualified professor, associate professor and reader in the university's para-clinical and pre-clinical departments;

(*b*) $1,250 per annum for each medically qualified senior lecturer and lecturer in the university's para-clinical and pre-clinical departments;

(*c*) $750 per annum for each dentally qualified professor, associate professor and reader in the university's dental clinical departments; and

(*d*) $625 per annum for each dentally qualified senior lecturer and lecturer in the university's dental clinical departments. 9.36

Permanent Review Machinery

19. A tribunal should be established by a statute of the Commonwealth and given the function of determining the salaries and salary ranges for the several grades of academic staff within universities and colleges of advanced education. 10.12

20. The tribunal's functions should be limited to the determination of salaries. 10.16

21. The tribunal should be constituted by one person whose qualification for appointment should be that he or she is:

(*a*) a judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court; or

(*b*) a deputy presidential member of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; or

(*c*) a judge of the Australian Capital Territory or any other Commonwealth superior court; or

(*d*) a judge of the supreme court of any State. 10.17

22. The person appointed to constitute the tribunal should be appointed for a term of not less than five years. 10.18

23. If requested by the tribunal the Australian Government should appoint two assessors to assist the tribunal in the performance of its functions, either generally or in relation to any particular case. 10.19

24. If assessors are requested they might conveniently be selected in the following ways:

(*a*) for the purposes of university salary reviews, one assessor might be chosen by the Australian Government from a panel of names furnished jointly by the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, while the other might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the State governments. 10.20

(*b*) for the purposes of college salary reviews, one assessor might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the Australian Commission on Advanced Education and the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education, while the other might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the State governments. 10.20

25. The tribunal should be provided with a permanent secretariat. 10.21

26. The tribunal should convene for the purpose of conducting a general review of academic salaries in universities, or in colleges, or in both, at regular two-yearly intervals, if so requested by any of the bodies set out below:

University Review
The Australian Government
A State Government
The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee
The Australian Universities Commission
The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations.

College Review
The Australian Government
A State Government
The Australian Commission on Advanced Education
The Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education. 10.27

27. Notwithstanding the requirement of a two-yearly review in accordance with recommendation (26), the tribunal should be empowered to initiate salary reviews at any time in relation either to all the full-time academic staff in universities and colleges of advanced education or to any sections or groups of such persons in either kind of institution, if any of the bodies mentioned in recommendation (26) can satisy it that there are special circumstances which warrant such a review. 10.28

28. The hearings should be conducted in an informal manner in the discretion of the tribunal; it should be empowered to make inquiries and to obtain information in any manner and from any source it might deem fit, and to request and receive submissions from the parties mentioned in recommendation (26) and from the governing bodies and staff associations of all universities and colleges of advanced education. 10.34

29. When a determination has been made by the tribunal it should send a certified copy of the determination, together with its reasons (if any), to the Prime Minister, the State Premiers, the Commonwealth Minister for Education, the Australian Universities Commission and the Australian Commission on Advanced Education. 10.36

30. The legislation should provide that the determination and the reasons (if any) be laid before both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. 10.37

31. Unless either House of Parliament, within a specified number of days after a determination has been laid before both Houses, passes a resolution disapproving the determination (or any part thereof), then:

(*a*) the determination, or the part not disapproved, should be used by the Australian Universities Commission for the purpose of recommending grants for recurrent expenditure for universities, and by the Australian Commission on Advanced Education for recommending similar grants for colleges;

(*b*) the Australian (and State) Governments should make grants in accordance with and giving full effect to the determination, or the part not disapproved, as the case may be; and

(*c*) all universities and colleges of advanced education should pay salaries to academic staff at rates not less than those determined by the tribunal. 10.38

32. Provision should be made in the legislation for salary agreements to be made between the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations (or the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education in a college salary agreement) and governments, and for such agreements to be lodged with the tribunal. Any such agreements should be made only after consultation with the governing bodies of universities or colleges, as the case may be. 10.40

33. Governments should continue to accept the obligation to make automatic adjustments to academic salaries in accordance with national wage case decisions. 10.42

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 On 11 September 1972 the Minister for Education and Science, the Honourable Malcolm Fraser, announced that I had been appointed by the Commonwealth Government to conduct an inquiry into academic salaries in universities. The Minister stated that I was to be assisted by Professor R. L. Mathews, Professor of Accounting and Public Finance at the Australian National University, and by Mr M. C. Timbs, Executive Member of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, as assessors.

1.2 The terms of reference were:

'(*a*) *To advise governments on the salaries or salary ranges for full-time members of the teaching staff of universities which the Inquiry considers should be adopted by the Australian Universities Commission for the purpose of recommending grants to be made to universities, including the Australian National University, for recurrent expenditure. The Inquiry shall make its recommendations with respect to the grade of lecturer, senior lecturer, reader or associate professor and professor. In coming to its conclusions, the Inquiry shall have regard to:*

(*i*) *the rates of salary in other occupations in Australia which have previously been taken into consideration, or may be regarded as relevant, in the determination of academic salaries;*

(*ii*) *the requirement to attract and retain a sufficient number of persons of the needed quality;*

(*iii*) *the qualifications, functions, responsibilities and other attributes or factors required in the performance of the various levels of academic work;*

(*iv*) *the desirability or otherwise of establishing several salary levels for professors to take account of special merit, responsibility or the requirements of particular disciplines.*

(*b*) *To advise governments on the percentage increases which the Inquiry considers appropriate in the salary ranges for full time members of the teaching staff of universities in sub-lecturer grades.*

(*c*) *To advise governments on the establishment of permanent machinery for future reviews of salaries for full-time members of the academic staffs of universities and colleges of advanced education and on the nature of such machinery, its powers and its procedures.*'

1.3 On 14 September 1972, Mr Fraser stated in Parliament that the Commonwealth Government, after consultation with State Governments, had concluded that the time was appropriate for such a review and that the Commonwealth would stand ready to support any salary increases which might be recommended by me with effect from 1 January 1973, the beginning of the university triennium. He later explained that any such increases would, of course, require a Government decision on my recommendations.

1.4 In replying to a letter from me querying the ambit of the terms of reference, particularly with respect to term (*a*) (*iv*) thereof, the Minister said, in a letter dated 3 November 1972, that this latter term was intended to relate only to

professors and not to members of the academic staff in general. However, Mr Fraser agreed that the terms enabled me, if I judged appropriate, to recommend salary ranges for such a special group as clinical lecturers in medicine, different from those recommended for the generality of members of the academic staff. In the circumstances of this Inquiry I have considered it necessary that I should make special recommendations relating to salaries for sub-professorial academic staff in medicine and dentistry.

Proposals for Interim Adjustments

1.5 Shortly after embarking upon the work of the Inquiry, I received a number of requests for interim salary increases from universities and staff associations. In particular, it was suggested that I should recommend to governments that an interim adjustment be made to all academic salaries from 1 July 1972, on the basis of comparative wage justice, before I entered upon the full inquiry in accordance with the reference. My answer to all such requests was that I was of the opinion that the terms of reference did not enable me to consider or to recommend any interim adjustment of salaries pending the completion of the Inquiry and the forwarding of my recommendations to the Minister. I further indicated that I considered the question of an interim adjustment a matter for governments. I have been informed that, after consultation with the State Governments, the former Commonwealth Government concluded that an interim adjustment would be undesirable and that the present Australian Government supports that decision.

Procedure of the Inquiry

1.6 At the time of my appointment, Mr M. C. Timbs was overseas and was unavailable until 12 October 1972. Mr. D. Fooks, an officer of the Department of Education and Science, was appointed as Secretary to the Inquiry in the week commencing 17 September 1972, and I was able to have a preliminary meeting with him and with Professor Mathews on 25 September 1972. As a result of decisions taken at that meeting, I wrote letters inviting written submissions from the governing bodies of all universities, the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, all vice-chancellors, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations and all university staff associations. Because I am also required to advise on machinery for future reviews of academic salaries in colleges of advanced education, letters inviting submissions bearing on this aspect were written to the Australian Commission on Advanced Education, the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education, the Board of Advanced Education (or the equivalent body) in each State, and the Advanced Education Conference. Having in mind the remarks of Mr Justice Eggleston (now Sir Richard Eggleston) in the Report of his Inquiry into Academic Salaries dated 7 May 1970, to the effect that governments could help future inquiries by providing an element of opposition to '*assist in the appraisal of arguments*' advanced by those representing the interests of universities and their academic staff, I wrote to the then Prime Minister and to all State Premiers inviting their Governments to present submissions. I also wrote to the Hon. E. G. Whitlam, then Leader of the Opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament.

1.7 Letters inviting submissions and relevant information were also sent to:

The Australian Medical Association;
The Australian Union of Students;
The Commonwealth Public Service Board;

The Institution of Engineers (Australia);
The Law Council of Australia; and
The New South Wales Universities Board.

1.8 After consultation with the Chairman of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Secretary of the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, 13 November 1972 was fixed as the closing date for submissions. On 30 September 1972, advertisements inviting written submissions from interested persons were published in thirteen newspapers. The form of this advertisement and the newspapers in which it appeared are set out in Appendix A.

1.9 In all I received 137 written submissions from the individuals or organisations listed in Appendix B. Written submissions were received from the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, from the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, from most universities and individual staff associations and from the Governments of Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, the Public Service Board of New South Wales and the Victorian Treasury. Although the Governments of South Australia and Western Australia did not make written submissions, they both made available Treasury or other officers for discussion of the issues involved.

1.10 I sought and received detailed information about academic salaries and methods of determining salaries in New Zealand (from Sir Alan Danks, Chairman of the New Zealand University Grants Committee) and in the United Kingdom (from Sir Kenneth Berrill, Chairman of the United Kingdom University Grants Committee). The Inquiry also received considerable assistance, in the form of comparative salary data and information about public service salary determinations, from the Chairman (Mr A. S. Cooley) and other officers of the Commonwealth Public Service Board.

1.11 Prior to inviting submissions, I had determined that the Inquiry would be conducted in an informal way and that the written submissions received would be used as a basis for round-table or seminar-type discussions. In so doing, I was influenced by the view expressed by Sir Richard Eggleston in his 1964 Report: *'I have felt that an informal and free method of inquiry has had definite advantages. In particular much of the information we have received would probably not have been available if a more formal approach had been adopted'*. After proceeding in this way, I am convinced that such an approach was preferable to the holding of formal, open sessions where witnesses would be required to give oral evidence, speak to their submissions and be cross-examined in a manner analogous to that of a judicial inquiry. I believe that the relaxed atmosphere of our discussions meant that more persons were prepared to come forward and express their views on many sensitive issues than otherwise would have been the case.

1.12 I was nevertheless conscious of the need to test the claims submitted and the evidence offered in support of those claims. I have already referred to the comment in the 1970 Eggleston Report concerning the desirability of having an adversary flavour, or element of opposition, in the proceedings. To this end, I decided that I would make available to governments the written submissions of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, and to furnish the latter bodies with each other's submissions and with the written submissions of governments. The Vice-Chancellors' Committee, the Federation and the governments all agreed to this exchange. In addition, at all conferences I sought discussion on points of view which opposed or differed from those being advanced. Naturally I made it clear that I would

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treat information as confidential if such was asked of me, but I can say that on the extremely rare occasions when I was asked to respect confidentiality the matter was of no substance, e.g. the names of academic staff who earned private incomes or who had special terms of employment.

1.13 I believe that all interested persons and groups had the opportunity to present their cases freely and fully and at the same time to answer any adverse submissions. During the course of this Inquiry, no submission was made that the procedure I adopted was unfair to any party and there was only one suggestion that my Inquiry, or that to be conducted by any tribunal for future salary reviews which might be constituted as a result of my recommendations, should proceed other than in an informal way.

1.14 Because of the wide-ranging nature of the terms of reference and the requirement upon me to consider the *'functions, responsibilities and other attributes or factors required in the performance of the various levels of academic work'*, I decided at the preliminary meeting that my assessors and I should visit each Australian university in order to provide an opportunity for university representatives, the staff association and other members of the university community to discuss their submissions and raise any additional relevant matters.

1.15 During the period from 28 November 1972 until 6 April 1973, I visited all the States and the Australian Capital Territory and there, together with one or both of my assessors, had detailed discussions with the members of eighteen universities. These included Griffith University in Queensland and Murdoch University in Western Australia, which have not yet reached the stage of enrolling students, and Wollongong University College which will become fully autonomous on 1 January 1975. During the same period, discussions were held with persons involved in the planning, organisation and administration (and in some States with representatives of the academic staff) of colleges of advanced education. Further, in each State capital and in Canberra we availed ourselves of the opportunity to speak with representatives of government. In each case, our discussions were full and frank and embraced all aspects which seemed to us to be material to the Inquiry. Appendix C provides a list of the 489 persons who were present at our discussions.

1.16 Prior to commencing our visits to universities, I had determined that we would, in the time available, endeavour to inspect a wide range of university facilities. This was considered important as one aspect of my work-value inquiry and helped me to gain an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of academics in many varied fields. Appendix D lists the places visited by us.

1.17 In January 1973, Mr Timbs was appointed Secretary of the Department of Property and Services and, as a consequence, considerable demands were placed upon his time. The effect of this was that he was unable to be with me during visits to the universities in the four eastern States and the A.C.T. (with the exception of the Universities of Sydney, Newcastle and New England, the last two of which Professor Mathews was not able to visit because of commitments with the Commonwealth Grants Commission). Mr Timbs was also prevented from attending most of the final discussions in Canberra during the latter part of March and in the month of April. However, I have had the benefit of his advice during the writing of this report.

1.18 In Canberra, in addition to visiting the Australian National University, we held meetings with representatives of the Australian Medical Association, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, the Australian Vice-Chancellors'

Committee, the N.S.W. Public Service Board (who, on this occasion, conveyed to us further submissions from the Government of Queensland), the Australian Commission on Advanced Education and the Australian Government. By this time Sir John Crawford had retired from the office of Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, but I had previously (in December 1972) availed myself of the opportunity of talking with him about the issues involved in the Inquiry. At my request, the Chairman of the Australian Universities Commission (Professor P. H. Karmel) conferred with us on matters of machinery and the procedures followed by the Commission in making recommendations about recurrent grants to universities. The Chairman of the Commonwealth Public Service Board (Mr A. S. Cooley) likewise accepted an invitation from me to talk about methods of salary fixation in the public service and about the public service structure generally.

Previous Salary Determinations

1.19 The Australian Universities Commission was established on 1 July 1959, but it was not until 14 May 1964 that Sir Richard Eggleston was appointed to conduct an inquiry into academic salaries for the purpose of advising on salaries to be used by the Commission in recommending grants to be made to universities for recurrent expenditure. The advice sought from that Inquiry was limited to *' the standard salary or range of salaries for a professor and the salary range for a reader or associate professor'*, although Sir Richard found it necessary in framing his recommendations to make certain assumptions as to the levels of salaries at the bottom of the lecturer scale and at the top of the senior lecturer scale. The 1964 Inquiry was a work-value inquiry; Sir Richard said that *' it cannot be assumed that at any particular time in the past [academic salaries] have been in proper relativity with other salaries in the community'*; he made it clear that he did not attempt to equate professors with any particular group in the community and his recommendations took into account the qualifications, functions and responsibilities of professors and of readers.

1.20 Sir Richard concluded that it was impracticable for him to do other than to recommend a standard salary for professors to be used as a measure for the assessment of grants; his terms of reference made no mention of differentials and loadings. In March 1970, he conducted another Inquiry with terms of reference identical with those of the 1964 Inquiry. However, he indicated that on this occasion the interested parties had agreed that an extended inquiry was not necessary, and that the investigation was intended merely to *' bring up to date the existing salary levels, having regard to changes in salary levels in general which had taken place since the last adjustment of academic salaries took place in 1967'*. The 1967 adjustment had been made following discussions between the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations and governments, when it was agreed that all salaries down to and including the top of the lecturers' scale should be increased by 15 per cent. The salaries of lecturers at the bottom of the scale were increased by 12·5 per cent, corresponding adjustments being made to the incremental range to make the increase at the top of the range 15 per cent. Like the 1967 agreement, the 1970 Inquiry involved no work-value assessment. I have therefore assumed that it was not intended to alter the existing relativity of academic salaries with other salaries in the community.

1.21 I have referred at some length to the two Eggleston Reports and must continue to do so. The matters upon which my advice is sought comprehend the earlier terms of reference. The enlargement of the present reference seems to

have resulted in part from issues which Sir Richard raised, although he conscious that they fell outside the narrow boundaries of his own inqui Indeed, in the 1970 Report he said: *'. . . it is fairly generally accepte academic circles that there is a need for a more leisurely investigation than been possible on either occasion, which would review the salary structure whole'*. It is a moot point whether this Inquiry can be said to have been *' leisurely'* than the previous ones, but at least I have been furnished with w terms of reference. In the course of the Inquiry, also, I have endeavoure make a comprehensive investigation of the qualifications, functions, responsibilities of academics, of the value of the contributions they make of the roles they play in the life of the nation.

Chapter 2: Academic work value

2.1 Salary movements and salary levels in universities need to be considered in the light of their effects on the following kinds of relativity:
(*a*) Relativity in respect of salary levels in comparable occupations at a point of time, involving an assessment of what is usually described as work value. Two aspects of work value need to be considered, the first involving comparisons with occupations outside universities and the second comparisons in respect of the different academic grades.
(*b*) Relativity in respect of salary movements in comparable occupations over time, involving what is usually described as comparative wage justice. This kind of relativity also has two elements, the first being concerned with salary movements in other relevant occupations and the second with movements affecting the internal salary structure of universities.
2.2 I will deal with work value before considering comparative wage justice. The adjustments consequent upon Sir Richard Eggleston's 1964 Report were such as to place academic salaries in a fairly well-defined relationship with salaries paid to persons in other occupations. This does not mean that a link was established between academic salaries and any other salaries in the overall wage structure, based on a comparison of the nature of the work. My investigation has persuaded me of the truth of the proposition contained in the 1964 Report that '*academic work is in truth* **sui generis**'. Because I consider that no valid equivalence can be established I, like Sir Richard, have not attempted to equate university teachers with any other group in the community. However, taking existing relativities as my starting point, I have been concerned with whether or not there should be a shift in relativity because of an increase or decrease in the work value of university teachers since 1964. In addition, this consideration requires me to make a judgment as to whether there should be any changes in relativities in the internal university salary structure, i.e. as between the several academic grades.

Functions of Academic Staff

2.3 Although it is possible to identify the work roles of academic staff in terms of their responsibilities for teaching, research, administration and community service, some elaboration of these roles is necessary for an understanding of the functions of universities and their responsibilities to society. Teaching needs to be interpreted not only as the transmission of an existing body of knowledge to undergraduate students, but also as the inculcation of systematic methods of analysis and critical modes of thought, which will be retained and further developed by students after they have graduated. Even at this level, effective teaching requires involvement in the pursuit of knowledge; at the very least it is necessary for all university teachers to evaluate the advances that are taking place on the developing boundaries of their disciplines. In a university context, teaching also comprehends post-graduate supervision and at this level the dividing line between teaching and research becomes even more blurred. The research functon is both a basic responsibility of universities and a requirement for the

satisfactory performance of the teaching function. The administrative role of academic staff is a subsidiary responsibility which needs to be considered in relation to the organisation of courses of study and research programs.

2.4 Although less apparent than the primary functions of teaching and research, the community service aspect of university work is pervasive. It involves the custodianship of standards of professional competence in the applied arts and sciences. It requires university staff, perhaps more than any other group in the community, to be cast in the role of social critic. This involves the identification of social, economic and technological issues and of the policy choices which are available to those confronted by these issues. By acting as independent advisers or consultants, university staff also contribute to more effective decision-making in the public and private sectors and, of course, the community service aspect of university work includes the benefits which society derives directly from the teaching and research activities of universities. The importance of vital and progressive universities to the social and economic well-being of the nation can therefore hardly be exaggerated.

Arguments in the Submissions

2.5 In its submissions, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations argued that there has been a marked increase in the value of academic work since 1964. While generally leaving it to individual universities to discuss work-value aspects, the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee argued that university work has changed in character during recent years, partly because students have become more demanding, partly because knowledge is growing at an exponential rate and partly because the growth in the size and complexity of universities has brought in its train all kinds of organisational and pedagogical problems, which did not exist when universities were smaller institutions operating in a relatively uncomplicated world. It was submitted that the notion of the university as an ivory tower, remote from the world's problems and with ample leisure and facilities for detached thought, no longer exists (even if, as popularly supposed, it was once true).

2.6 The Federation based its claims on a number of elements of change affecting academic work, which it identified as: '*(i) smaller classes and specialist options which entail more administration and require greater skills in communication; (ii) more rapid change in information to be communicated and thus in curriculum modification; (iii) the increased importance of audio-visual technology; (iv) the demand for "relevant", i.e. real world, material; (v) change in methods and quantity of student work assessment*'. The Federation also argued that the administrative area of academic responsibility was becoming more demanding, as all grades of staff were drawn increasingly into the decision-making processes. Finally, the Federation contended that the increasing responsibilities of university staff had been matched by higher qualifications, both formal and informal.

2.7 State government submissions did not have very much to say about work value, but the Australian Government commented as follows on the Federation's case:

'*The Federation bases its claim for an increase of 30%, in part, on "the qualifications, functions, responsibilities and other attributes or factors presently required in the performance of the various levels of academic work". It is the Commonwealth's submission that for these factors to contribute to any salary increase over and above the quantum which may be justified on the basis of*

comparative wage justice, firm evidence of an increase in the "work value" of academic functions must be present . . . .

'It is felt that submissions contending an increased volume of work do not, in general terms, present an adequate case for an increase in work value. Any finding that the volume of academic work has increased would suggest that an increase in the number of staff is required to restore proper balance rather than that a compensatory salary increase is in order. Such a consideration is outside the Inquiry's terms of reference. Similarly, it is suggested that administrative duties associated with academic work could be regarded as a lower function and any increase which may have occurred in these duties is correctly solved by giving lower level clerical staff to provide administrative assistance to academics.

'For work value arguments to succeed, there needs to be demonstrated some tangible increase in job functions, added complexity of the duties or new or increased responsibilities . . . .

'While it is considered that there may well be some validity in the Federation's contentions regarding increase (sic) *work value, it is submitted that the material presented in the written submissions is not conclusive . . . .*

'In summary, it is submitted that the Inquiry does not have before it sufficient evidence that the work-value aspects have changed, and in these circumstances there can be no finding that a salary increase is justified on "work value" grounds.'

2.8 In discussing these claims and refutations, I should first make it clear that my assessment of work value does not depend, as the Australian Government submission seems to imply, merely on the written submissions of the Federation and the Vice-Chancellors' Committee. During the course of the Inquiry, I have received detailed written submissions relating to work value from several universities and staff associations, and written information from most universities about job specifications, appointment and promotion criteria, work situations, work loads, research output and changes which were said to have occurred in the value, volume and quality of academic work. A large proportion of the time spent in discussions and inspections in individual universities was also devoted to the probing of work-value claims.

2.9 I turn now to a detailed examination of these claims.

Changes in Academic Responsibilities

2.10 I believe that changes in teaching responsibilities since 1964 have been brought about by two principal factors. The first of these is the increasing use of the small-group or seminar method of instruction and other changes which have occurred in methods of teaching and assessment. The other is the explosion of knowledge which has been taking place in so many areas, particularly in the scientific and technological field but also in many branches of the social sciences and the humanities. The traditional concept of the formal lecture as the primary method of instruction and of the communication of ideas within the university is becoming somewhat outmoded. Of course it has never been true that lecturers and other senior staff have confined their activities to lectures while sub-lecturer staff have taken all tutorial classes. But during recent years there has been a tendency for all university teachers to become increasingly involved in small-group discussion, a change in teaching method which I consider a considerable improvement and which stems to a large extent from student pressures. Whether this has made the life of the lecturer significantly more onerous over the last decade is a difficult question to answer; but at least it has not lightened the teaching responsibility.

2.11 Small-group teaching is one of the factors which has brought about greater contact between lecturer and student outside normal class hours. Students today are more demanding than they were ten years ago, in that they are prepared to insist if necessary on higher standards of teaching and on greater accessibility of staff to discuss their personal problems or difficulties they may be having with their courses.

2.12 Another factor affecting teaching responsibilities has been the replacement, either wholly or in part, of the traditional end-of-year examination by the method of progressive or continuous assessment, based on regular assignments, essays, term examinations and evaluation of performance in seminars and tutorials. This, it has been said, has made considerable inroads upon the time which academic staff may otherwise have been able to devote to lecture preparation, research or the pursuit of their own private interests.

2.13 While these developments may well have affected the distribution and complexity of academic work, it must be remembered that universities have set up student counselling offices, student health services and vocational guidance machinery to help students cope with the academic environment. All these are comparatively recent innovations. Moreover, has not the good university teacher always been interested in the progress of his students and, to that end, been accessible to them at reasonable times? Why should not members of the full-time teaching staff set aside a certain number of hours each week, when students can call to discuss their problems? For some years now, universities have been placing greater emphasis on teaching methods. I believe that the picture of the academic harassed by a queue of students outside his study has been overdrawn, and that the organisational problems which have arisen during the period of transition have not always been dealt with in a calm and objective fashion. Staff-student ratios in many disciplines may be far from ideal, and I am conscious that the majority of academic staff are willing to help students individually outside the class-room. However, careful planning of times and the sharing of responsibilities among staff will alleviate the burdens which some may think are irritating. In its last Report, the Australian Universities Commission made the point that *'whether their emphasis is on teaching or on research and whether they occupy senior or junior posts, all university teachers have responsibilities to their students that do not end with formal classes'* (para. 3.34).

2.14 I am likewise not persuaded that progressive assessment is a factor which, in the context of changing (and often experimental) teaching methods, should lead me to conclude that the university teacher has such an additional load as to warrant his salary being increased on work-value grounds. The new methods clearly require a different kind of expertise and new approaches to the art of communicating knowledge and ideas and to the evaluation of students. But unless these techniques are mastered and successfully applied the teacher will fail. I accept that these changes in methods of teaching and student assessment, and in the pattern of staff-student contact, may have left staff with less time for the quiet pursuit of scholarship and research. On the other hand, effective undergraduate teaching is, for most full-time academic staff, a (if not the) primary responsibility. If university research were to suffer slightly during what I believe is a period of adjustment, I would be prepared to accept it as the lesser of two evils. But there is no sign that this has been so. I am convinced that the majority of academics have the capacity, skill and enthusiasm to continue with research, despite the interruptions and pressures which may occur as a result of the increased demands of teaching and administration. Neither the quantitative output nor the quality

of academic research seems to have suffered during the last decade, but I accept the proposition (which was put to me in several universities) that this may only have been achieved through an increase in aggregate work loads.

Knowledge Explosion

2.15 In recent years there has been a large increase in the rate of growth of new knowledge, especially in the sciences and the social sciences. This has obliged the university teacher to spend more time in keeping abreast of the latest developments and in selecting from the mass of available material that which is suitable for course content at several levels. Although there has not been a comparable quantitative outpouring in most branches of the humanities, changes in teaching techniques involving, for example, increasing use of new kinds of library facilities, language laboratories and computers, have undoubtedly made increased demands upon staff. On the other hand, these developments have helped academic staff by making improved facilities available, and they have been associated with greater specialisation within universities. In any case, it must be recognised that the growth of knowledge has made the pattern of life more complex for senior staff in other fields, such as scientists in the C.S.I.R.O. and other research organisations and those who hold responsible positions in the public services, commerce and industry.

2.16 What I have said in relation to work value ought to be sufficient to show that I am persuaded that, on the whole, the responsibilities of the academic have not become less onerous or less time-consuming since 1964. Indeed, I am of the opinion that I should look more favourably upon the university teacher as a worker, as a person who by his efforts makes a valuable contribution to society, than I may have done ten years ago. But having regard to the increasing responsibilities of other high-income groups with whom university teachers may reasonably be compared, I am not persuaded that there should be a significant shift in relativities towards academic salaries on work-value grounds.

Internal Relativities

2.17 It was argued before the Inquiry that sub-professorial staff have assumed, or had thrust upon them, far more responsibility during the last decade. This, it was said, has been due to new ideas permeating the university community, ideas which may compendiously be described as the philosophy of 'participatory democracy'. This philosophy reflects the view that all academic staff (and students also) should participate in the decision-making processes material to the design, planning and organising of the content, structure and teaching methods involved in all subjects and courses, in the tasks to be performed both within and without the academic institutions and in determining the role of the university itself in the social milieu. As a result, it was said, the responsibilities which were formerly undertaken largely by heads of departments (or by the professoriate) are now shared by all academics. The load of one group has been lightened, it was argued, that of the others made heavier.

2.18 There is a further aspect of this argument. Universities have changed considerably in terms of physical size, financial resources, staff and student numbers, the range of courses and research activities. Post-graduate studies have increased in terms of student numbers, range and complexity and there has been a significant development of post-graduate course-work programs. Processes of student selection and enrolment have become more time-consuming. The quality of university teachers, particularly at lower levels, has, for a variety of

reasons, improved. Academic staff at all levels have been called upon to take a more active part in, and give more time to, community affairs, for example by acting as advisers to governments, discussing social and economic issues through the media, participating in the activities of learned societies, and so on. All this has led to a significant increase in administrative work in universities and to a sharing of responsibility right down the line, even to the sub-lecturer grades. The argument, developed in this way, has been advanced in support of the proposition that, since greater responsibility in the day-to-day running of universities now rests on sub-professorial staff, I should recommend a greater proportionate increase to their salaries than to those of the professors. The argument is thus concerned with internal relativities in the university salary structure as well as with the question of work value in general.

2.19 If one thing became clear to me during the course of the Inquiry, it was that there has been a proliferation of committees within universities. Committees not only increase the volume of papers needed for purposes of agenda, reports, minutes, etc., many of which are passed from one committee to another, but they necessarily use up the time of academic staff members which would otherwise be devoted to teaching and research. There is no doubt that factors such as those I have mentioned—growing undergraduate enrolments, the introduction of new courses and the refashioning of old ones, greater emphasis on post-graduate studies and concern about teaching methods—have led to not inconsiderable participation by a large number of willing staff in the administrative work of universities.

2.20 I do not believe that the growth of the committee structure has, by itself, led to any real shift in responsibility from professors to other members of the academic staff. The professors of the university must possess and display qualities of academic leadership, and they are usually obliged to assume substantial administrative responsibility in the university whether they are heads of departments or not. In some universities it is now possible for members of the sub-professorial staff to become heads (or chairmen) of departments, even when those departments contain one or more professors, but this is still fairly rare and I cannot say whether it will happen more often in the future. In any event, although there may be a case for the head of a department to be paid a loading in addition to his basic salary because of the added responsibility and work load undertaken by him (and I will discuss this more fully later), I do not think that this situation alone should lead me to conclude that the margin between the salary of a professor and that of a reader, senior lecturer or lecturer should be narrowed. The quality of a university depends to a large extent upon the quality of its professoriate, and although a professor may not be the head of his department all those within it will look to him for leadership and guidance in academic matters. This is a responsibility which the professor should not, and cannot, shed.

2.21 It seems to me that much of the so-called administrative responsibility which is undertaken by members of a department should rather be described as routine or relatively unskilled administrative work. I am aware that the lecturing staff to whom administrative chores are delegated are obliged not infrequently to make decisions on such important academic matters as changes of courses by students, time-tabling, the content of particular courses, and so on, but these decisions are usually made within an established administrative framework and undoubtedly form part of the normal duties of the academic. This level of activity differs greatly from management responsibility which, in a university context, involves academic policy formulation. Although sub-professorial staff

may also be participating more actively in decision-making at this level, it seems to me that the committee system places greater demands upon the professors in terms of their responsibility to provide academic leadership. Is it not less onerous to be a professor or leader in an authoritarian system than in a democratic one? Professors today may have less power than their predecessors in office but, in my opinion, they do not have less responsibility. For the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded that there should be any alterations to the internal relativity of the academic salary structure, based solely upon shifts of administrative responsibility or work loads.

Promotion Prospects

2.22 I am aware that there are some academics who do not pull their weight as much as others, but I believe that those who are lazy or inefficient represent a very small minority of the whole; and such people exist in every stratum of society. Universities are now wisely adopting a stricter approach to promotion from lecturer to senior lecturer, and they are also tending to introduce a greater number of fixed-term contracts of employment for academic staff of the rank of lecturer and above, relative to tenured staff (see the Fifth Report of the Australian Universities Commission, para. 7.18). These factors, together with the greater emphasis on improvement of teaching methods and assessment of teaching standards (illustrated by the establishment of teaching research units within universities), must have a bearing upon the future careers of those who tend to stand aside. In addition to their performance in teaching and research, a criterion in assessing staff for promotion should be competence and willingness to take part in the committee and other organisational work necessary for the effective operation of the department. I therefore do not judge the special quality and value of university teachers by reference to the small minority whose performance is below standard.

2.23 The top of the senior lecturer's scale has been regarded as the normal "career grade" for academic staff. However, some staff groups argued before the Inquiry that the introduction of more stringent rules for promotion to senior lecturer should induce me to treat the top of the lecturer's scale as the career termination point for an increasing number of staff, and that this should have a bearing upon my determination of the salary payable at that level. I cannot agree that the existence of a more effective bar at the transition from lecturer to senior lecturer should alter internal salary relativities. I expect that in the long run it will not bring about any significant shift in the proportion of staff in each grade. I therefore regard the top of the senior lecturer's scale as a point which will be reached by most academic staff whose performance satisfactorily matches their responsibilities.

2.24 Significant numbers of senior lecturers and lecturers obtain posts as professors, associate professors or readers in their own or other universities—the 1972 ratio of senior lecturers and lecturers to professors, associate professors and readers in Australian universities was approximately 2·7 to 1. Sub-professorial staff are also being presented with increasing opportunities to move to higher-salaried posts in colleges of advanced education. Consequently, I am not persuaded by the argument that more difficult promotion prospects and increased rigidity in the staff structure require a relative increase in the salaries payable to lecturers or senior lecturers.

Qualifications of Academic Staff

2.25 I accept the argument that the academic qualifications which form part of the criteria for the selection of staff in universities are generally higher now than they were ten years ago. I also accept the fact that promotion from lecturer to senior lecturer, and from senior lecturer to reader or associate professor, has become more difficult. In recruiting new staff, universities are looking increasingly to the pool of those who have higher degrees and who are able to point to post-doctoral research and scholarly publications. But the community as a whole is better educated and better informed than it was in the recent past, and the large and growing body of students in the tertiary academies of today both expect and need teachers of quality.

2.26 The improvement in the average quality of academics has also been advanced as an argument in support of a shift in internal relativities of salaries as between lecturers, senior lecturers and professors, on the ground that younger staff members are better qualified than those who obtained their appointments in earlier years. I appreciate that in these times of change and growth in universities, differences in the relative qualities and capacities of academic staff members may have led to some anomalies. But I believe that these anomalies will largely disappear as less qualified staff members retire or are by-passed for promotion. I am not persuaded that there should be a change in the internal salary relativity on grounds of either work value or qualifications.

Chapter 3: Recruitment and retention of staff and the benefits of academic employment

3.1 From all universities we acquired information about difficulties in obtaining suitably qualified staff. Generally, the most troublesome areas appear to be medicine (clinical and medically qualified pre-clinical), law, architecture, economics, accounting, business administration, actuarial studies and, to a lesser degree, dentistry, agricultural science, veterinary science and social work. The problem varies within one discipline from university to university. There are no difficulties in obtaining satisfactory recruits in most scientific areas, such as physics, chemistry, geology and biology. In the main the universities have been successful in attracting and keeping an adequate number of staff of quality in all departments.

Influence of the Market

3.2 Staff recruitment or retention reflects more general shifts in supply and demand, certain people being attracted to other markets with which the university is in competition. In the broad sense, the university has always been competing in the market place with other bodies who employ professionally qualified persons or university graduates, and with the self-employed professionals. There are very many attractions of academic life but it is obvious that the salary payable must not be so low as to prevent the universities from obtaining their share of the best people in the relevant disciplines.

3.3 We did not receive a single submission to the effect that I should recommend that Australian universities should adopt the policy of open-ended bargaining which is a feature of staff recruitment in the universities of North America. However, we were reminded time and time again of the disparity in incomes between the academic and the outside professional man. I cannot accept the argument that I should use, as a measure of relativity, the earnings of the successful independent practitioner—the barrister, medical practitioner, consulting engineer, architect, public accountant, and so on. No direct comparison is possible between salaried staff and those whose earnings come from private practice. Earnings in private practice fluctuate considerably over time, vary greatly even in one profession, sometimes can be very large but are always at risk. Subject to the cushioning arrangements of a partnership, the independent practitioner does not earn money when he is ill or on holiday, and he has to pay for his own superannuation.

3.4 The academic is not subject to the anxieties, pressures, tensions, risks and uncertainties of private practice. I propose to explore the advantages of academic employment a little more fully later on, but it is clear that the occupation of a scholar and teacher is vastly different from that of the independent practitioner or business-man. Each is a specialist of a different kind, although many people have the capacity and skills to pursue either path.

3.5 I do not mean to imply that the incomes from private practice must, in all cases, be totally ignored. Such incomes play a part in setting the level of the market and are relevant to the extent that they affect the rates of salary paid to the employed sector of corresponding professions or vocations. It is those rates of salary to which I should look, and indeed to which by term of reference (*a*) (*i*) I am required to look, in forming an opinion as to the salaries which should be paid to university employees. Hospitals, dental and health services employ persons with medical and dental qualifications, while many government departments employ lawyers, engineers, scientists, economists and other graduates. The salary levels in those places, among others, are fixed so as to attract and retain suitably qualified people.

3.6 Just as I have not been persuaded that in any area I should use as a benchmark or index the earnings of the private practitioner, so I do not believe that salaries paid in the private enterprise sector of the market are especially relevant. The market price of labour may change rapidly in any field, and to base academic salaries for particular disciplines upon this capricious standard would create temporary differentials, internal problems and personal jealousies within universities. Differentials based on scarcity would need to be reviewed from time to time as demand and supply change. I believe that if academic salaries generally are raised to the levels I recommend, a lot of the worries of recruitment in particular fields will be lessened. I will say more about these matters when I discuss the many benefits of academic employment, but I think that the opportunity for university teachers to engage in private consultative practice to a limited extent, and to receive some consequential financial remuneration therefrom, will assist in easing the market pressures in areas where recruitment is difficult.

3.7 Universities have traditionally countered the pulls of the outside market in particular academic disciplines by all kinds of *ad hoc* measures. These include appointment to chairs and academic recognition at earlier ages than in fields where there is no scarcity and, in the case of sub-professorial staff, appointment at higher points on incremental scales than similar qualifications might command in other disciplines, and perhaps even appointment in higher grades. This is not a completely satisfactory solution but it is a realistic approach which must, at times, be taken. I deal with the question of salary differentials for professors later, but a merit differential, which recognises the excellence of a very distinguished professor, may influence him to stay with (or to accept) a chair rather than to succumb to the inducements of considerable financial rewards in another sphere. Universities cannot hope to provide salaries sufficient to retain professors who would otherwise be attracted by the incomes earned in successful independent professional practice. Nevertheless, it is my opinion, based upon the information I have received from people vitally concerned in universities and research institutes with the recruitment of distinguished staff in an international market, that merit differentials need not be large in order to have a helpful effect. Even a modest supplement may provide a psychologically significant sign of the esteem which is accorded to a person, and frequently this factor reinforces his sense of vocation and is as important as the financial reward itself. The ability to provide very good research facilities, supporting staff and conference leave is another allurement which universities can offer such a person.

3.8 I conclude, therefore, that it should not normally be necessary for universities to adopt differential salary scales for different disciplines in order to respond to the pressures of the market, and that there is a variety of other devices which universities may adopt in order to adjust to those pressures. This

has, indeed, been the traditional approach which Australian universities have used as a means of maintaining parity of salaries among disciplines.

Overseas Recruitment

3.9 Because they operate in an international market, Australian universities must compete for staff with universities and research organisations in other countries, in particular the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the U.S.A. and Canada. The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations submitted figures which indicated that sources of recruitment had remained relatively stable between 1970 and 1971, when approximately half of the new appointments were made from overseas universities and 10 per cent from other overseas organisations (these figures would, of course, include Australians returning after studies or appointments abroad). The Federation was concerned in particular that the continuing growth in tertiary education in the United Kingdom and recent substantial increases in British academic salaries might reduce the flow of well qualified applicants for Australian posts.

3.10 Having examined academic salary levels in the countries I have mentioned, I believe that Australian university salaries, even at present levels, compare well with those paid in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand. I feel that, if they are increased to the levels recommended by me, any difficulties in recruiting staff from those countries will not be caused or exacerbated by unfavourable salary comparisons.

3.11 Recent currency changes affecting the value of the Australian dollar have probably made it easier for Australian universities to recruit younger staff who have not had time to accumulate large savings, but the position of senior staff is less clear-cut. This is because, on a straight exchange basis, Australian incomes have increased in value relative to overseas incomes, while capital transfers to Australia are now worth less in terms of Australian dollars.

3.12 It would be futile to fix academic salaries with regard to those paid in North America. It is interesting to see that many outstanding Australians resist, and some Americans eschew, the attractive and financially rewarding offers made to them from universities and research institutes in the United States of America and in Canada. I know that our universities must compete for academic staff in the international market, but I believe that, if the salary structure recommended by me is adopted, they will be in a better position to do so than has been the case in recent years.

Fringe Benefits

3.13 In assessing salaries in 1964, Sir Richard Eggleston properly gave consideration, *inter alia*, to certain advantages attaching to those who pursue their vocation within the university community, which he referred to as *'fringe benefits'*. He enumerated the following: superannuation, study leave, vacations, security of tenure, outside earnings, housing assistance and academic freedom. To these I would also add conference leave. In the light of his full examination of these matters it would be pointless for me to discuss them at length in this Report, although we did obtain relevant details from all universities. It is agreed on all sides that there are attractions in academic life which are material to the assessment of the salaries which should be paid, and I will content myself with making some general observations about some of the benefits of academic employment.

3.14 Superannuation. I should first say something about superannuation. The Australian Universities Commission in its Fifth Report, after concluding that there

were inadequacies in the superannuation arrangements in many universities, said (para. 9.20): '. . . . *it is clearly desirable to consider introducing new types of superannuation arrangements which might result in improved benefits and greater transferability from university to university*'. In so far as they are relevant to my terms of reference, I endorse those remarks, particularly on the aspect of portability.

3.15 The inadequacies of retirement benefits of academic staff convince me of the pertinence of the point made by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations '*that superannuation should be regarded as a normal feature of career services and not as conferring any special advantage upon academic staff*'. There are considerable advantages in having some movement of teachers and scholars not only from university to university but between the universities and colleges on the one hand and governments, the professions, commerce and industry on the other. Staff and students in many university disciplines, particularly those with an applied or professional orientation, need invigoration and strength from contact with persons who have had relevant experience in the application of knowledge. If such movements can be facilitated, the claim that universities are isolated from the world of affairs will cease to have as much force as at present.

3.16 In order to encourage mobility, it is desirable that an academic should suffer no detriment in relation to retirement and invalidity benefits should he transfer from one Australian university to another or from the university to employment in the outside community. The Federation and the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee have the matter of superannuation under consideration but the important issue of transferability of benefits is one which requires the co-operation of governments. I hope that there can be devised and implemented a scheme which will give increased portability so as to facilitate the movement of persons in the ways I have mentioned.

3.17 Study Leave. Although it frequently imposes a not inconsiderable financial burden on a member of staff, study leave is a great advantage. Australia is a long way from many of the older and more sophisticated centres of learning and I believe that it should be obligatory upon academic staff members to take regular leave in order to refresh their minds and widen their horizons. All universities now make provision for, and indeed are extending the use of, short study leave, involving for example an absence of three or six months at a time. Reasonably adequate financial assistance is generally available from the universities, and many academics are able to obtain grants from educational foundations or remuneration from other sources while overseas. A small minority abuse this privilege in that they do not make full use of the leave to advance their knowledge and develop their scholarship, but this sort of thing is not peculiar to the university.

3.18 Conference Leave. I have spoken of conference leave. Universities are wisely providing increasing opportunities for their staff to make short visits to places within and outside Australia, in order to attend gatherings of learned societies and similar meetings and to spend short periods with other research workers and scholars. In many cases, the expenses involved are financed from departmental funds, augmented by earnings from outside consultative work performed by members of the department. This is so particularly in disciplines such as engineering, medicine and other science-oriented areas. In many technological fields, frequent visits to overseas laboratories and research centres are essential for the development of research within this country. Because of financial constraints, university allowances for travel and accommodation are seldom as generous as those provided by governments and private firms. I will again refer

to conference leave when I mention the particular problems of the remote universities.

3.19 Vacations. I am aware that members of the academic staff work during most of the periods of the university vacations, undertaking research, teaching preparation, supervision of post-graduate students, examining, enrolment and other administrative tasks. In some disciplines, such as medicine, dentistry and veterinary science, the teaching period may in any case be longer and clinical responsibilities may continue throughout the year. But I was not impressed with the argument, which we heard on many occasions, that university teachers are becoming relatively worse off because the rest of the community is now moving to four weeks' annual vacation. One cannot, and should not, compare the academic with the ordinary worker. Responsible senior people in all walks of life are usually unable to leave their occupational environment for more than a short period of time.

3.20 University academic staff are usually entitled to long service leave and to reasonable sick leave, accouchement leave, etc. I accept the fact that research and scholarship do not flourish in an atmosphere of routine regulation of working hours and conditions. But because of the existing factual situation and of the usually unwarranted criticism emanating from many members of the community, it may be desirable for all universities to formalise these arrangements and to specify in contracts of employment that academic staff are entitled to four weeks' annual recreation leave, to be taken normally during university vacations and at times suitable to their departments. But of course my terms of reference are restricted to advising on salaries in the light of employment conditions as they presently exist, and not on what those conditions of employment ought to be.

3.21 Tenure. The security of tenure enjoyed by academic staff is, in the words of Sir Richard Eggleston, *' an important element in the assessment of salary levels '*. It will be noted that when I assess the salaries of tutors and senior tutors, I do so on the assumption that they generally hold non-tenured positions. Only in one or two universities are there fixed-term appointments for lecturers or other senior staff (other than the normal probationary period of three years in respect of a lecturer's first appointment), and only in two universities are professorial appointments liable to be terminated upon six months' notice. However, even where such a provision exists, the *de facto* situation is that an academic's appointment will only be terminated after due and proper inquiry and upon such grounds as misconduct and redundancy.

3.22 Views as to the desirability of tenured appointments vary, but it is not out of place to refer to the Fifth Report of the Australian Universities Commission (para. 7.19): *' . . . . as far as flexibility is concerned there is a good deal to be said for maintaining a proportion of lectureships and senior lectureships as limited term appointments.'* I learned that some universities are accepting this advice and that others are treating the initial appointment of lecturers as a real probationary period—in the past it has been comparatively rare for tenured appointments not to follow the initial term. The creation of fixed-term appointments should assist in bringing about greater mobility of staff between universities and colleges of advanced education and, to some degree, between tertiary institutions and commerce and industry. Such increased mobility will be beneficial both for the university and for the community in general.

3.23 There is something to be said for the proposition that, other things being equal, the salary payable to the holder of a limited term appointment should be higher than that payable to a tenured member of staff. Short-term appointments may be associated with relatively worse superannuation and study leave

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arrangements as well as lack of tenure, but on the other hand they may carry the advantage for overseas appointees of return travel. In the existing circumstances, tenure must be reflected in the assessment of standard salaries for lecturers. In effect, a university lecturer cannot be dismissed simply because he is a below-average performer as a teacher or as a research worker, although he will not generally be promoted from lecturer to senior lecturer. As I have said elsewhere, universities are tightening up their promotion procedures and criteria and many lecturers do not succeed in gaining promotion to senior lectureships. I support the making of an efficiency judgment before promoting persons who have reached the top of the lecturer's scale.

3.24 Outside Earnings. For reasons already given, I think that outside earnings should be ignored as a factor in the assessment of standard academic salaries. However, the right of private practice is material in relation to two aspects of this Inquiry. The first of these concerns the recruitment and retention problems which arise from time to time in certain areas as a result of market pressures; these I have considered earlier in this Chapter. The second concerns the related issue as to whether there should be differential professorial salaries based upon differences between disciplines.

3.25 All universities permit some right of private practice, but this right is usually limited in the sense that it is subject to the approval of the vice-chancellor or governing body in accordance with specified criteria. For such approval to be given, it is generally necessary for the staff member to demonstrate that the work involves high-level consultative skills and is not merely routine professional practice. In most places, also, there is an upper limit (usually 20 or 25 per cent of university salary except with special leave) which the academic may retain for himself from the proceeds of such outside activities.

3.26 The limited right of private practice makes it possible for academic salaries to be more competitive with higher salaries in the more lucrative professions. But of course not all academics in the relevant fields take advantage of this right; they may be working on research problems which do not have an immediate commercial value outside the university, they may be motivated in their work by considerations other than the monetary rewards, or they may not have the time available by reason of university commitments. University teachers who make significant earnings from outside work are generally in fields such as engineering, geology, clinical medicine, veterinary science, business administration and economics. It is my impression that, overall, fewer than 2 or 3 per cent of academic staff earn more than 15 per cent of salary by private work, and for about 90 per cent of staff additional earnings are insignificant.

3.27 We sought information from all universities about the extent to which academic staff earn fees from outside work. The situation varies from university to university. By way of illustration, in one large institution in 1971–72 about 20 per cent of the academic staff received earnings ranging from nearly $8,000 in the case of one man down to very small amounts in the case of others. In another university during roughly the same twelve-month period, 3·3 per cent of the academic staff received outside earnings amounting to between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of salary (81 per cent of people there received nothing at all from this source). In yet another place, 16 per cent of the members of a non-medical professional school received remuneration from outside work. In some universities, no satisfactory records were available. It is common for clinical medical staff to supplement their incomes to the extent of several thousand dollars a year, and a few clinicians earn considerable amounts.

3.28 I agree that, provided the privilege is not abused, it is desirable from many points of view for university staff to be available to undertake special consultative work. Governments, semi-governmental bodies and outside industrial and business firms should be able to benefit by obtaining expert advice which may be available only from people and research groups within universities. I might say that I found, when talking to some groups in some universities, that this was a sensitive area and I was left with the impression that a small minority of staff have, on occasions, abused the right of independent practice. This has led to criticism of the general body of academic staff from some sections of the community. In fact, I am convinced that there are a few people who have engaged in outside remunerative work to such an extent that their university responsibilities have been neglected.

3.29 Sir Richard Eggleston said, in 1964, that university rules giving this right *'work satisfactorily if they are enforced'*. I agree with him and I would very much like to see every university adopt a rule that, prior approval for outside work having been obtained, each member of staff be required to furnish the vice-chancellor with a signed statement, after the close of each taxation year, certifying confidentially to the gross outside earnings in the year and the amount of expenses incurred in earning the gross income. Although royalties on books, payments for articles, fees for examining and payments for broadcasts, telecasts and public lectures are usually not required to be included in the limited amount which can be earned, I suggest that for the sake of completeness all such receipts be included in the confidential statement.

3.30 Such a policy is desirable for two reasons. First, this procedure will alleviate any difficulties involved in enforcing compliance with the rules of the university and ensuring that excess earnings are paid into departmental or other university funds. Secondly, there can be no proper investigation by an Inquiry such as this unless all academics are obliged to complete such returns. The information derived from them will be available (albeit confidentially and with no names disclosed) to the investigating tribunal.

3.31 My remarks should not be taken as implying that universities should look any more, or less, favourably upon the rights of full-time staff to engage in outside consultative work than they do now. It is a matter for each university to lay down its own rules, but I consider that it is both wise and proper that all universities should fix an upper limit of the moneys which a staff member may retain from outside earnings, and that this should be in the region of 20 to 25 per cent of the member's academic salary. In my opinion, this would be a generous upper limit.

The Benefits of Academic Employment

3.32 While I have taken the benefits of academic employment into account in making my recommendations on salary levels, I do not consider that, relative to other occupations, there have been significant changes in the value of these benefits during the past decade. In particular, I agree with the view of the Australian Government that: *'On balance, it is suggested that the specific fringe benefits attaching to academic appointment as compared with those which may be enjoyed by comparable positions in private industry are not of the magnitude to qualify any recommendations for salary increases on other criteria'*.

Chapter 4: Salary movements in relevant occupations

4.1 Although the terms of reference of the first Inquiry conducted by Sir Richard Eggleston required him to advise only on salaries for professors and readers or associate professors, he examined the salaries and responsibilities of academic staff generally and established, for purposes of his recommendations, both external and internal relativities for all tenured staff based on judgments about academic work value and other salary movements. He nevertheless emphasised that, because academic work has certain unique qualities, he did not think that *' there is any single group in the community whose work is sufficiently closely related to that of academic staff that a fixed relationship should be established between them'*.

The 1967 and 1970 Adjustments

4.2 While the first Eggleston inquiry was thus concerned with both aspects of relativity which I have previously distinguished—work value comparisons and comparative wage justice—the 1967 agreement and the 1970 review seem to have been concerned only with comparative wage justice. This was in spite of the fact that in 1970, in reviewing the 1967 adjustment (the basis of which has not been described in any published document), Sir Richard made the following observation:

> *A comparison of the percentage increases granted to academic staffs* [in 1967] *with the percentage increases in salaries in other occupations, so far as I have been able to check them, would suggest that the increases were greater than any which could have been justified on the sole basis of comparative wage justice.'*

4.3 The shift in relativities in 1967 does not appear to have resulted from any assessment of changing work values, but has been explained in terms of the need to compensate academic staff for the fact that their salaries were being adjusted at less frequent intervals than those of most other groups in the community; that is to say, the shift in relativities was itself said to be based on the notion of comparative wage justice. In Sir Richard's words, *' it was suggested to me that some part at least of the increase was attributable to the fact that, whereas the 1964 increases were made retrospective to 1 January 1964, the 1967 increases dated only from 1 July 1967, which was more than six months after the major adjustments on which the Federation was basing its claim, and three and a half years from the date from which the previous increases became operative. At the same time it was conceded that the prospective disadvantages which would result from the absence of any provision for adjustment between periodical reviews may have had some influence on the result.'*

4.4 In the light of an examination of movements in the consumer price index, average weekly earnings and minimum weekly wage rates between 1964 and 1969, and the introduction of national wage increases in 1970, Sir Richard concluded in 1970 that *' the disadvantage suffered by a salary earner who receives no review except at three yearly intervals may be very substantial indeed'*. He indicated that he had attempted to allow for the effect of lags in university salaries in making

his recommendations. He also suggested that, in future, academic salaries should be adjusted automatically in accordance with national wage case decisions. The significance of this suggestion, which has been implemented since 1970, will be examined later in the context of the more general question of the frequency of academic salary adjustments relative to those of other income groups.

4.5 Although his terms of reference were the same as in 1964, Sir Richard's Inquiry in 1970 was clearly intended to concern itself only with comparative wage justice. It had been indicated to him, he said, that *' the interested parties were not desirous of having an extended inquiry, but rather one which would bring up to date the existing salary levels, having regard to changes in salary levels in general which had taken place since the last adjustment of academic salaries took place in 1967 '.*

4.6 Both the 1967 and 1970 adjustments changed internal relativities in university salary structures by recommending lower rates of increase for lecturers than for other grades. Thus in 1967 the salary for a lecturer was increased by only 12·5 per cent compared with increases approximating 15 per cent for higher grades. In 1970, the corresponding figures were 17 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. Sir Richard pointed out that his decision in 1970 was based, not on an assessment of work value as such, but on *' a tendency which is apparent throughout the whole field of the inquiry for a higher percentage increase in remuneration in the higher levels than in the lower '.* This tendency, he said, was in contrast with the position in 1964, when:

' I was able to find some support for what I believed to be a desirable concept, namely, that percentage increases (though not, of course, increases in monetary terms) should be lower for high salaries than for low salaries. I do not feel that in the application of the idea of comparative wage justice I can give effect to this belief in 1970, however much I may regret the widening of the income gaps between the poor and the rich.'

Comparative Salary Movements : The Issues

4.7 The terms of reference of the present Inquiry require me not only to assess academic work value but also to examine comparative salary movements over time. I therefore turn to the problem of reviewing the case for changes in university salaries based on comparative wage justice. In this Chapter, as in Chapter 2, discussion is restricted to grades of lecturer and above. The problem of tutors is discussed in Chapter 7.

4.8 All groups submitting evidence to the Inquiry, including the representatives of governments, university governing bodies and academic staff, agreed on the need for salary increases, but differed in their judgments about appropriate salary levels. One State government argued for a flat-rate increase in academic salaries of 16 per cent, while the Australian Government argued for percentage increases ranging from 15 per cent for professors and readers to 21 per cent for lecturers and senior lecturers. The government representatives based their arguments for relatively low rates of increase on salary movements and levels of salaries in other occupations, and in so doing raised issues relating to the choice of relevant occupations, the use of bench-marks in salary comparisons, the appropriate starting dates for purposes of comparison, the significance of shifts in relativity following the 1967 and 1970 reviews and the related question of lags and leads.

4.9 The submission received from the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee argued that academic salaries have fallen below salaries in other occupations previously taken into consideration or regarded as relevant in the determination

of academic salaries. The Committee submitted that because, in the determination of salaries, universities are followers not leaders, and because major adjustments have recently been made more frequently in Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (C.S.I.R.O.), public service and other relevant salaries than in university salaries, the latter have fallen and remained behind those of other comparable groups. The Vice-Chancellors also called into question the procedures which previous inquiries had adopted for maintaining relativities:

'The method which seems to have been followed on previous occasions of restoring parity with certain outside salaries with "a little in hand" for prospective changes is no longer appropriate. University salaries have now lagged behind salaries previously taken into consideration by a substantial amount for a long period and the lag may be increased before academic staff in Universities receive higher salaries.'

4.10 In arguing for more frequent reviews of university salaries (a question taken up later in my Report), the Vice-Chancellors claimed that when a large percentage increase is given only at three-yearly intervals, the time element is often ignored by those who receive more frequent adjustments. Discussions with the Executive of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee indicated that the Committee, like the government representatives, considered that issues in relation to comparative wage justice included the choice of relevant occupations, bench-marks for purposes of comparison, the starting dates to be used in establishing relativities and the significance of leads and lags. The Executive submitted that, having regard to both comparative wage justice and work value, university salaries should be increased by 25 per cent for all academic staff of the grade of lecturer or above.

4.11 Submissions made by or on behalf of university governing bodies generally supported the views of the Vice-Chancellors by arguing that, in so far as comparative wage justice is concerned, the problem is essentially one of restoring reasonable comparability with salary rates in other relevant occupations and of somehow taking into account: (*a*) the periods during which academic salaries have been at a relative disadvantage; and (*b*) prospective movements in other comparable salaries. Not all universities recommended specific rates of increase, but some sought interim adjustments of 15 per cent to take effect from 1 July 1972 and others proposed general adjustments ranging from 15 per cent (plus allowances for the time lag effect and for prospective movements in bench-mark salaries) to 25 per cent.

4.12 The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations also argued that additional amounts should *'be included in increases to academic salaries from 1st January 1973, to make allowance for the longer periods between adjustments of academic salaries, because Universities are followers, not leaders in salary adjustments'*. The Federation claimed salary increases ranging from about 30 per cent for professors and lecturers (minimum) to about 38 per cent for readers and senior lecturers (maximum); the increase proposed for lecturers (maximum) was nearly 44 per cent. However, the Federation indicated that its claim was based on both comparative wage justice and work-value consideations, in that it had regard *'to movements in salaries in the Commonwealth and State Public Services, and in the C.S.I.R.O., since 1.1.70, taking into consideration delays in past, and likely delays in future, adjustments of academic salaries'*, as well as to *'the qualifications, functions, responsibilities and other attributes or factors presently required in the performance of the various levels of academic work'*. The Federation also joined a number of university governing bodies in

pressing for a 15 per cent increase from 1 July 1972. Most individual staff associations gave general support to the Federation's wage justice claim while elaborating on work-value aspects and other terms of reference. Some staff associations discussed comparative wage justice in detail; they argued for increases in academic salaries of up to 35 per cent or more on this count, on grounds of movements in C.S.I.R.O. salaries, average weekly earnings or other indicators and the need to compensate for past lags in university salaries.

4.13 In discussing the foregoing claims and submissions relating to comparative wage justice, I propose to deal with the following issues: (*a*) the choice of relevant occupations for purposes of comparing salary movements; (*b*) salary movements at different levels; (*c*) the use of bench-marks in salary comparisons; (*d*) the selection of starting dates; and (*e*) the significance of the shifts in relativities which occurred as a result of the 1967 and 1970 adjustments to academic salaries, and the shifts in the reverse direction which resulted from the more frequent adjustments to other comparable salaries. The first two of these are considered in this Chapter and the remainder in Chapter 5.

The Choice of Relevant Occupations

4.14 Sir Richard Eggleston indicated in both his 1964 and 1970 Reports that it was inappropriate to use, as a guide to academic salaries, particular salary ranges in other occupations requiring similar qualifications. Nevertheless, he said that he had been assisted in his task by an examination of salary movements over a wide range of activities. Whilst specifically rejecting the argument that academic salaries should be adjusted by reference to statistical indicators such as the Commonwealth Statistician's index of average minimum weekly wage rates or the figures for average weekly earnings, he conceded that '*each series is of some value in providing background information as to what has occurred outside the academic field*'.

4.15 I agree with Sir Richard's assessment of the limited relevance of salary movements in other occupations for the same kind of reason as he gave in his 1964 Report: '*However comparable the basic qualifications may be, a judge, a public servant or a business executive is being paid for the exercise of quite different skills, and for the assumption of quite different responsibilities, from those of a professor*'. I likewise have been assisted by an examination of data in respect of salary movements in other sectors of the economy, including salaries paid to senior executives in the private sector, Commonwealth and State public service salaries and general salary movements as indicated, for example, by the Statistician's figures for average weekly earnings. It has helped me to put particular salary movements in perspective to know that, between the December quarter of 1969 and the December quarter of 1972, average weekly earnings increased by about 31·7 per cent, representing annual movements of about 9·4 per cent, 11·1 per cent and 8·3 per cent in 1970, 1971 and 1972 respectively.

4.16 Of somewhat more relevance to academic salaries is the movement which has occurred in non-academic salaries and wages in universities, as calculated in a series of indexes prepared by the Australian Universities Commission. These '*reflect movements in salaries and wages of positions in the Commonwealth and State Public Services which are similar to positions occupied by non-academic staff in universities other than those senior staff* [whose salaries are] *related to academic salaries*' (Fifth Report, Appendix B). For purposes of these calculations, '*thirteen representative positions covering administrative, clerical, library*

and technical posts, tradesmen and maintenance staff were selected and weighted according to the relative expenditure on the non-academic staff, which they represented, for Australian universities as a whole'. Indexes were then prepared for the Commonwealth and each State by reference to similar posts in the public services. Simple averages of these seven indexes indicate that, between the December quarter 1969 and the December quarter 1972 (figures for which were obtained from the Commission), non-academic salaries and wages increased by 35·4 per cent, representing annual movements of 9·0 per cent in 1970, 12·6 per cent in 1971 and 10·2 per cent in 1972.

4.17 Despite the differences which exist in qualifications, skills and responsibilities in the different occupations, the most appropriate fields on which to base comparisons of salary movements over time seem to be research organisations (in particular the C.S.I.R.O.), the Second and Third Divisions of the Commonwealth Public Service (distinguishing between clerical/administrative and professional classifications), similar levels in the State public services and State education departments (in respect of teachers' salaries). Most of the parties appear to have accepted the relevance of these comparisons. Some staff associations and individual submissions attempted to relate academic salaries to the salaries of particular professional groups such as barristers, medical practitioners, engineers or business executives. I do not accept the relevance of these comparisons.

4.18 In discussions about relevant occupations for purposes of comparing salary movements, some governments argued that teachers' salaries are of special significance and that the link that Sir Richard Eggleston established with C.S.I.R.O. salaries is no longer appropriate. Except at the entry point to university and secondary teaching, where I consider that salaries of university tutors need to stand in reasonable proximity to those of four-year trained teachers, I do not accept the argument that university salaries should be closely related to those of teachers. The qualifications required by university staff are very much higher than those needed by teachers, in terms of both the length of the educational process and the levels of academic performance which must be demonstrated during under-graduate studies (and subsequent academic employment). The respective responsibilities of the two groups also diverge markedly, not only in respect of the research work which is required of university staff, but also in respect of the more advanced level of teaching and the greater self-reliance which university teachers must exhibit in developing and presenting their courses. No doubt partly reflecting these differences in responsibility, conditions of employment have little in common. As an indication of this, I was told in one State that an issue which had arisen in relation to the transfer of teachers' college staff to colleges of advanced education, following the recent change in status of teachers' colleges, was the right to ten weeks' leave which staff of teachers' colleges had been exercising in common with teachers generally.

4.19 For these reasons, I reject the suggestion that there should be a close relationship between the salaries (or movement in salaries) of teachers and university staff, although as I have indicated I make an exception in respect of the entry point of a tutor's salary and that of a four-year trained teacher. I take up this question again later. I also agree that teachers represent one of the occupational groups with which it is meaningful to compare salary movements over time. I therefore include figures relating to movements in teachers' salaries with the other comparisons I make below.

4.20 The Australian Government submitted that, in reviewing salary movements, *'rates in Commonwealth employment areas are most relevant because of the*

Public Service Board's policy of seeking to maintain these rates as competitive with other employment areas'. The Australian Government also conceded the relevance of C.S.I.R.O. salaries, and in particular the continuing relevance of the C.S.I.R.O. research scientist's commencing salary for that of the lecturer.

4.21 In arguing against the continued linking of university and C.S.I.R.O. salaries, State governments concentrated on the commencing salaries of university lecturers and C.S.I.R.O. research scientists. I shall deal with this argument, and with the attempts by some universities and staff associations to link higher grades in universities with particular C.S.I.R.O. classifications, when I discuss bench-marks. At this stage I shall refer only to general movements in C.S.I.R.O. salaries in the ranges that appear to be comparable with the several levels of university salaries.

4.22 In comparing movements in university salaries with those in other occupations since 1 January 1970, I have directed attention especially to C.S.I.R.O. research scientists, the Commonwealth and State public services (distinguishing in each case between clerical/administrative and professional classifications) and teachers.

Movements in C.S.I.R.O. and Public Service Salaries

4.23 As a result of national wage increases, the commencing salary for a lecturer has increased by 7·6 per cent since 1 January 1970. This compares with 33·5 per cent for a research scientist (minimum), implying the need for a 24·1 per cent increase in the lecturer's salary to restore 1970 relativities. Comparable figures or ranges for these and other groups selected for purposes of comparison by the Commonwealth Public Service Board are set out in Table 4.1. The selected levels in the salaries being compared were chosen by locating salaries which at 1 January 1970 were closest to the commencing salary for a lecturer. The figures in this and the other Tables in this Chapter do not include the national wage adjustment announced on 8 May 1973.

4.24 In interpreting these figures, it must be remembered that salary movements in these occupations may have incorporated work-value changes which should not necessarily be reflected in university salary movements (even if the comparisons

TABLE 4.1

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1.1.1970 IN SALARIES OF LECTURERS AND COMPARABLE GROUPS

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Lecturer (minimum)	7·6	..
C.S.I.R.O. Research Scientist (minimum)	33·5	24·1
Commonwealth Public Service—		
Clerical/Administrative	26·4	17·5
Professional	33·3–38·4	23·9–28·6
State Public Services—		
Administrative	26·5–41·3	17·6–31·3
Professional	30·7–41·8	21·5–31·8

are otherwise valid). The New South Wales Public Service Board thus referred to a 1970 Industrial Commission award in which a conscious decision was taken to place teachers in '*a somewhat higher niche in the wage structure generally but particularly that relating to professional work*'. The time span covered by the comparison is also of some significance, and the high points in the ranges generally relate to salaries which have been adjusted more recently than those representing low points in the ranges. In the case of the Commonwealth Public Service, for example, the differences between movements in clerical/administrative and professional salaries may be explained first by the fact that the former have not been adjusted since 15 June 1972 while most of the latter were last adjusted in December 1972 or February 1973. The movement in C.S.I.R.O. research scientist salaries relates to a period of three years and four months, that is from October 1969 to February 1973. Although it strictly does not fall within the period of review, I have included in the calculated rates of increase the 3 per cent increase awarded C.S.I.R.O. and some other Commonwealth professional groups in February 1973. The fact of these increases I certainly take to be relevant to my own task. The arithmetical average of the rates of increase in university salaries needed to restore relativity with the salaries selected for purposes of comparison is 24·5 per cent; this of course has no statistical meaning.

4.25 At the senior lecturer (maximum) salary level, a similar comparison reveals the information summarised in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.2

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1.1.1970 IN SALARIES OF SENIOR LECTURERS AND COMPARABLE GROUPS

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Senior Lecturer (maximum)	7·0	..
C.S.I.R.O. Principal Research Scientist	32·7	24·0
Commonwealth Public Service—		
Clerical/Administrative	28·8	20·4
Professional	32·7–36·6	24·0–27·6
State Public Services—		
Administrative	27·4–44·0	19·1–34·6
Professional	22·1–42·1	14·1–32·8

4.26 As with the comparison in respect of lecturers, the ranges in salary movements partly reflect timing differences. The movement in Commonwealth Public Service clerical/administrative salaries, which is derived from the Clerk Class 11 (or the maximum Third Division) salary, relates to the period to 15 June 1972, while the movement in the salaries of C.S.I.R.O. Principal Research Scientists is in respect of the period 17 October 1969 to 8 February 1973. The rate of increase in the senior lecturer (maximum) salary needed to restore average relativity with the selected salaries is 24·1 per cent.

4.27 At the associate professor (or reader) level, a comparison with other selected salaries is made in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.3

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1 1.1970 IN SALARIES OF ASSOCIATE PROFESSORS (OR READERS) AND COMPARABLE GROUPS

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Associate Professor (or Reader)	6·9	..
C.S.I.R.O.—		
Principal Research Scientist and Senior Principal Research Scientist	32·7–34·5	24·1–25·8
Commonwealth Public Service—		
Second Division	22·5	14·6
Professional	22·7	14·8
State Public Services—		
Administrative	22·8–38·8	14·9–29·8
Professional	22·1–38·8	14·2–29·8

4.28 In this case also the C.S.I.R.O. salaries were adjusted on 8 February 1973, but the Commonwealth Public Service Second Division salaries were last adjusted (except for national wage adjustments) on 4 November 1971; the 22·5 per cent increase recorded thus covered a period of just over two years (from 20 September 1969 to 4 November 1971). The average rate of increase in university salaries needed to restore relativity with the salaries selected for purposes of comparison is 22·1 per cent.

4.29 Table 4.4 makes the same kind of comparison for professors. At this level, it is more difficult to obtain a range of professional salaries which is

TABLE 4.4

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1.1.1970 IN SALARIES OF PROFESSORS AND COMPARABLE GROUPS

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Professor	6·7	..
C.S.I.R.O. Chief Research Scientist	21·1	13·5
Commonwealth Public Service—		
Second Division	22·7	15·0
Professional	28·5	20·4
State Public Services—		
Administrative	24·8–40·7	17·0–31·9
Professional	22·5–39·5	14·8–30·7

distinct from higher administrative salaries, so that the professional salaries referred to relate mainly to medical officers or senior administrators in government departments.

4.30 The average rate of increase needed to restore relativity with the selected groups is 23·4 per cent.

4.31 At this level, it is of some interest to compare movements in the salaries of permanent heads, statutory officers and other senior officers in Commonwealth and State public services. This is done in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.5

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1.1.1970 IN SALARIES OF PROFESSORS AND PERMANENT HEADS (AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS) IN COMMONWEALTH AND STATE PUBLIC SERVICES

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Professor	7	..
Commonwealth Permanent Heads	29–50	21–40
New South Wales—		
Range	30–51	21–41
Mode	40	31
Victoria	25	17
Queensland	38–39	29–30
South Australia—		
Range	25–39	17–30
Mode	28	20
Western Australia	37–40	28–31
Tasmania	35–40	26–31

4.32 These movements also reflect different time periods between adjustments. Until 1 April 1973 Commonwealth First Division salaries had not been varied since 1 December 1968; the range in this case results from the fact that all permanent heads receive the same salary ($29,250) as a result of the April 1973 adjustment, whereas previously salaries of permanent heads had ranged from $19,500 to $22,750. The movements recorded in Table 4.5 relate to salaries only and do not include allowances.

Movements in Teachers' Salaries

4.33 Comparisons of academic salaries with teachers' salaries are rendered difficult by the problem of finding reasonable points of alignment, but the Commonwealth Public Service Board has provided information about movements in what it considered to be key points in salary scales for Commonwealth and State teachers. This information is summarised in Table 4.6.

4.34 In evaluating these movements, it is necessary to bear in mind the comments I made above concerning the timing of adjustments and the possibility that work value changes may have been recognised by tribunals for the purpose of raising the relative level of teachers' salaries. The movements in teachers' salaries compare with movements in university salaries over the same period (due to national wage increases) which ranged from 7·6 per cent to 6·7 per cent.

TABLE 4.6

MOVEMENTS IN TEACHERS SALARIES SINCE 1.1.1970

	%
Commonwealth	33·1–40·4
New South Wales	32·9–52·3
Victoria	31·4–36·3
Queensland	31·0–37·4
South Australia	30·8–42·7
Western Australia	32·8–47·1
Tasmania	32·9–33·8

Salary Movements at Different Levels

4.35 Some State governments argued that percentage salary increases should be in ascending order from lecturer to professor, with professors receiving the highest percentage increases, while others argued for equal percentage increases. These submissions seemed to be based mainly on work-value considerations. The Australian Government, on the other hand, seemed to use comparative salary movements as the main basis for its argument that lecturers and senior lecturers should receive higher percentage increases (21 per cent) than professors and readers (15 per cent). The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee and most universities supported the principle of uniform percentage increases for all grades of staff. As we have seen, however, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations argued, on work-value grounds, that percentage salary increases should be higher for middle levels than for professors and lecturers at the minimum.

4.36 It will be seen from Tables 4.1 to 4.4 that, although the pattern of average salary movements and ranges is roughly the same for all levels of salary, the lower levels of C.S.I.R.O. research scientist and Commonwealth Public Service salaries have increased to a relatively greater extent than levels which are comparable with the salaries paid to professors (and to a lesser extent readers). It is therefore desirable that I should emphasise that these differences are due essentially to differences in timing and are not due to differences in percentage increases granted by salary tribunals at the several levels. The most recent increases in C.S.I.R.O. salaries, for grades up to and including senior principal research scientists, were awarded in February 1973, whereas the salaries of chief research scientists and chiefs of division have not been adjusted since November 1971 (except for national wage cases). The salaries of senior principal research scientists, which in February 1970 were $2,024 below those of chief research scientists grade 1, are now $322 higher. Similarly, Commonwealth Third Division clerical/administrative salaries were last increased by the Public Service Arbitrator on 15 June 1972, whereas Second Division salaries have not been the subject of a determination since 4 November 1971.

4.37 Because of these differences in timing, I do not accept the Australian Government's submission that *'since 1970 wages at higher administrative and professional levels have not shown the same level of increase as at the lower levels'*, an argument which seems to have been chiefly responsible for the Government's submission that the salaries of professors and readers should be increased by only 15 per cent compared with 21 per cent for lecturers and senior lecturers. The fact that Commonwealth Public Service Second Division salaries last moved by approximately 15 per cent in November 1971 (after 25

months), while C.S.I.R.O. Chief Research Scientist 1 salaries last moved by approximately 12·5 per cent in November 1971 (after 21 months), does not provide a sufficient guide to the appropriate movement in academic salaries over a 36-month period ending in January 1973. In any case, although there are indications that equal percentage salary increases for higher and lower levels may soon give way to some form of tapering, adjustments to C.S.I.R.O. and Commonwealth and State public service salaries during the past three years have almost invariably taken the form of equal percentage increases. To the extent that a case for tapering academic salaries now exists, it rests on assumptions about future developments rather than observed trends in the past.

Movements in Academic Salaries in the United Kingdom and New Zealand

4.38 To the extent that Australian academic staff are recruited from or by universities in other countries, movements in academic salaries in those countries are relevant to a review of Australian university salaries. Because salaries are not uniform in the U.S.A. and Canada, salary movements cannot be easily identified in those countries. In the United Kingdom, however, university salaries are now adjusted annually and a pattern can be established. The minimum non-clinical lecturer's salary increased by 30·2 per cent between 1 October 1969 and 1 October 1972, in annual steps of 10·0 per cent, 10·1 per cent and 7·5 per cent. Because of an increase in the incremental range, the non-clinical lecturer's maximum salary increased by 38·5 per cent over the same period. The minimum non-clinical professor's salary increased by 30·5 per cent (in annual steps of 10·0 per cent, 7·0 per cent and 10·8 per cent), while the permitted average salary for non-clinical professors rose by 28·0 per cent (in annual steps of 10·0 per cent, 7·0 per cent and 8·7 per cent). These movements may be placed in perspective by noting that average earnings of all employees rose by about 45 per cent during the three-year period.

4.39 Between April 1970 and October 1972, non-medical lecturers' and senior lecturers' salaries in New Zealand universities increased by 36·3 per cent. Average minimum and maximum salaries paid to professors, associate professors and readers increased at the same rate.

Chapter 5: Comparative wage justice: Other considerations

5.1 In this Chapter, I turn to a consideration of the other issues relating to comparative wage justice which were mentioned briefly in Chapter 4. These include the use of bench-marks in salary comparisons, the choice of starting dates, the question of leads and lags, and repercussive effects.

The Relevance of Bench-Marks

5.2 Although Sir Richard Eggleston referred generally, in his 1964 and 1970 Reports, to movements in C.S.I.R.O., Commonwealth Second Division and other public service salaries, he specifically cautioned against *'assuming that any particular salary range in any other occupation should be treated as a guide for the movement of academic salaries, with the exception of the commencing salary of a research scientist in C.S.I.R.O.'*.

5.3 In his 1964 Report, Sir Richard explained the need for a link between the commencing salary for a lecturer and the commencing salary for a research scientist in the C.S.I.R.O. in terms of the identical qualifications which he said were needed for appointments in science faculties on the one hand and the C.S.I.R.O. on the other, the fact that science graduates of one kind or another formed a majority of university staff and the insistence of selection committees that a common standard of recruitment should apply for permanent staff in all university faculties. During the present Inquiry, some States have argued that Sir Richard was not justified in establishing a close link between the commencing salaries of research scientists and university lecturers. Their argument was based on a number of propositions, including one that the academic qualifications of lecturers are below those of research scientists, another that the duties and career prospects of the two positions are not comparable, and a third that since 1964 there has been a much faster rate of growth in the recruitment of staff for the humanities and social sciences (who typically have fewer Ph.D. and other higher degrees) than for the natural sciences and engineering.

5.4 It is my view that changes in the mix between science and non-science recruitment do not invalidate the use of the research scientist bench-mark provided the other two conditions specified by Sir Richard still hold, that is provided qualifications for research scientists and science lecturers are similar and provided a common standard of recruitment applies throughout all university faculties.

5.5 I have therefore spent some time in reviewing appointment qualifications and procedures in universities and in discussing these matters with senior officers in both universities and the C.S.I.R.O., some of whom have had experience in recruiting staff in both kinds of institutions. In the light of these inquiries I am satisfied that, at the point of entry into C.S.I.R.O. research scientist posts and university science lectureships, recruitment is from a common pool and substantially the same qualifications and levels of ability are required. Because of increases which have occurred in the supply of graduates with Ph.D. degrees relative to the

number of new staff posts available, universities have become more selective in making appointments in both science and non-science faculties (and in some fields graduates with Ph.D. degrees are being appointed to sub-lecturing posts). But C.S.I.R.O. appointments are likewise affected by increased competition for research posts.

5.6 In so far as relative standards of recruitment in science and non-science faculties within universities are concerned, it is necessary to look not only at formal educational qualifications, but also at experience requirements and at the recruitment problems of individual disciplines which result from such factors as pressures of the market. It is clear that selection committees need to take into account both previous academic experience (say as a tutor) and the needs of particular disciplines (such as law, engineering, education or business administration) for persons with practical experience. In so doing, they must weigh the respective merits of experience requirements on the one hand and formal academic qualifications on the other, and I am satisfied that, having regard to both kinds of factors, recruitment standards overall in universities are reasonably uniform.

5.7 The effect of market pressures on the standard of university appointments (e.g. in disciplines such as law and accounting) is more difficult to gauge, but the existence of such pressures undoubtedly results in persons being appointed with fewer qualifications or with less experience than would usually be required of university lecturers. Given uniformity in salary levels between disciplines, however, the only way in which universities can expect to make reasonable appointments in these areas is to vary requirements in respect of formal qualifications or experience, for example by appointing younger men of demonstrated ability who have not yet completed Ph.D. or other higher degrees. In so doing they are making a conscious decision, in the Australian academic tradition, to maintain salary uniformity between disciplines and to deal with recruitment problems by means other than salary differentials. I conclude that there is nothing in this approach to suggest that the commencing salaries of lecturers in the difficult market areas should be lower than those of other lecturers. Indeed, insistence on the same formal qualifications for both groups would necessitate higher salaries for disciplines subject to stronger market pressures, a policy which universities have traditionally resisted for reasons which I support.

5.8 The final argument advanced for breaking the link between commencing salaries for research scientists and lecturers was the existence of differences in the nature of their responsibilities and in their career prospects. Differences in responsibility undoubtedly exist; to mention only the most obvious one, lecturers are required to teach as well as undertake research work. While there are also differences in tenure and promotion prospects, these are not all in favour of the lecturer. With the introduction of fixed-term appointments in universities, in the form of lecturing fellowships and three-year or contract appointments, the differences are in any case not as great now as they were when Sir Richard first established the nexus. But because Sir Richard specifically restricted the use of the research scientist bench-mark to the **commencing** salary for a lecturer, and rejected the idea that bench-marks for higher university posts could be obtained from other points in the C.S.I.R.O. salary scale, the comparisons that have been made are not really relevant to the discussion. I therefore conclude that it is only after the initial appointment that differences in duties or promotion prospects may necessitate or justify salary differentials. In its submission, the Australian Government supported the continued use of the research scientist bench-mark.

5.9 This leads to the question whether additional bench-marks might reasonably be established by reference to other points in the C.S.I.R.O. salary scale. Some university and staff association submissions have explicitly sought to establish links between (*a*) senior lecturer and senior research scientist or principal research scientist, (*b*) reader and principal research scientist or senior principal research scientist, and (*c*) professor and chief research scientist (or chief of division grade 1). Other submissions seem to be suggesting similar links by implication. Although there is some movement of staff between the C.S.I.R.O. and universities, it is not possible to establish meaningful relativities on the basis of these movements. Given the differences in functions, responsibility, staffing structures and conditions of employment in the two kinds of institutions, I do not consider that any useful purpose can be served by seeking to identify equivalent points in salary scales. As I have already pointed out, however, movements in C.S.I.R.O. salaries at appropriate levels must be considered relevant in relation to comparative wage justice aspects of my Inquiry.

5.10 I have therefore not been persuaded that appropriate bench-marks can be established in relation to the higher levels of university salaries. On the other hand, there was general agreement on the part of governments, universities and staff associations that the entry point to the teaching profession (as represented by the commencing salary paid by State education departments to four-year trained teachers) provides a useful basis of comparison with the commencing salary paid to university tutors and demonstrators. I accept this as a meaningful bench-mark, subject to a number of qualifications which seem to me to rule out exact equivalence between the two starting salaries. These are discussed when I deal with salaries for sub-lecturer staff.

Starting Dates in Comparisons of Salary Movements

5.11 In some government submissions, arguments to justify particular rates of university salary increases were based on comparisons with other salaries which made use of inappropriate starting dates, such as dates when those other salaries were adjusted in 1970 after the date of the Eggleston Report (May 1970). The rates of increase in the salaries being used for purposes of comparison thus either related to a shorter time span than the three-year period covered by the review of university salaries, or ignored adjustments which had been made in respect of the other salaries during the three-year period.

5.12 On the other side, it needs to be recognised that university and staff association claims, based on adjustments made to C.S.I.R.O. and certain Commonwealth Public Service salaries in February 1973, would have the effect of introducing a slight opposite bias in favour of university salaries if, for purposes of comparing rate increases, those adjustments were assumed to fall within the three-year period of comparison. (I should point out that I regard the fact of the C.S.I.R.O. and other 1973 salary adjustments as relevant to my review of university salaries; it is their significance in comparisons of rate increases which needs to be carefully established.) A related problem in making rate comparisons over time stems from the lags in university salaries (or the leads in other salaries) which are associated with differences in the frequency of adjustments. This question is examined below.

5.13 Submissions made on behalf of two States argued that 1 January 1964 should be used as the starting date for purposes of comparing movements in university salaries with changes in salaries of other relevant groups. Because neither the 1967 nor the 1970 adjustment was based on any review of work-value

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changes, it is clearly necessary to go back to 1964 in evaluating changes in qualifications, functions, responsibilities and other factors bearing on academic performance. But the State submissions concerned also argued or implied that the 1964 starting date was the appropriate one to use for purposes of the comparative wage justice aspects of my Inquiry. In opposing this view, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations claimed that Commonwealth and State Governments had all agreed to the adjustments made to university salaries in 1967 and 1970, and that these adjustments were both clearly intended to preserve comparative wage justice. In so far as this aspect of my Inquiry was concerned, the Federation argued that it would be improper to go back beyond the last decision, which everyone had agreed had achieved appropriate relativity at that time.

5.14 The Australian Government seemed to support the Federation in this view, by suggesting that *'it would appear that the academic salary levels recommended by Mr Justice Eggleston in 1970 are the most appropriate to take for comparison purposes with other occupational groups. These rates were fixed as fair and reasonable after looking at wage comparisons at that point of time'*. However, later in its submission the Australian Government suggested that changes in relativities which were associated with the 1967 and 1970 adjustments can no longer be justified, thereby implying that there should be a reversion to 1964 relativities.

5.15 This issue is of some importance because both the 1967 and, to a lesser extent, the 1970 adjustments resulted in shifts in relativities which it is difficult to explain by reference to percentage movements in other relevant salaries. Between January 1964 and July 1967, for example, the research scientist (minimum) salary increased by 9·7 per cent while the lecturer (minimum) salary rose by 12·5 per cent. The comparable rates for chief research scientists and professors were 13·9 per cent and 15·4 per cent. Between July 1967 and January 1970, the research scientist (minimum) salary rose by 16·9 per cent while the percentage increase for the lecturer (minimum) salary was 17·0 per cent. In this period, the 20 per cent increase for professors was below the rate of increase of 22·3 per cent achieved by chief research scientists. The percentage increase in lecturers' salaries which would now be needed to restore the 1964 relativity with research scientists is 20·8 per cent, while an increase of 24·1 per cent would be needed to restore the 1970 relativity. The corresponding figures for professors and chief research scientists (which no doubt reflect the fact that salaries of the latter have not been adjusted since November 1971, whereas research scientists' salaries were last adjusted in February 1973) are 13·3 per cent and 14·0 per cent. Analysis of movements in academic and Commonwealth Second Division salaries lends further support to the view that the 1967 and 1970 adjustments resulted in shifts in relativity compared with the situation that prevailed in 1964.

5.16 Although I accept the general proposition that, for the purposes of maintaining comparative wage justice, the appropriate starting date for my Inquiry is January 1970, this does not mean that I can base my conclusions merely on such changes in comparative salaries as may have occurred since that date. In the first place, it is necessary for me to examine the timing of adjustments in other salaries to ensure that the percentage increases being compared relate to equivalent time periods. It is therefore of some significance that C.S.I.R.O. and most Commonwealth Second and Third Division salaries had all been adjusted during the few months immediately preceding the adjustment in university salaries

that resulted from the 1970 Eggleston Inquiry, and had presumably therefore been taken into account by Sir Richard in reaching his decision. It is equally important to recognise that, although C.S.I.R.O. salaries up to the level of senior principal research scientist have been adjusted as recently as February 1973, higher C.S.I.R.O. and Second Division salaries have not been adjusted since November 1971 while Third Division clerical/administrative salaries were last adjusted in June 1972. Secondly, it is necessary to examine movements in other salaries being considered with a view to isolating any components which may be said to reflect work-value changes. If another tribunal has made a conscious decision to shift relativities in the light of a work-value study, it would be inappropriate for me to use the percentage increase in the other salaries as a guide to the movement needed in university salaries to maintain comparative wage justice. Such shifts in relativities need to be examined by me in the context of my own work-value studies.

5.17 Equally important is the need to study the shifts in relativities which occurred in 1967 and 1970, with a view to deciding whether comparative wage justice requires that the effects of these changes be perpetuated through the recommendations of the present Inquiry. It seems clear that these shifts were intended largely to give leads in university salaries, at the time of the adjustments, in order to compensate for past lags or expected future delays in adjusting university salaries relative to adjustments in other relevant salaries. The question therefore is whether similar leads (or perhaps leads of a different magnitude) need to be recognised in the present Inquiry, or whether for purposes of comparative wage justice it is appropriate to revert to the 1964 relativities. In terms of the C.S.I.R.O. research scientist (minimum) salary which I have decided to continue to use as a bench-mark, the answer to this question requires the selection of a rate of increase for the minimum lecturer's salary either (*a*) somewhere between the 20·8 per cent needed to restore the 1964 relativity and the 24·1 per cent increase needed to restore the 1970 relativity or (*b*) as seems to be argued by the Federation, somewhat in excess of 24·1 per cent.

5.18 I therefore now turn to an examination of the significance of shifts in relativities involving lags and leads and the associated question of compensation for past or future losses.

Compensation for Past and Future Losses

5.19 In his 1970 Report, Sir Richard Eggleston considered the case for shifts in relativities, in a comparative wage justice adjustment, in order to take account of past or future lags in university salaries. We have seen that, in discussing the 1967 adjustment, Sir Richard indicated that increases granted then were greater than seemed to have been justified on the sole basis of comparative wage justice, and that the size of the increases may have been influenced by the fact that there was no provision for adjustments between the periodical reviews. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, Sir Richard drew attention in 1970 to the disadvantages suffered by groups whose salaries are adjusted only at three-yearly intervals, and said that his recommendations on salary levels assumed that academic salaries would henceforth be adjusted in accordance with national wage case decisions. He concluded: '. . . *while I should make a small discount in recommending present salaries on the assumption that I do not need to provide a cushion against future price rises, as I did in 1964, if I did not make this assumption I should feel bound*

to recommend a level which would afford a much larger cushion than I then thought appropriate. I am of course not unmindful of the fact that academic staff have not had the benefit of adjustability during the past 2½ years but whether this disadvantage has been greater or less than the allowance made for it, is incapable of accurate assessment. Neither the deduction to be made for the future nor the addition (if any) to be allowed for the past is capable of being quantified, but I have done my best to make a fair allowance for all these elements.'

5.20 To summarise, it appears that in 1964 the consideration that university staff would not receive automatic adjustments, and were thereby disadvantaged by comparison with other salary earners, influenced the figures recommended. In 1967 it appears that the increases were affected both by the past loss suffered by staff in not having had their salaries adjusted for a period of some three and a half years, and by the prospective factor arising from the absence of any provision for adjustment between periodical reviews. Sir Richard's 1970 recommendations were based on the assumption that automatic adjustments would be made to academic salaries in accordance with national wage decisions, a policy which has since been implemented. The shifts in relativities which, as we have seen, occurrred in 1967 and in 1970 may thus be explained largely in terms of allowances for lags and leads.

5.21 Academic salaries were increased by 6 per cent in January 1971 and by a further $104 per annum in May 1972 as a result of national wage case decisions. I propose to recommend not only that permanent machinery be constituted to permit academic salaries to be reviewed at least every two years but also that the present convention of making adjustments in accordance with national wage decisions be continued. On the assumption that these recommendations will be adopted, I consider that it is not necessary for me to include a prospective cushioning factor in my assessment.

5.22 If justice is to be done in terms of allowing for leads and lags, over a relatively long period any losses which a particular group may incur through lags in adjustments need to be roughly compensated for by gains resulting during periods when that group's salaries are in advance of other comparable groups. An analysis of adjustments that have been taking place since 1964 lends some support to the view that, until the end of 1970, this kind of justice was substantially achieved, and that despite the introduction of automatic national wage adjustments the balance of advantage then swung against academic staff. It was argued by staff associations that university staff were disadvantaged as a consequence of substantial increases which were awarded to most C.S.I.R.O. research scientist salaries in December 1970 (15 per cent), Commonwealth Third Division salaries in December 1970 (9·5 per cent to 12·76 per cent) and June 1972 (7·5 per cent), and Commonwealth Second Division salaries in November 1971 (15 per cent). State public service salaries recorded similar increases.

5.23 To the extent that these other groups have been receiving higher salaries for some time prior to the present review, there is an argument that academic staff have been at a relative disadvantage. However, it needs to be emphasised that it is not possible to determine to what extent the adjustments of those other salaries took into consideration the shifts in relativities which occurred in 1967 and 1970, when university salary adjustments were influenced by compensating factors for past and prospective losses. Again, it cannot be assumed that shifts in relativity will continue to operate for any specified length of time in the future.

5.24 It must be remembered that I am endeavouring to fix academic salaries at a proper level as at 1 January 1973, in a situation where salary levels were determined three years previously and were increased, in the intervening period, in accordance with national wage decisions. Sir Richard said in 1970 that the acceptance of national wage adjustments would *' be likely to take much of the heat out of claims for re-assessment '*. In the light of the shifts in relativities which have occurred since 1964, it is impracticable for me to determine whether university teachers have suffered any real disadvantage by not having their salaries adjusted during the past three years, and if so to what extent. I have therefore come to the conclusion that I should disregard this factor and make no further allowance for past (or future) losses. In the light of the history of academic salaries over the past decade, I think there is pertinence in the point made in the Australian Government's submission: *' It is unrealistic to attempt to obtain effectively simultaneous adjustment of all salaries by some complex system of compensation incorporated into salary adjustments '*. Further, on the assumption that there will be set up permanent review machinery in accordance with my recommendations, I do not wish to include in the recommended salary levels an element of uncertainty, which may add to the difficulties of a future tribunal in arriving at new levels based on a comparative wage justice assessment.

Repercussive Effects

5.25 The submissions which we received from some State governments and their officers emphasised the effects which university salary increases might have upon their budgets. In his 1964 Report, Sir Richard Eggleston referred to the position of the so-called claimant States, which receive special grants through the machinery of the Commonwealth Grants Commission. He said: *' Under existing circumstances, the burden of any increase in academic salaries which would otherwise be borne by the budget of a claimant State will normally be recouped by a special Commonwealth grant, and for these States there is no budgetary problem '*. Because there are now three claimant States (Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania), I should indicate that I am aware that, as a result of the Grants Commission's procedures, the claimant States are not at present relieved of the responsibility for meeting their share of increases in academic salaries.

5.26 Apart from the direct financial effects of university salary increases, State governments said they were concerned with the repercussive effects which any increases might have in relation to colleges of advanced education, teachers and the public services generally. The major burden, it was said, would arise because of the acceptance by governments of the principle formulated in the Report of the Inquiry into Salaries of Lecturers and Senior Lecturers in Colleges of Advanced Education, which was presented by Mr Justice Sweeney on 1 May 1969. The Sweeney recommendations that the salaries of lecturers and senior lecturers in colleges should be broadly the same as those in universities have now been implemented throughout Australia in respect of those members of college staff who have satisfied the criteria suggested by Mr Justice Sweeney. In most States and the A.C.T., also, salaries paid to more senior academic staff have been related to those of university professors and readers. Colleges of advanced education have rapidly increased in number in recent years and vary considerably in size and function. They can be classified into the five categories distinguished in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF C.A.E.'S AND RANGE OF ENROLMENTS IN 1971

Type of Institution	*Number of C.A.E.'s*	*Approximate Range of Total Enrolments*
Large, Multi-Discipline Metropolitan Institutes	12	640–8800
Smaller Single-Discipline Metropolitan Colleges	15	32– 500
Multi-Discipline Non-Metropolitan Colleges	8	200–1020
Small Single-Discipline Colleges	8	40– 275
Former State Teachers' Colleges Emerging as Autonomous Institutions	39	35–1250

5.27 I have been urged, both by some State governments and by some members of the college sector, to give consideration to the position of college staff in framing my recommendations on salary levels. I should therefore make it clear that I regard any such consideration as falling outside my terms of reference, which require me to consider colleges only in relation to the question of permanent machinery for review. In so far as repercussive effects are concerned, I cannot disagree with what Sir Richard said, in his 1970 Report, to the effect that any repercussive effects in relation to colleges of advanced education will be the consequence of the acceptance by governments of the Sweeney recommendations.

5.28 Some government submissions also drew attention to the likelihood of the increases in academic salaries having repercussive effects on teachers' salaries and public service salaries generally. It was also said that departments of education may have trouble in attracting senior officers from the fields which yielded capable administrators in the past. I was told that such flow-ons would impose considerable strains upon State budgets. I have taken account, and I hope proper account, of the salaries payable by, and the salary movements in, the education departments of the States, including the salaries received by school teachers. I have also taken into consideration salary levels and salary movements in other areas of the State public services. The salaries I have considered are the ones in effect at the date of this Report, so that I can see no justification for my recommendations being used as an argument for an increase in the salaries of research scientists, public servants or teachers (or indeed any other persons in the community whose salaries are not formally related to academic salaries).

5.29 I can appreciate that the benefit of any major salary increase carries with it a corresponding detriment to those who have to pay, and in reaching my assessment I have had regard to the financial burdens involved. The Australian Government has recently announced that it is prepared to take over from the States, as from 1 January 1974, their respective shares of the recurrent and capital grants for the financing of all tertiary educational institutions. This is not relevant to my assessment of salaries, but it may well have considerable bearing upon the argument that the State Treasuries will be financially embarrassed by any consequential salary adjustments in colleges of advanced education. As for the more indirect repercussive effects which I have discussed, I am not persuaded that there is anything in my Report which will cause academic salaries to become leaders rather than followers in the area of wage and salary determination. It follows that I am not persuaded that the payment of adequate academic salaries will have any adverse effect upon the recruitment of senior administrative staff in State departments of education, school teachers or public servants.

Chapter 6: Recommended salary levels

6.1 In the light of my assessment of academic work value and comparative salary movements, I now proceed to specific recommendations on salary levels for university professors, associate professors (or readers), senior lecturers and lecturers.

Submissions on Salary Levels and Rates of Increase

6.2 In order to place my recommendations in perspective, I list in Table 6.1 the specific submissions regarding salary levels made by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Australian Government. The proposed salaries reflect the views of the bodies concerned on both academic work value and comparative wage justice. Most State governments refrained from making specific proposals, but the rates of increase which some States recommended were within the limits which the Australian Government recommended for different staff grades (15 to 21 per cent). Salaries recommended by university governing bodies sometimes exceeded and sometimes fell short of the amounts proposed by the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (A.V.C.C.), while amounts recommended by some individual staff associations were substantially in excess of those proposed by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations (F.A.U.S.A.). The

TABLE 6.1

SUBMISSIONS ON ACADEMIC SALARY LEVELS AND RATES OF INCREASE

	Existing Salaries (1 *Jan.* 1973)	*Proposed Salaries*					
		F.A.U.S.A.		*A.V.C.C.*		*Australian Government*	
		Amount	*Rate of Increase*	*Amount*	*Rate of Increase*	*Amount*	*Rate of Increase*
	$	$	%	$	%	$	%
Professor	15,368	20,000	30·1	19,210	25	17,673	15
Associate Professor/Reader	12,697	17,500	37·8	15,871	25	14,602	15
Senior Lecturer—							
Maximum	11,234	15,500	38·0	14,042	25	13,593	21
Minimum	9,644	N.S.	N.S.	12,055	25	11,669	21
Lecturer—							
Maximum	9,390	13,500	43·8	11,737	25	11,362	21
Minimum	6,801	8,850	30·1	8,501	25	8,229	21

N.S. = Not Shown.

existing salaries recorded in Table 6.1 are those in effect at 1 January 1973, that is before the national wage case decision announced on 8 May 1973. The salaries paid by some individual universities at certain levels differ slightly from the standard salaries recorded in Table 6.1.

Submissions on Internal Relativities

6.3 It will be seen that the Federation, the Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Australian Government have different views not only about the appropriate magnitude of salary increases in general but also about the relative increases to be awarded to different grades. Table 6.2 shows the implications of these differences with respect to the internal salary structure of universities, by relating the proposed salary levels for sub-professorial grades to those suggested for professors.

6.4 The adoption of the Federation's proposal would result in the salaries of other grades rising relative to those of professors and lecturers (at the minimum), while the Vice-Chancellors' Committee suggested that internal relativities remain unchanged. The Australian Government submitted that salaries of lecturers and senior lecturers be increased relative to those of professors and associate professors or readers. As I have already observed, some State governments and most universities recommended that internal relativities be maintained, most individual

TABLE 6.2

SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED SALARY STRUCTURES

per cent

	Existing Relativities	*Proposed Relativities*		
		F.A.U.S.A.	*A.V.C.C.*	*Australian Government*
Professor	100	100	100	100
Associate Professor/Reader	82·6	87·5	82·6	82·6
Senior Lecturer—				
Maximum	73·1	77·5	73·1	76·9
Minimum	61·1	N.S.	61·1	68·2
Lecturer—				
Maximum	61·1	67·5	61·1	64·3
Minimum	44·3	44·3	44·3	46·6

N.S. = Not Shown.

staff associations supported the Federation's proposals for changes in the salary structure, while some State governments recommended that there should be inverse tapering, that is to say they proposed that the rates of increase should be in ascending order (with lecturers receiving the lowest percentage increases and professors receiving the highest).

6.5 In considering these conflicting viewpoints, it is necessary to have regard both to work-value arguments affecting internal relativities and to comparative salary movements at different levels.

6.6 In 1964 Sir Richard Eggleston found some support, on the basis of salary movements and arbitral determinations in the community generally, for the view that percentage increases should be lower for higher salaries than for low salaries. His recommendations were based on this approach. The 1967 adjustment, however, gave a greater percentage increase to salaries from professor down to the top of the lecturer's scale than to the bottom of the lecturer's scale, and the 1970 Eggleston Report also recognised the then current tendency for a higher percentage increase at higher levels than at lower ones.

6.7 There exists some uncertainty as to what may happen in the higher ranges of salaries which I have regarded as relevant in looking at comparative salary movements, for example, in the salaries of C.S.I.R.O. chiefs of division (or chief research scientists) and those in the Second Division of the Commonwealth Public Service. As I have pointed out, there have not been adjustments in these salaries for some time. In the Australian Government submission it was said that *'since 1970 wages at higher administrative and professional levels have not shown the same level of increase as at the lower levels'*. On the other hand, the representatives of the Commonwealth Public Service Board with whom I had discussions did not feel that, in public service salary adjustments over recent years, there could be discerned any reliable indications of a compression of higher salaries relative to lower ones. Nevertheless, I think that both the policy of the present Australian Government and the current notions predominating in the community are that higher salaries should be adjusted by lower percentage increases than are applied to lower salaries. Such a philosophy seems to have influenced the recent national wage case decisions of the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission. I feel I should give some weight to this social philosophy and that, in case I have erred in this evaluation of trends in salary fixation, my view should be made known to a future university salaries review tribunal. With these considerations in mind, and also having close regard to the salaries paid at senior levels in the comparable occupations to which I have earlier referred, the salaries which I recommend illustrate a degree of tapering in the grades from professor down to lecturer (and indeed to sub-lecturer staff).

Recommended Salary Levels

6.8 Turning now to salary levels in general, it may help if I summarise the conclusions which I reached following my assessment of academic work value and my review of comparative salary movements.

6.9 In so far as academic work value is concerned, I indicated in Chapter 2 that I am satisfied that the responsibilities of university teachers have not become less onerous or less time-consuming since 1964, and indeed that their contribution to society is probably greater now than it was then. But I also came to the conclusion that, having regard to the increasing responsibilities of other high-income groups with whom university teachers may be compared, there should not be a significant shift in relativities towards academic salaries on work-value grounds alone.

6.10 My consideration of problems of recruitment and retention of staff on the one hand, and of the non-salary benefits of academic employment on the other, likewise did not lead me to accept that there should be any substantial shift in academic salaries relative to those of other comparable occupations. It follows that the salary levels which I recommend are based principally on the salary movements which have occurred, and the salary levels which have been reached, in those other occupations. My choice of relevant occupations was influenced by the view that the incomes of professional or other groups in the private sector provide little guide to appropriate levels of academic salaries, and that movements in C.S.I.R.O. and certain Commonwealth and State public service salaries were more relevant for purposes of my review.

6.11 My recommendations are also based on the beliefs: (a) that there is still a strong case for linking the commencing salary of a lecturer with that of a C.S.I.R.O. research scientist; (*b*) that I must concern myself mainly with salary movements which have occurred since university salaries were last reviewed in

January 1970; and (*c*) that I cannot take it upon myself to shift relativities in such a way as to compensate university teachers for any past or future losses arising out of delays in adjusting academic salaries.

6.12 In the light of all these considerations, the salary scales which I recommend for professors, associate professors (or readers), senior lecturers and lecturers are set out in Table 6.3.

6.13 I recommend that the proposed salary levels be implemented with effect from 1 January 1973, as indicated in the then Minister's statement at the time I was asked to undertake the Inquiry, and that funds be made available to universities accordingly. My recommendations assume that academic salaries will continue to be adjusted from time to time in accordance with national wage decisions. It follows that the salary levels recommended in Table 6.3 should be

TABLE 6.3

RECOMMENDED SALARY SCALES FOR AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 1 JANUARY 1973

	Existing	*Recommended*	*Rate of Increase*
	$	$	%
Professor	15,368	18,600	21·0
Associate Professor/Reader	12,697	15,500	22·1
Senior Lecturer	9,644–11,234(*a*)	11,900–400 (5)–13,900	23·4–23·7
Lecturer	6,801– 9,390(*a*)	8,400–460 (7)–11,620	23·5–23·7

(*a*) Incremental scales are not given because they vary from university to university.

further adjusted following the national wage decision announced on 8 May 1973, by which date the drafting of this Report had been virtually completed.

6.14 Because of the differential rates of increase at the several levels, the recommended salaries of other grades of staff will increase relative to those of professors. The proposed commencing salary for a lecturer will thus be 45·2 per cent of that for a professor, compared with 44·3 per cent at present, while the maximum salary for a senior lecturer will increase from 73·1 per cent of the professor's salary to 74·7 per cent. In 1964 Sir Richard Eggleston determined the senior lecturer's maximum salary by reference to the midpoint of the interval between the professor's salary and the commencing rate for a lecturer. It will be observed from Table 6.3 that the maximum I am recommending for a senior lecturer will be $400 above this midpoint.

Uniform Salary Scales and Increments

6.15 The salary scales for lecturers and senior lecturers differ slightly among universities both as to minimum or maximum points and as to incremental steps. I recommend that the opportunity be taken to standardise these scales in accordance with the amounts and incremental steps specified in Table 6.3. In the Universities of Queensland and James Cook the increments for lecturers in the lower half of the incremental range are considerably lower than in the other universities—approximately $340 per year for the first four steps instead of approximately $369. This results in a not insignificant loss of income in those early years and I can see no justification for it.

Research Appointments and Other Categories of Academic Staff

6.16 Although my terms of reference relate specifically to university teachers, I assume that the salaries of senior research staff will be increased in such a way as to maintain their existing relativities with the salaries of university teachers. Appropriate percentage increases should also be given to other special categories of academic staff (such as personal professors, professorial fellows, fellows, etc.) in order to maintain existing relativities.

Rates for Part-Time Staff

6.17 The terms of reference relate only to full-time members of the teaching staff but I have been asked by some universities to consider the question of payments to part-time staff who are paid on an hourly rate. Universities spend significant funds on payments for part-time teaching and I expect that members of the part-time staff will have their rates of remuneration increased in direct proportion to the increase in salaries payable to comparable full-time staff. The rates for part-time teaching vary from university to university and in the present context it could be expected that any increases in part-time rates, ensuing from higher rates for full-time staff, will continue to reflect the existing divergent pattern. Another material factor is that the Australian Universities Commission in the recommended recurrent grants for the 1973–75 triennium has made allowance for payments to honorary clinical teachers for clinical teaching sessions for medical students. The Fifth Report of the Commission states (para. 9.18): *'The Commission expects that all universities will now make such payments from their recurrent funds in the same way as they pay other part-time lecturers, tutors, demonstrators or instructors'.*

6.18 We were informed that part-time lecturers and tutors are discontented with their present salary levels and that, in one State at least, rates paid for roughly similar part-time work to teachers with similar qualifications are higher in colleges of advanced education than in the university. I consider that it would make the task of university administration easier if there were national uniform rates adopted for part-time staff; it will make internal budgeting simpler and will enable each university to use the rates as a base when employing part-time teachers.

6.19 It has been suggested that I determine appropriate hourly rates for formal lectures, tutorials and demonstrating under supervision. I have not had sufficient material or the benefit of adequate discussions on the work load, functions and responsibilities of part-time academic staff in universities to enable me to make such assessments, even if my terms of reference were to permit me to do so. All I can say is that I think it desirable that uniform rates be fixed in this area, and that the Australian Universities Commission or a future salaries tribunal be asked to review the situation. As part of that review, it may be desirable to examine the rates of payment in the colleges of advanced education.

Chapter 7: Sub-lecturer grades

7.1 Very early in the course of my Inquiry, it became clear to me that sub-lecturer staff in Australian universities were suffering greater disabilities, in relation to salaries, than other members of the academic staff. Unlike senior grades of lecturer and above, the sub-lecturer grades have not been standardised in terms of qualifications, functions, responsibilities, nomenclature, salaries and other conditions of appointment. Substantial disparities exist not only among universities generally, but also, in some cases, within individual universities. There was general recognition, on the part of governments, governing bodies and staff associations, of the need to rationalise the salary position relating to sub-lecturer staff, and numerous submissions were received from members of the sub-lecturer staff themselves. I have also had the benefit of reading a report prepared by the Tutors/Demonstrators Committee appointed in 1970 by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations (which was published in *Vestes*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1971) and a subsequent issue of *Vestes* largely devoted to a symposium on junior staff (Vol. XV, No. 2, 1972).

Arguments for a Uniform Salary Structure

7.2 No doubt because of the confused situation which exists in respect of sub-lecturer grades, my terms of reference specified different treatment from that to be accorded senior grades and required me specifically to advise governments *'on the percentage increases which the Inquiry considers appropriate in the salary ranges for full-time members of the teaching staff of universities in sub-lecturer grades'*. It was therefore necessary for me to point out, in response to numerous submissions suggesting drastic restructuring of the sub-lecturer salary structure, that if this term of reference were to be interpreted literally it would preclude me from rationalising the salary structure in the light of any work-value study I might be disposed to make. Given the diversity of existing salary ranges and employment conditions, also, it was clear that any attempt to ensure comparative wage justice would be very much a hit-or-miss affair. Finally, it needs to be emphasised that it is my responsibility to make recommendations about academic salaries in the light of the qualifications, functions and responsibilities of academic staff, and not to determine what those attributes should be or to make recommendations about staffing (as opposed to salary) structures. These are properly matters for the individual universities to resolve in the light of recommendations which may be made from time to time by the Australian Universities Commission.

7.3 Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that there was a genuine desire, on the part of most of the parties who submitted evidence, for the establishment of some semblance of order into the salary ranges of sub-lecturer staff. As the Inquiry progressed, a substantial measure of agreement was reached with respect to relevant salaries in comparable occupations, thus indicating the possibility that I might be able to establish bench-marks which could be used in fixing uniform salary scales. In particular, most governments, universities and staff associations gave support to the notion that the commencing salary for a tutor should stand in close relationship to that of a four-year trained teacher,

thus making it possible for a salary range for sub-lecturer grades to be established between that point and the commencing salary for a lecturer. Finally, the representatives of the Australian Government, both in the written submission and in the discussions I had with Ministers and their advisers, made it clear that the Government would welcome the introduction of a uniform salary scale for sub-lecturer grades. After noting that the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations had argued that parity of qualifications, work roles and employer expectations justified salary uniformity, the Australian Government commented as follows:

'The Commonwealth would agree with the structural arguments put forward by the federation. It is considered that duties at the sub-lecturer levels would be, at the least, as homogeneous across disciplines as those of more senior academics and uniform salary ranges would be in keeping with the existing structure at higher levels. Some parity of minimum commencement rate particularly would seem to be equitable.'

7.4 In the light of these considerations, I have decided to recommended the adoption of a uniform salary scale for sub-lecturer staff, subject to the requirement that existing members of staff should be fitted into the scale in such a way as to ensure that no one receives less than a specified percentage increase in salary. In this way, I believe that it is possible to reconcile my terms of reference, designed as they were to deal with a confused existing situation, with the requirements of an equitable, internally consistent and effective long-term academic salary structure for all Australian universities. I turn now to the problem of determining what this minimum percentage increase and salary structure should be.

The Existing Situation : A Confused Picture

7.5 The present position in regard to sub-lecturer salaries is that there are typically two main grades of staff, who are usually designated as tutors or demonstrators on the one hand and senior tutors or senior demonstrators on the other. The term demonstrator has traditionally been used to describe sub-lecturer staff in science-type faculties or schools, while the term tutor has been used in arts and other non-science areas. But this distinction is now breaking down as some universities use tutor as a generic title to describe all sub-lecturer staff. The foregoing differences in nomenclature are in any case only part of the story. Some universities use the term teaching fellow as a substitute for tutor/demonstrator, others have both teaching fellows and tutors/demonstrators with identical salary ranges, others again have the two categories of staff with different (but partly overlapping) salary ranges. One university employs teaching fellows in a salary range that is identical with that of senior tutors/demonstrators, while in other universities the salary scales for senior teaching fellows and senior tutors/demonstrators are broadly similar. One university uses the term principal tutor/demonstrator in respect of a salary range which in other universities embraces senior tutors/demonstrators, and the same university has another grade of assistant lecturer which overlaps the senior tutor/demonstrator and lecturer grades in other universities. Another university has, in addition to tutors/demonstrators and senior tutors/demonstrators, four grades of instructor, the first three of which have salary scales which range from the tutor's minimum to the senior tutor's maximum, while the range of the fourth is identical with that for lecturers. The range for senior tutors/demonstrators usually stops short of the commencing salary for lecturers, but is sometimes extended by one or two increments beyond, and in other universities it extends nearly to the top of the lecturer range.

7.6 The salary ranges for sub-lecturer staff are often non-incremental. Tutors/demonstrators are usually appointed on an annual basis up to a maximum of three to five years, while senior sub-lecturer staff have annual appointments in some universities, permanent appointments in others and either annual or permanent tenure in others. Promotion is often possible from the tutor/demonstrator to the senior tutor/demonstrator grade, but in no university is it possible for a member of the sub-lecturer staff to be promoted to a lectureship; all such appointments must be gained in open competition for advertised vacancies. Minimum salaries for tutors/demonstrators and similar junior grades range from $4,011 to $4,738, while maximum salaries range from $5,040 to $5,828. Minimum salaries for senior sub-lecturer grades range from $5,404 to $5,966, while maximum salaries range from $6,403 to $8,806 or, if instructors are included, to the top of the lecturer range at $9,390.

7.7 This striking variety of staffing and salary structures reflects a considerable diversity in sub-lecturer qualifications and responsibilities, both among and within universities. Some universities invariably require an honours or higher degree while others often make appointments on the basis of a pass degree. Some universities treat tutors and demonstrators as teaching assistants while others devolve upon them considerable responsibility for organising and even designing courses. Some universities encourage sub-lecturer staff to undertake post-graduate study or research while others require any such work to be carried out in staff members' own time, e.g. outside the 35 hours of service which they are required by the contract of employment to give each week in the performance of their teaching duties. Class contact hours and teaching responsibilities themselves vary considerably. Some universities encourage sub-lecturer staff to give lectures as well as tutorials and practice classes, while others expect them to concentrate on small group teaching. Some universities treat sub-lecturer staff as apprentices or academic cadets who, if they perform well, will progress to lectureships in their own or other Australian universities. Other universities seem to regard sub-lecturer staff in the same light as foremen or non-commissioned officers, destined to play a subservient role in the educational system throughout their academic lives. Tenure, superannuation and other conditions of appointment clearly reflect these differences in viewpoint.

7.8 Even within individual universities, the roles and responsibilities of sub-lecturer staff may differ as between disciplines or as between different types of appointment. Thus in one university, where tutors and teaching fellows have the same salary scale, tutors teach substantially more than teaching fellows. In another university, teaching fellows are appointed on the basis of variable proportions of teaching responsibility (known as the teaching assistantship component) and postgraduate studies (known as the academic fellowship component). To a large extent, however, it appears that differences in staffing classifications and salary ranges have often represented responses by individual universities to particular types of teaching needs or to budget constraints. Having regard to the similarity in educational objectives, roles and standards of Australian universities and the uniformity in staffing and salary structures which exists for senior academic staff, I have no doubt that the rationalisation of sub-lecturer salaries is both feasible and desirable. Before such rationalisation can be attempted, however, it is necessary to examine the qualifications, conditions of appointment, functions and responsibilities of the major categories of sub-lecturer staff, both as they exist at present and as universities see them developing in response to the educational demands being placed upon them.

Qualifications, Rights and Duties of Sub-Lecturer Staff

7.9 On the basis of a survey which it had conducted, the Tutors/Demonstrators Committee appointed by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations described the typical sub-lecturer member of the academic staff in the following terms (*Vestes, loc. cit.*, pp. 330–1):

'The 'typical/average' sub-lecturer grade academic in our universities is 28·5 *years old (range* 22·9–49·1*), and with high qualifications. He is likely to be a candidate for a higher degree. He has been in his present occupation about* 2·5 *years (range* 1·0–11·0*) and has spent some time in another institution. He works a* 43·5 *hour week (range* 22·6–68*), devoting a little less than a third of this to furthering his own qualifications. He teaches about* 10 *hours a week and spends about* 16 *hours on work directly associated with his teaching. He also spends about* 3 *hours per week attending meetings, talking to students, arranging lab. and tutorial groups, etc. His main complaints about his work-role are centred around tenure, superannuation, study leave, promotion and the provision of adequate facilities and time for study and research. He seeks improvement chiefly in four areas—tenure conditions, promotion opportunities, study leave conditions and study/research provisions.'*

7.10 Of the 612 staff members who responded to the Committee's survey, 85 per cent had honours or higher degrees; half had a single honours degree and a third had a double first degree, a master's degree or a doctorate. Conditions of appointment differ from university to university, but tutors/demonstrators are rarely eligible for superannuation benefits, are never eligible for study leave and are usually restricted to three or four weeks' recreation leave. Senior tutors/demonstrators are invariably eligible for superannuation, seldom eligible for study leave and likewise restricted to three or four weeks' recreation leave.

7.11 The Report of the Federation Committee suggested that *'most of the senior tutors/demonstrators and some of the tutors/demonstrators play a part in association with more senior staff in both course construction and evaluation'*. Some senior tutors/demonstrators were seen to have sole responsibility for the supervision of honours or higher degree candidates, and the majority appeared to have a joint responsibility. But *'virtually no tutors/demonstrators have sole responsibility and a few have joint responsibility'*.

7.12 The recommendations of the Committee included, in addition to a number of proposals relating to appointment, tenure and promotion, recommendations to the effect that: there should be only two grades of sub-lecturer appointments, namely tutors/demonstrators and senior tutors/demonstrators; sub-lecturer staff should be permitted to enrol for higher degrees and engage in research; the amount of lecturing should be limited; senior tutors/demonstrators should have the same rights and privileges (e.g. with respect to tenure, study leave and housing assistance) as lecturers; equivalent salary scales in all universities should be established for the sub-lecturer grades of academic staff; and the top of the senior tutor/demonstrator scale should substantially overlap the lecturer scale.

Submissions on Sub-Lecturer Grades

7.13 In discussing the work role of tutors and demonstrators, the submission of the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations commented as follows:

'The nature of their duties, involving mainly small group teaching is exacting, and vital in the development of the academic stature of students. It is often the adequacy or otherwise of small group teaching which determines success or failure.

Junior staff are the essential bridge between the highly structured environment of the secondary school and the less-structured one of the Universities. They may play a definitive role in the students' perception of the University and its purposes and specifically in the students' appreciation of a discipline area. Further it should be noted that unlike higher level staff who are treated as specialists in specific areas, Tutors/Demonstrators are viewed as generalists and hence are required to attain and maintain a high level of competence over an entire discipline area.

'Over the past few years the range of duties associated with tutoring/demonstrating staff has tended to widen and increasingly such staff are called on to help make important decisions concerning the outcomes of student learning. The gradual shift away from the all or nothing final examination towards progressive and continuous assessment has entailed the increasing involvement of junior staff in the process of evaluation.'

7.14 Turning to senior tutors/demonstrators, the Federation noted that their proportion to total academic staff had more than doubled between 1962 and 1972 (from 3·88 per cent to 7·85 per cent). After arguing that senior tutors/demonstrators serve the dual functions of providing a reservoir of suitable applicants for lectureships and of being a career grade, the submission continued:

'It is important to note that though Universities do not generally propagate this view, their conditions of appointment reflect a general acceptance of the view that such appointments constitute a career grade. Specifically it should be noted that virtually all Universities grant tenure, superannuation and long service leave to appointees in this grade. Some have provision for study leave. The procedures too—in many cases open advertisements and a formally constituted interview committee with stipulated procedures—virtually identical with those for appointment to Lectureship, further support the Federation's contention that for many this is a career grade.

'Senior Tutorships/Senior Demonstratorships are important positions within Universities, and their importance has continued to grow over the past few years with the growth of student numbers and the attendant problems of organization and teaching. They fulfil multiple roles within most departments. They teach, they organize teaching and also conduct research. It is not unusual to find that Senior Tutors/Senior Demonstrators are made responsible for all tutorial/laboratory organization and preparation. They are often required to supervise the work of junior tutorial and/or technical staff and at least assist in course construction and evaluation.

'Most Senior Tutors/Senior Demonstrators have a further lecturing function and some would carry a full lecturing load either as their sole duty or as a supplement to other work.

'In the recent past the role of the Senior Tutor/Senior Demonstrator has tended increasingly to move away from that of the Tutor/Demonstrator and to overlap that of the Lecturer. It is now quite possible to conceive of the two roles—that of the Lecturer and the Senior Tutor/Senior Demonstrator, although different, as equally important in their respective spheres.'

7.15 In the light of these arguments, the Federation urged that the rank of Senior Tutor/Senior Demonstrator should be viewed as a career grade; and that, because *'Senior Tutors/Senior Demonstrators are for the most part mature married adults with an extensive, relevant, experiential history, possessing high qualifications and proven competence'*, it would be appropriate to view this grade as equivalent to that of the lecturer.

7.16 The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the representatives of individual universities lent some support to the view that members of the sub-lecturer staff are tending to assume new and more demanding responsibilities, although they did not always agree with staff association and sub-lecturer staff representatives about the nature and extent of those responsibilities. In particular, most university representatives opposed the Federation's view that the senior tutor/demonstrator grade should be treated as a career grade and that it should have the same maximum salary as that of lecturer.

7.17 State government submissions tended to concentrate on comparative salary movements affecting sub-lecturer staff and did not discuss work-value aspects. The Australian Government, however, joined the university representatives in opposing the Federation's claim that senior tutors/demonstrators should be regarded as equivalent to lecturers. It submitted that there was *'no indication that the entrance standard and work value of these positions are comparable and we consider that there are no grounds for Seniors receiving the salary equivalent of Lecturers'*. Having regard to the importance of the role of senior tutors/demonstrators, the fact that in some cases some lecturing duties are involved and the extent of the existing overlap with lecturers' salaries in some universities, the Australian Government was nevertheless prepared to concede a case for the maximum salary for senior tutors/demonstrators being somewhat higher than the minimum salary for lecturers.

Conclusions Leading to Proposals for Rationalisation

7.18 Although the diversity of sub-lecturer qualifications and responsibilities makes it difficult to make generalisations about their work roles or salary claims, I have nevertheless reached a number of broad conclusions which have led me to propose a complete restructuring of the sub-lecturer salary scales. These conclusions are summarised in the following paragraphs.

7.19 More than any other group in the academic community, sub-lecturer staff have been down-graded in terms of their work value relative to that of comparable occupational groups, such as teachers, public servants and even research scholars. As a result, universities have encountered increasing difficulty in recruiting staff of suitable quality.

7.20 The importance of the role of sub-lecturer staff in Australian universities has not received sufficient recognition, and during recent years their salaries and other conditions of service have suffered in comparison both with the growing numbers of their contemporaries who obtain research scholarships and with senior academic staff. Well qualified and competent sub-lecturer staff are important to universities not only because of their direct contribution to teaching and research but also because they constitute a reservoir of talent which may be drawn on for senior academic appointments.

7.21 The proportion of academic staff holding sub-lecturer appointments has increased from below 20 per cent in 1962 to nearly 25 per cent in 1972. Although this may have been partly due to greater emphasis on small-group teaching, it appears to have been mainly due to financial limitations on university budgets. Although unsatisfactory salaries and conditions of employment have forced many universities to make appointments in sub-lecturer grades below the standards desired, demographic influences and the recent intensification of postgraduate studies have significantly improved the supply situation in relation to sub-lecturer appointments. Already the universities employ many staff with doctorates and other advanced qualifications in their sub-lecturer grades; given better financial

rewards and other incentives, a substantial lift in recruitment standards will be possible, with significant long-run benefits both for universities and for the community at large.

7.22 The greater emphasis which universities are placing on small-group teaching and continuous assessment, the growing recognition of the need for face-to-face contact between teachers and students, the need for generalist teachers to balance the specialised interests of senior scholars and teachers, and the tendency for greater participation in curriculum development and the formulation of academic policy, have all contributed to an enhancement of the work role of sub-lecturer staff.

7.23 Although the disparities which exist in relation to qualifications, functions and responsibilities of sub-lecturer staff have acted as a barrier to rationalisation of salary structures, the adoption of a uniform scale does not depend on prior standardisation of work roles. Indeed, in so far as universities may decide for reasons of academic policy to vary conditions of appointment or employment of sub-lecturer staff, the existence of uniform salary scales may be expected to facilitate such changes. As I have already pointed out, however, my task is to make recommendations on salaries on the basis of existing qualifications, duties, responsibilities and other relevant factors. It is not within my terms of reference to recommend what these job requirements and roles ought to be.

Assumptions About Job Specifications

7.24 In terms of these job specifications, it is possible to distinguish between three distinct categories of sub-lecturer staff in Australian universities, which for ease of reference I shall call tutors, senior tutors and principal tutors. For this purpose, I shall regard the terms tutor and demonstrator as interchangeable. Tutors and senior tutors correspond to the traditional academic groupings and may normally be expected to have the distinguishing characteristics of high academic qualifications (good honours or postgraduate degrees), annual or short-term appointments (up to five years), limited teaching responsibilities in a supporting rather than a principal role, substantial involvement in postgraduate studies or research, and the expectation of appointment to lectureships if their performance in teaching and research is sufficiently meritorious. Persons should not be encouraged to remain in these posts for more than 3 to 5 years or so, and tenured appointments at these levels should be reserved, if at all, for the career grade people whom I describe below as 'principal tutors'. Tutors are likely to differ from senior tutors in being younger, not so well qualified in terms of higher degrees and less experienced, but both groups may be treated as having similar career prospects, as being in effect apprentice lecturers.

7.25 The third group of sub-lecturer staff, whom I designate principal tutors although, as we have seen, in practice they hold appointments under a variety of names, may be thought of as career tutors who for one reason or another will not progress into more senior academic appointments. These people are usually older with considerable teaching experience—often in secondary schools as subject masters as well as in universities. Their formal academic qualifications are likely to be of a lower order than those of their other sub-lecturer colleagues, and they are likely to devote virtually their whole time to teaching—with all that means in terms of scholarly activity and the need to keep abreast of their subjects—rather than to research. Principal tutors are sometimes given full responsibility for organising and conducting large first-year or even second-year courses, and thus fill the same kind of teaching role as senior academic staff. But they are generalists

rather than specialists; hence their concentration on first-year teaching. Even in those universities which rely predominantly on the other two categories of tutors for their junior staff, there are usually a few people who fit the foregoing description of career tutors. Although they have permanent tenure and many of the other privileges of senior academics, including a salary structure which often extends into the range for lecturers, principal tutors are seen by their universities, and they see themselves, as having reached their career grade; they usually have no aspirations for appointment to lectureships or other senior posts. Many married women fit the specifications of career tutors, but whether individual members of staff are to be regarded as temporary tutors or career tutors must depend on their qualifications, experience and responsibilities.

7.26 The foregoing categorisation is obviously an over-simplification and in practice it will be difficult to classify individual members of the sub-lecturer staff into one or other of the three groups that have been distinguished. My remarks should also not be construed as implying that universities should establish a career grade for sub-lecturer staff when at present none exists, or that conditions of appointment of sub-lecturer staff generally should be varied where they do not correspond to my postulated conditions. But my recommendations for a salary structure for sub-lecturer staff recognise the fact that something corresponding to each of these three groups exists in most universities. In particular, I propose salary ranges for temporary tutors (tutors and senior tutors) which reach a maximum at the minimum salary for a lecturer, and a salary range for career tutors (whom I have called principal tutors) which extends well up the scale for lecturers. I have shown earlier that the qualifications and functions of principal tutors are, and should be, distinguishable from those of lecturers, and this difference should be reflected in the salary structure. I consider it undesirable, if staff/student ratios are reasonable, to use or appoint principal tutors in order to enable senior staff to avoid small-group classes; face-to-face teaching is a proper and important function of all senior academic staff.

Comparative Salary Movements in Other Occupations

7.27 In reaching decisions about what salary ranges should be, it is necessary to have regard not only to the recommendations I have already made with respect to the salaries of lecturers, but also to comparative salary movements in other occupations which seem to be relevant to the determination of sub-lecturer salaries. I begin by considering the commencing salary for tutors.

7.28 An examination of salary movements in comparable occupational groups, at levels of salary which were approximately the same as the minimum tutor's salary at 1 January 1970, reveals the information which is summarised in Table 7.1.

7.29 It will be seen that, in order to restore the 1970 relativities with salaries of four-year trained teachers, tutors' salaries would need to be increased by 20·6 per cent to 29·0 per cent (22·4 per cent in New South Wales and 29·0 per cent in Victoria). The increases needed to restore relativity with comparable salary groups in Commonwealth and State public services range from 17·3 to 29·2 per cent for clerical-administrative classifications and 23·1 to 30·0 per cent for professional and scientific classifications. Again it must be emphasised that the selection of comparable salaries has been arbitrarily derived from information supplied by the Commonwealth Public Service Board, and that the rates of increase may not be strictly comparable because they reflect different time periods.

TABLE 7-1

MOVEMENTS SINCE 1.1.1970 IN SALARIES OF TUTORS AND COMPARABLE GROUPS.

	Rate of Salary Increase Since 1.1.1970	*Rate of Increase in University Salaries to Restore* 1970 *Relativity*
	%	%
Tutor (minimum)—N.S.W.	8·6	..
Four-year Trained Teacher—		
Commonwealth and Six States	31·0–39·9	20·6–29·0
Commonwealth Public Service—		
Clerical—Administrative	28·2	18·0
Professional	33·7–34·6	23·1–23·9
State Public Services (N.S.W. and Vic.)—		
Clerical (honours degree)	37·7–40·1	26·8–29·0
Scientific	34·6–41·2	23·9–30·0
Commonwealth and State Clerical—		
Non-graduates	27·4–40·3	17·3–29·2

Tutor's Commencing Salary

7.30 But rates of increase in any case only tell part of the story. As I have already indicated, there was general support during the course of my Inquiry for the notion that the commencing salary for a university tutor should be roughly in line with that for a four-year trained teacher. The arguments for such a bench-mark are based on the broadly comparable period of education and standard of qualifications required by teachers and honours graduates (or graduates of professional faculties) on the one hand, and the similarity between the work roles of teachers and tutors on the other. There are of course substantial differences in conditions of employment. Teachers have tenure and all the advantages which go with tenure, including superannuation, assured progression up the salary scale and more certain promotion prospects. Teachers usually have 10 weeks' annual leave compared with 3 or 4 weeks for tutors, and it seems to be the case that this leave is generally used for purposes of recreation rather than for study or professional development. The weekly class contact hours of teachers are much higher than those of tutors, reflecting not only differences in the level and nature of teaching but also the commitment which most tutors have to postgraduate study and research. The salary levels of teachers have not only advanced well beyond those of tutors during recent years, but have been adjusted more frequently. The incremental scales of teachers are much longer than those for tutors and in fact extend well into the salary range for lecturers. The annual increments are also very much larger than those for tutors, who in any case do not necessarily receive increments automatically. As a result of State cadetship schemes, teachers have usually had the benefit of living allowances to a greater extent than tutors during the period of their tertiary education, and this advantage is not altogether lost through the operation of the bonding provisions which have been applied to teacher trainees.

7.31 Some of the State government representatives argued that, because many tutors have the opportunity to assist their own advancement by undertaking postgraduate study during their appointments, their salaries should be lower than

those of four-year trained teachers. Having regard to their limited tenure and generally inferior conditions of appointment, however, I am not prepared to give very much weight to this argument although it certainly needs to be taken into account. If tutors are to progress in their careers to the same extent as teachers are able to do automatically, that is to the level of a lectureship, they must demonstrate ability in respect not only of teaching but also of postgraduate studies or research; postgraduate study or research must therefore be considered one aspect of their job. In any case, tutors usually need to have demonstrated greater ability and to be more highly qualified than teachers in terms of their university undergraduate performance; a good honours degree is usually considered a necessary qualification for a tutorship, while relatively few teachers have honours degrees and those who do usually receive an additional increment on their initial appointments. Furthermore, as we have seen, many tutors have already been awarded higher degrees at the time of their appointments.

7.32 Putting all these factors together, my conclusion is that the commencing salary for tutors should not be appreciably below that of four-year trained teachers. In reaching this conclusion, I am assuming that the minimum qualification for a tutorship will usually be a good honours degree or its equivalent. Although some governments have suggested that the level of a tutor's commencing salary should vary in accordance with his formal academic qualifications, I believe that universities should and do take other factors (such as experience) into account in determining commencing salaries. I therefore do not propose to prescribe hard and fast rules intended to link salaries with formal qualifications, while nevertheless indicating that I believe that a specified lower commencing salary will normally be appropriate for tutors who do not possess honours degrees or professional degrees obtained on the basis of courses of four years or longer.

7.33 The level of salary needed in each State to bring a tutor's commencing salary up to the commencing salary of a four-year trained teacher is indicated in Table 7.2.

TABLE 7–2

COMPARISION OF COMMENCING SALARIES OF TUTORS AND FOUR-YEAR TRAINED TEACHERS, JANUARY, 1973.

	Teacher's Commencing Salary	*Tutor's Commencing Salary*	*Rate of Increase in Tutor's Salary to Achieve Parity*
	$ p.a.	$ p.a.	%
New South Wales	5,450	4,290(*a*)	27·0
Victoria	5,550	4,569	21·5
Queensland	5,466	4,290	27·4
Western Australia	5,450	4,420	23·3
South Australia	5,330	4,199	26·9
Tasmania	5,250	4,351	20·7
Commonwealth	5,450	4,738	15·0

(*a*) Honours degree required in Universities of New South Wales and Newcastle (pass degree $4,011).

7.34 It will be seen that, whereas commencing salaries for tutors range from $4,199 p.a. to $4,738 p.a. ($4,011 p.a. for pass graduates in two New South Wales universities), the salaries paid to four-year trained teachers range from $5,250 p.a. to $5,550 p.a. The rates of increase in tutors' salaries needed to achieve parity range from 15·0 per cent in the Australian National University to 27·4 per cent in the Queensland universities.

7.35 I have also examined the commencing salaries paid to honours graduates or graduates of professional faculties who enter Commonwealth or State public services. In the Commonwealth Public Service, the commencing salaries for graduates with first or second class honours have recently been increased to $5,450 p.a., and in some specialised areas rapid advancement is possible beyond this salary during or after the first twelve months of service. Thus, in the Australian Foreign Service selected first or second class honours graduates receive a salary of $5,450 during a year of training, successful completion of which results in a salary of $6,787. State public service commencing salaries for clerical/administrative grades are sometimes below the Commonwealth level (e.g. $4,844 p.a. for an arts/commerce honours degree in Victoria and $5,631 p.a. for a second class honours degree in New South Wales), while commencing salaries for honours graduates in professional fields usually range from about $5,000 p.a. to about $5,500 p.a. in Commonwealth and State public services.

Recommended Salary Levels

7.36 The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations submitted that the commencing salary of tutors should be $6,000 p.a., rising by five increments of $400 each to a maximum of $8,000 p.a. Universities and State governments, while generally supporting the proposition that my recommendations on salary ranges for sub-lecturer staff should take into account the level of teachers' salaries, tended to argue that rates of increase should be roughly in line with those of lecturers. But the Australian Government proposed uniform commencing salaries for all universities, graduated according to the level of academic qualification. The commencing salary proposed by the Australian Government for a pass graduate was $5,300, for an honours graduate $5,700 and for a higher degree $6,100. In each case, however, there were to be only two additional increments in the tutor's range, the first of $300 and the second $400.

7.37 In the light of the foregoing considerations and having regard to the various claims which have been made, I recommend that the commencing salary for a tutor be fixed at $5,500. As I have already indicated, in recommending this salary I am assuming that universities will usually require a good honours or four-year (or longer) professional degree as the basis for appointment at this level. For reasons which I have already given, I do not intend to recommend salary levels which are rigidly geared to the attainment of formal academic qualifications. However, I recommend that for the time being a lower commencing salary of $5,100 be retained for tutors whose qualifications and experience do not match those of a good honours graduate. In so doing I envisage that this lower salary of $5,100 will be paid to tutors in New South Wales universities who, because they have only pass degrees, are currently receiving salaries of $4,011 p.a.

7.38 It is convenient to consider the range of salaries for my categories of tutor and senior tutor after the appropriate maximum salary for senior tutors has been determined. The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations recommended that the maximum salary for senior tutors should be the same as the maximum salary for lecturers, but in so doing the Federation clearly had in mind

career tutors (or what I have called principal tutors). The Australian Government, in recommending maximum salaries of $8,100 (pass degree) and $8,500 (honours degree), indicated that it considered that senior tutors should be *'given the opportunity to advance to a comparable level to the range maximums of State graduate teachers'*. Because the qualifications and responsibilities of teachers and senior tutors have little in common at this level, I would not wish to prescribe a rigid link between the maximum salaries of senior tutors and graduate teachers. In present circumstances, however, I consider that the maximum salary for senior tutors should be $8,400, which is the same as the minimum salary recommended for lecturers.

7.39 Given the salaries which I am recommending for tutors (minimum) and senior tutors (maximum), and having regard to existing salary ranges, numbers of steps and periods for which appointments are usually made, I further recommend that salary ranges be fixed for tutors at $5,500 rising by 5 steps or increments of $250 to $6,750, and for senior tutors at $7,000 rising by 5 steps or increments of $280 to $8,400. In proposing these ranges, I should make it clear that I am not recommending that there should necessarily be an automatic annual progression from one point on the scale to the next. This is a matter which individual universities will need to determine for themselves, in the light of the period of appointment, conditions of service generally and the standard of performance of the staff members concerned. Given the tendency for automatic progression in the salaries of other comparable groups, however, I would normally expect tutors and senior tutors to be given the benefits of salary progression within their respective ranges during the periods of their appointment.

7.40 I should also make it clear that I am not recommending any change in existing arrangements in universities regarding transition from the tutorship grade to the senior tutorship grade. Furthermore, in recommending a salary scale for my category of principal tutors I assume that universities, if they use the principal tutor range at all, will continue to apply a promotion bar at the level of the commencing salary for a lecturer, that is at $8,400 on my recommended scale for senior tutors. It is not my function to make recommendations about staff structures and work roles, but I would assume that before they make use of the proposed principal tutor scale universities will consider carefully whether there is in fact need for a sub-lecturer scale which parallels that of lecturer.

7.41 The range I recommend for principal tutors is $8,400 to $10,700. I see a close affinity, in terms of qualifications, experience and even responsibilities, between this group and subject masters in schools. The range for principal tutors has therefore been selected with due regard to the salaries which teachers can command as subject masters and, in terms of their career prospects, as deputy principals or even principals of high schools. The incremental steps of $460 which I am recommending correspond to those in the lecturer's range, but the proposed maximum salary of $10,700 is two steps below the maximum for a lecturer. Existing sub-lecturer staff who have been appointed on a salary scale which extends beyond this point should have their expectations confirmed, but I am recommending that no new appointments to sub-lecturer staff be given a salary range which extends beyond two steps below the maximum salary for a lecturer.

Transformation of Existing Salaries to New Scales

7.42 It remains to consider the problem of reconciling a minimum percentage increase for sub-lecturer staff with the recommended salary ranges for the

three categories I have distinguished. Having regard to the salary movements which have occurred in other occupations and the percentage increases which I am recommending for senior academic staff, I recommend that the salaries of all sub-lecturer staff in the categories of tutor and senior tutor be increased by at least 24 per cent, and that the salaries of all principal tutors be increased by at least 23·5 per cent. Existing staff members should then be fitted into the proposed salary scales in such a way as to ensure that they all receive at least those rates of increase.

7.43 Tables 7–3 to 7–5 are intended to be used as transformation tables for this purpose. For tutors and senior tutors, the actual rate of increase of individual staff members will range from just over 24 per cent to a maximum of 31 per cent, but in most cases the range is 25 to 29 per cent. The minimum increase for principal tutors will be 23·5 per cent. To the extent that the upper limit of these percentage increases is more generous than I would normally have been disposed to recommend, it may be justified by the disadvantages which most sub-lecturer staff have suffered in the past and by the need to rationalise and standardise the sub-lecturer salary structure. Again I should make it clear that, although existing staff members may derive additional benefits as a result of their transformation to the new salary scales, I have it in mind that all future appointments will be made in accordance with the new

TABLE 7–3

PROPOSED SALARY TRANSFORMATION TABLE FOR TUTORS.

Recommended Scale	*Existing Scales*						
	Macquarie New England N.S.W. Newcastle Sydney(b)	*La Trobe Melbourne Monash(b)*	*Adelaide Flinders*	*Queensland James Cook*	*W.A.*	*Tas.(b)*	*A.N.U.*
$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
5,100	4,011						
5,500	4,290		4,199 4,384	4,290	4,420	4,351	
5,750	4,513 4,569	4,569	4,569	4,510	4,575	4,564	
6,000	4,736	4,709 4,710	4,754	4,730	4,730	4,777	4,738
6,250	4,848 4,960 4,984	4,850 4,851 4,991 4,992	4,939	4,950	4,885	4,990	4,905
6,500	5,127 5,184	5,128	5,124	5,170	5,040	5,203	5,072
6,750	5,406	5,266 5,404		5,390		5,416	5,239 5,406
7,000(*a*)						5,629	
7,280(*a*)	5,828						

(*a*) Recommended to apply only to staff already on stated salaries. No new appointments to be made or additional increments to be granted to raise salaries beyond $6,750.

(*b*) Includes teaching fellows.

TABLE 7-4

PROPOSED SALARY TRANSFORMATION TABLE FOR SENIOR TUTORS.

Recommended Scale	*Existing Scales*						
	Macquarie New England N.S.W. Newcastle Sydney	*La Trobe Melbourne Monash(a)*	*Adelaide Flinders(a)*	*Queensland James Cook*	*W.A.*	*Tas.(a)*	*A.N.U.*
$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
7,000		5,404 5,545	5,474	5,504	5,473		
7,280		5,685 5,686	5,685	5,724	5,628 5,783	5,685	
7,560	5,964	5,827 5,965 5,968	5,896	5,944	5,938	5,964	5,966
7,840	6,244	6,109 6,244 6,247 6,252(b)	6,107	6,164	6,093 6,248	6,243	6,133
8,120		6,385 6,400(b)	6,318	6,384	6,403		6,300 6,467
8,400	6,522	6,523(c) 6,548(b) 6,660 6,661 6,696(c) 6,697(b)	6,529 6,740	6,604		6,522	6,634

(a) Includes teaching fellows, senior teaching fellows or instructors.
(b) Principal Tutors in University of Melbourne.
(c) Includes Assistant Lecturers in University of Melbourne.

scales. For example, I am proposing that an Australian National University tutor on the bottom of the range (who now receives a salary of $4,738) should have his salary increased to $6,000. However, I have it in mind that the future commencing salary for a tutor in any university should be $5,500 (assuming as I have done that such a person has a good honours degree or its equivalent).

7.44 Because the salary ranges which I am recommending extend through a greater number of steps than those currently in force in some universities, the funding of increased salaries in later years of the present triennium should allow for any continued progression to the extent that it is expected to operate in the universities in question.

TABLE 7-5

PROPOSED SALARY TRANSFORMATION TABLE FOR PRINCIPAL TUTORS
(Senior Tutors and Other Sub-Lecturer Staff in Lecturers' Salary Range).

Recommended Scale	*Existing Scales*						
	Macquarie New England N.S.W. Newcastle Sydney	*La Trobe(b) Melbourne Monash*	*Adelaide Flinders*	*Queensland James Cook*	*W.A.*	*Tas.*	*A.N.U.*
$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
8,400	6,801	6,801				6,801	
8,860	7,136	6,869 7,062 7,172	6,951 7,162	6,854 7,105		7,080	
9,320	7,470	7,255 7,448 7,543				7,462	
9,780	7,804	7,641 7,914				7,795	
10,240	8,138	8,285				8,128	
10,700	8,472	8,656					
11,160(a)	8,806	9,027					
11,620(a)		9,390					

(a) Recommended to apply to staff already on stated salaries. No new appointments to be made to raise salaries beyond $10,700.
(b) Includes instructors.

Chapter 8: Several salary levels for professors

8.1 It is important to bear in mind that I am asked to advise on salaries or salary ranges to be used as the basis for the assessment of grants to universities, having regard, *inter alia*, to the desirability of several salary levels for professors to take account of special merit, responsibility or the requirements of particular disciplines. I have mentioned earlier that, although this term of reference speaks of *'salary levels for professors'*, it is open to me to recommend special salary ranges for any special group of sub-professorial staff (such as clinical lecturers in medicine) as distinct from the generality of academic staff.

Differentials and Loadings

8.2 Sir Richard Eggleston used the term 'differential' to denote a salary addition which attaches to the position occupied and the term 'loading' to denote an addition based on the personal position of the person receiving the loading. I shall tend to use the term 'differential salaries' in a generic sense, but in so far as I make a distinction between differentials and loadings I shall be defining the terms somewhat differently from Sir Richard. When I use the term loadings I shall have in mind supplements for responsibility, and when I refer to differentials I shall have in mind supplements intended to take account of special distinction, other personal attributes (such as seniority) and the requirements of different disciplines. In effect, I shall therefore be distinguishing between responsibility loadings and merit, seniority or market differentials. A particular category of responsibility loadings, discussion of which I shall defer until Chapter 9, is a loading for clinical responsibility of the kind which is commonly paid in medical schools.

8.3 Merit and seniority differentials will usually be permanent. Discipline differentials and responsibility loadings may be either permanent or temporary. In discussing responsibility loadings, I should also indicate that I see a distinction between the salary paid to a person who holds full-time responsibilities of a kind which cannot be regarded as part of a professor's normal duties, for example a full-time dean, and the supplements which may be received by a professor who is temporarily performing a particular task, for example a dean who has been appointed for a limited term and who continues to perform teaching or other professorial functions. I am not really concerned in this Chapter with the salaries paid to people such as full-time deans or directors of schools. Staff associations (and others opposed to differential salaries) agree that such persons exercise a different kind of responsibility from professors and that their salaries may therefore properly be differentiated from those of professors.

Approaches to Differential Salaries for Professors

8.4 There are broadly four options available to universities in relation to differential salary levels for professors:

(*a*) The open-ended bargaining system prevailing in the United States of America, where in effect all the factors responsible for differential salaries are taken into account by the operation of the market.

(*b*) A range of professorial salaries of the kind which operates in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, where in addition to upper and/or lower limits an average level of salary is specified for funding purposes and certain other conditions may be laid down to ensure that a spread of salaries is actually achieved.
(*c*) A combination of a standard professorial salary and a laissez-faire approach to differentials of the kind which operates in Australia; individual universities are left to determine their own policies, with the result that some pay differential salaries according to their own criteria and some pay no differentials at all.
(*d*) A standard professorial salary with no provision for either differentials or loadings.

The Existing Situation in Australia

8.5 The present position in Australia is that, while all universities with medical schools pay clinical loadings, some universities also pay merit, seniority or market differentials and responsibility loadings. Many universities either pay no differential salaries to professors or restrict the differential payments to clinical loadings. The criteria used for differentials include: special merit, distinction or achievement; length of service; differences among disciplines; and market considerations based, for example, on the extent to which staff need to be recruited from fields in which there is a high proportion of independent professional practitioners. In one university, responsibility loadings are paid to heads of departments in accordance with a size criterion, heads of departments which are classified as 'very large' receiving higher loadings than heads of so-called 'large' departments. In other universities, loadings are paid to some heads of departments, heads of schools and deans. In addition to the clinical loadings in medical schools which have already been mentioned, medically qualified non-clinical professors and dental professors sometimes have their salaries differentiated by means of loadings.

8.6 Although no university has what may be described as a range of professorial salaries, the Australian National University has three salary levels for professors, the lowest corresponding to the standard professorial salary in Australian universities and the others carrying merit differentials of $1,000 and $2,200 respectively. Differentials and loadings in all universities are small in comparison with the basic professorial salary. In one university, merit differentials range from a few hundred dollars to about $1,000, and responsibility loadings from a few hundred dollars to less than $2,000. About half the professors receive differentials or loadings of one kind or another. In another university, non-clinical differentials and loadings range from about $500 to about $1,500. Whether, to what extent and on what criteria differentials and loadings should be paid are questions which each university has been left to resolve for itself.

The British and New Zealand Schemes

8.7 In the United Kingdom, average and minimum salaries are fixed for professors. Within these constraints, universities may determine the salaries paid to individual professors with regard to such factors as responsibility, eminence in scholarship, difficulty of recruitment and so on. Salaries of medical staff who have clinical responsibilities in teaching hospitals are determined separately by reference to National Health Service salaries. We were informed of a convention that the average should not become the norm, but there is a heavy concentration at this point. As at 21 November 1972, the broad distribution of salaries was as follows:

	Percentage of all professors
Between 12% and 18% below average salary	9
Between 6% and 12% below average salary	17
Between average and 6% below average	42
Between average and 6% above average	20
More than 6% above average	12
	100

8.8 As at 3 August 1972, the minimum salary for professors was £5,376 p.a. and the permissible average was £6,528 p.a. The maximum salary for a clinical professor is currently 36·7 per cent greater than the minimum salary for the non-medical professor.

8.9 In New Zealand, a range of salaries for professors was introduced in April 1964. An average which must not be exceeded is stipulated as is also a minimum mean deviation. The purpose of the range of salaries is to enable university governing bodies to recognise a number of criteria: quality of teaching, contributions to research, administrative responsibilities in running a large department, competition for staff with particular qualifications from universities overseas and, outside the universities, from New Zealand and other countries, and seniority. In February 1973, the range of salaries for professors (excluding professionally qualified staff of medical and dental schools) was $12,268 p.a. to $15,675 p.a. (New Zealand currency), provided that:

(*a*) the average of salaries paid to professors in any year was not to exceed $13,631, and

(*b*) the mean deviation from the average of salaries paid to professors ($13,631) was to be not less than $700.

The range of salaries for university medical academic professors was from $16,016 to $17,721, provided that the average of salaries paid in any year was not to exceed $17,378. In the case of university dental academic professors, the range of salaries was from $12,268 to $15,675 provided that the average of salaries paid in any year was not to exceed $14,314.

Conflicting Views on Differential Salaries

8.10 It will already be apparent, from the differences in policies which have been noted, that the governing bodies of Australian universities have conflicting views about the payment of differential salaries. We were also informed that, medical salaries apart, the members of the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee are not of one mind on the issue of different salary levels for professors. In the Committee's submission these differences were expressed as follows:

'Some Vice-Chancellors take the view that the disadvantages of several salary levels outweigh the advantages; that it is better to attract distinguished scholars by providing very attractive conditions of work, including, where other responsibilities are heavy, appropriate administrative and research assistance. Other Vice-Chancellors take the view that the provision of funds to finance either several salary levels as at the Australian National University, or the British 'professorial spread' scheme, could have net advantages; that the view that differential salaries for Professors is contrary to the right academic spirit does not

square with existing differences or with the willingness to rely on outside earnings to keep University salaries 'competitive' in areas where there is a strong demand in the market place for the services of Professors.'

8.11 The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations is strongly opposed to different salary levels for professors, and I think it true to say that most academics dislike differential salaries based on merit, seniority or differences between disciplines. In its submission the Federation indicated its opposition to differentials (defined as permanent up-grading of salaries for particular staff members) in the following terms:

'The Federation recognises that differentials are already applied to a greater or lesser extent by all Australian Universities over limited areas and according to policies decided by each University. However, it has consistently opposed such differentials arguing that satisfactory basic salaries for all academics would remove many of the difficulties of recruitment and retention which are the main grounds for argument in favour of differentials.

'The Federation holds to that position. While recognising the current practices in the various Universities it would argue against any general extension of such practices and in particular against differentials being built into the academic salaries structure by the fixing of professorial salary scales or of differentials by the Tribunal.'

8.12 The Federation indicated that it was opposed to merit and discipline differentials partly because of the difficulty of objectively assessing academic merit and market value, and partly because it regarded such differentials as inimical to the true nature of a university and the traditional concept of equality of disciplines. In this regard, the Federation and individual staff associations expressed a fear that merit and discipline differentials would cause divisiveness and internal frictions in universities. The Federation was also opposed to differential salaries for professors based on the degree of responsibility carried, on the ground that: *'Any scheme which provides differential material reward for administrative responsibility at the expense of scholastic qualities can only be to the detriment of the Universities in the long run'*. The Federation was nevertheless prepared to concede that there might be a case for loadings for staff members who assume temporary administrative responsibilities. But it submitted that such a case *'has strength only when burdens cannot be shared and when the extra responsibilities place a significant extra work load upon a member of staff relative to his colleagues'*.

8.13 The representatives of some State governments supported responsibility loadings and discipline differentials in order to attract professors into certain faculties. Two State government submissions argued in favour of a range of professorial salaries; one of these indicated reservations about using special merit as a criterion and argued that responsibility should be the major test: *'The greatest emphasis should be on the classification the position calls for rather than the particular qualifications of the person who currently occupies it'*. (The adoption of such a principle, it was submitted, would also permit differentiation in professorial salaries between universities; this is a question I take up later.) The representatives of some State governments indicated that they did not support differential salaries (especially merit differentials).

8.14 The Australian Government saw some merit in salary differentiation for professors, but said it was hesitant to give unqualified support to the concept because it did not wish to impose differential salaries on an individual university if the university considered that they were undesirable. Subject to these

reservations, the Government suggested two alternative schemes for my consideration. The first was described as follows:

'In preference to the Inquiry recommending specific salary differentials, the Commonwealth would favour the recommendation of a basic professorial salary . . . . with each university being granted additional funds, based on a percentage of the total professorial salary grant, which it would be free to use to provide higher professorial salaries in specific areas (e.g. medical) in which it considers this desirable.'

8.15 The alternative scheme proposed by the Australian Government provided for additional grants to be allocated for professorial salary differentials *'on a formula which would* **ensure** *that the bulk of professorial positions did not drift away from the basic salary towards an average figure'*. Thus the proportions of professorial appointments which universities could make at various levels would be specified in some detail.

The Responsibility of Governing Bodies

8.16 I have enjoyed the full and frank discussions on these issues which I have had with all sections of the academic community and with representatives of governments. I can say that the American approach to salary differentiation received no support in any quarter. We have seen, however, that some governments favoured the adoption of a professorial range along the lines of the United Kingdom and New Zealand systems. The main advantage I see in this approach is that it would simplify the problem of making funds available to universities for the purpose of paying differentials and loadings. But in my view any advantage of this kind would be more than offset by the disadvantages of such a system. These would include the loss of university autonomy which would be associated with the coercive effect mentioned by the Australian Government. The introduction of such a scheme would also, in my view, create considerable disharmony in the academic community at the time when existing professors had to be classified in accordance with points in the range.

8.17 It therefore remains for me to consider the desirability, in the Australian context, of curtailing, continuing or extending the existing practices. The firm conclusion to which I have come is that these are matters which should be decided, either as a matter of general policy or in individual cases, by the governing body of each institution, a view which was expressed by Sir Richard Eggleston in his 1964 Report.

8.18 I cannot see why, within the financial constraints imposed by the grants received from governments, any university should be prevented from paying differential professorial salaries in excess of the basic salary which is adopted for the purpose of allocating the grants. I consider that an over rigid salary structure could inhibit the ability of a governing body to act in the best interests of the university. We have seen that there are arguments for and against differential salaries, and there is much room for the diverse opinions held by experienced university academics, administrators and governing bodies. I am persuaded that the financial grants made by governments should be such as to enable those universities which now pay professorial loadings and differentials to continue the practice (and to extend it if they think it necessary or desirable), and to enable universities which do not pay these additional amounts to adopt the practice should they, at any future stage, deem it wise to do so. For practical economic reasons there should be a limitation on the amounts made available for these purposes by the government grants.

Merit Differentials

8.19 As I have already indicated, existing merit differentials are rare and small in amount. The distinguished academic usually receives satisfactory recognition of his excellence through the provision of better research funds, facilities, research teams and supporting staff. But I recognise that a university may occasionally consider it desirable to pay a differential for outstanding distinction in service, scholarship or teaching. In those Australian universities where merit differentials are presently paid there do not appear to have arisen any internal jealousies among the professorial staff, and while there are undoubtedly problems in establishing a procedure for identifying merit I do not agree that they cannot be resolved. The machinery for determining merit should be left to each university to establish.

The Role of Responsibility Loadings

8.20 Although I fully accept the right of universities to lay down criteria for responsibility loadings, I would like to express my own thoughts on this question. I have already spoken of the way in which the notion of responsibility has been, in my view, loosely equated with that of additional administrative burdens. Everyone should play his or her part in the performance of the routine administrative functions of a department or school. This sort of work has increased in quantity in recent years for reasons I have mentioned, and I believe that universities should take care to see that the greater involvement of certain members of academic staff in the administrative chores does not result in a diminution in the quality of teaching and research. I appreciate that academics find it difficult to avoid a certain amount of this work—indeed it has always been part and parcel of their role. But a university teacher has not been appointed to carry out routine housework and if the department cannot be run without an undue work load of this kind there is something wrong with its management or with that of the university itself. After all, much money has gone into Australian universities, while physical conditions for staff at all levels and the quality of libraries, equipment, laboratories, etc. are better now than they have ever been. If the problem is as bad as stated by some there is a need for a re-organisation of the administrative structure and possibly for the provision of more administrative staff, research and laboratory assistants. But this takes me outside my terms of reference.

8.21 My personal view is that universities should pay loadings to departmental heads, faculty deans or heads of schools only when a significant 'management' responsibility is involved, for example in the case of a large department where there is a responsibility well above the average for the managment of financial resources and staff or for the control and care of sophisticated equipment. Another person who may well qualify for such a responsibility loading is the chairman of the professorial (or academic) board in some universities. A professor is not appointed as an administrator as is a vice-chancellor or a full-time dean. It was agreed on all sides that there could be no objection to differential salaries being paid for different tasks. Universities are now appointing people as full-time deans or as heads of schools or of departments either permanently or for fixed terms. The full-time dean is appointed primarily as an administrator, not as a lecturer and researcher; he performs, in a more specialised field, duties analogous to those carried out by vice-chancellors, principals and their deputies. Such full-time appointments should carry with them salaries (and possibly expense allowances) commensurate with their status and functions. Where there is a

rotating headship among the professors in a department or the headship is part of a professor's normal duties, so that the head is expected to participate in teaching and research, the answer to the administrative load is the provision of support staff, the lightening of the teaching load if necessary and arrangements to enable him to recoup any out-of-pocket expenses related to his office.

8.22 But why should such a person be paid more than he was receiving as a professor merely because he spends time on administration rather than on teaching and research? And if a reader or senior lecturer becomes the head or chairman of a department or the dean of a faculty why should he, for that reason alone, receive a higher salary? The head or dean (as the case may be) must assume a certain amount of administrative responsibility and be capable of delegating tasks among the members of his department or faculty. By virtue of his appointment, a professor should possess the qualities needed for planning and directing programs of teaching and research and should be prepared to serve on university committees. The duties which he performs by virtue of his chair are recognised in the higher salary paid to him.

8.23 It is not for me to endeavour to formulate any criteria for the assessment within a university of a scale for loadings or differentials. There is no advantage in uniformity in these matters. What I have said about responsibility loadings stems from my concern that academics feel they are becoming obliged to participate more and more in administration and are able to spend less time on research and scholarship. I repeat my view that Australian universities should take a fresh and a hard look at this problem and at their own administrative machinery, with a view to making it less cumbersome and less wasteful in terms of academic resources.

The Funding of Differentials and Loadings

8.24 It will be clear from the foregoing that I am leaving it to each university to decide whether differentials or loadings are to be available to its professors, and if so to what extent such supplements are to be paid. In effect, I am recommending that the existing situation with respect to differentials and loadings be continued.

8.25 The permissive philosophy which I have espoused with respect to differential salaries poses some problems in relation to funding. This is because universities differ in their policies relating to loadings and differentials, and because I am recommending that such policies be left to individual universities to determine. If I had been recommending a range of salaries on the United Kingdom or New Zealand pattern, it would have been possible for me to recommend that funds be provided on the basis of an average level of professorial salaries. Under circumstances where I am leaving it to universities to determine their own policies, however, it is not possible for me to recommend that funds be made available universally on the basis of some average figure. If a university were to decide to use such funds, not for salary supplementation but for some other purpose, the effect would be to nullify the purpose of my recommendation. On the other hand, if I were to recommend that earmarked funds be made available to universities to the extent that they decide to take advantage of the opportunities for paying loadings and differentials, this would tend to erode the autonomy and responsibility of universities.

8.26 In dealing with this problem in 1964, Sir Richard Eggleston commented as follows:

'My recommendation accepts the existing situation and contemplates that

each university will continue its present policy (or lack of it) with regard to loadings and differentials. I should only add that if any State university wished to change from a system of equality to one of paying loadings I think it should be made possible for it to do so. Certain safeguards would obviously be necessary. For example, it might be intimated by the Universities Commission that if a State university were to define in acceptable terms the basis on which professorial loadings would be paid and the machinery by which they would be assessed, and could make the necessary arrangements for so much of the finance as was not available from Commonwealth sources, the Commission would recommend the necessary increase in the Commonwealth grant. It would be necessary to impose some overall limitation on the additional expenditure involved. On the figures supplied to us by one university now paying such loadings, an addition of approximately 4 per cent to the aggregate of non-medical professorial salaries calculated at the standard rate is required to cover existing non-medical loadings. A smaller percentage would be sufficient at the inception of any new scheme. Where there are non-medical differentials, as distinct from loadings, such a proposal should, I think, provide for their absorption in a general loading scheme over a period of time. It is of the essence of these suggestions that sums so made available could not be used to pay equal salaries at a higher average level.'

8.27 I support in general these proposals as a basis for funding and my own calculations indicate that the 4 per cent figure suggested by Sir Richard should be sufficient to enable State universities, and the Australian National University in respect of its School of General Studies component, to finance the kinds and levels of loadings and differentials which I consider appropriate (excluding, however, the medical and dental loadings which I recommend be funded separately).

Supplementary Grants for Existing Differentials and Loadings : Suggested Guidelines

8.28 In so far as existing differentials and loadings are concerned I recommend that, in calculating the supplementary grants necessary to give effect to my proposals, the Australian Universities Commission propose finance on the basis of the following guidelines. For funding purposes, universities should be permitted to increase all existing differentials and loadings, if they wish to do so, in direct proportion to the increase in standard professorial salaries, namely 21 per cent, subject to the following additional constraints in terms of absolute amounts:

(*a*) an upper limit of $2,000 per annum for the total salary supplements of an individual professor in each State university;

(*b*) an overall upper limit of 4 per cent of total professorial salaries, calculated at the standard rate, for each State university; and

(*c*) special arrangements for the Australian National University, discussed in detail below but consistent with the constraints to be applied to State universities.

8.29 To be consistent with my proposal that the determination of salary differentials should be left to individual governing bodies, I should perhaps indicate that I am not suggesting that the constraints I have recommended should operate as an embargo prohibiting the payment of additional amounts. But I believe that the limits I have proposed are generous and that, if a university wishes to exceed these limits, it should not receive additional funds for the purpose.

8.30 The Australian National University poses a special problem because of the unique character of its Institute of Advanced Studies, with its six research schools, in the Australian university system. The University has three levels of professorial salary. The highest level (currently $17,569) is used sparingly and only for recognition of outstanding services and distinction, the middle level ($16,369) is received by most professors in the Institute and a few in the School, while the standard Australian professorial salary ($15,369) is paid to some professors in the Institute and to most professors in the School. In addition, further salary supplements are paid to directors and deans in both the Institute and School. Despite the three levels of salary, the system operating in the University is closer to that of other Australian universities which pay merit differentials than to the British system of a professorial range. The salary structure which I have described was established in 1966 with the concurrence of the then Minister. The salary differentials have not changed for a long time and I was informed that the Commonwealth Government has in the past expressly instructed the University not to increase them. In its submission, the University's Council asked that funds be provided to enable the 1966 relativities of the differential salaries to be restored.

8.31 In line with my recommendations relating to State universities, I recommend that supplementary grants be provided to the Australian National University to enable it to increase all its salary differentials and loadings by 21 per cent. In the case of the School of General Studies, the $2,000 limit on individual supplementation and the limit of 4 per cent on standard professorial salaries should apply for funding purposes, as in the case of State universities. A dean receiving a middle-level salary should thus be limited to a total supplement of $2,000 for funding purposes. Because most Institute professors are on the middle level and a few are on the highest level, these limits are not appropriate for the Institute and I recommend merely that the straight 21 per cent increase be applied to professorial salaries for funding purposes. Because their responsibilities are different from those of other Institute professors, the full-time deans or directors of Research Schools should be eligible, as they are now, for both the highest level salaries and the additional supplements payable to deans or directors.

8.32 I have it in mind that universities themselves will determine whether or not the salary supplements are superannuable. Their main criterion will presumably be whether the supplements are permanent or temporary.

Guidelines for Funding a New or Extended System of Differential Salaries

8.33 The foregoing recommendations will, I believe, enable the Australian Universities Commission to use existing differentials and loadings as the basis for its recommendations on the level of supplementary grants to be made to universities. If, in the light of the proposals made in this Report, a university wished to introduce a system of loadings and differentials or significantly to extend an existing system, it could do so at any time but in order to receive supplementary funds for the purpose it would need to make a specific application to the Commission on the basis of the guidelines I have recommended above. Funds could then be provided (without retrospectivity) on the occasion of the beginning of a new triennium or a general salary adjustment (which might be either an adjustment following a national wage case decision or an adjustment resulting from a decision of the proposed academic salaries tribunal). I should make it clear that, except for this initial

allocation, I am not suggesting that funds be provided separately for the purpose of loadings and differentials. I am assuming that any funds which are provided for purposes of loadings and differentials will be absorbed in general university funds and that, in future years, the Commission's recommendations will merely take account of the existence of loadings and differentials in a quite general way.

8.34 My recommendations should not be taken as implying that universities must adopt policies of awarding salary differentials to professors or of increasing the numbers or amounts of present loadings. It would be improper, and contrary to the spirit of my recommendations, for a university to increase the average of professorial salaries by granting 4 per cent across the board. Loadings should only be given in selected cases based upon the kind of special considerations which I have mentioned, and I am recommending that a professorial salary range of the British or New Zealand type should not be introduced.

8.35 Professors who receive loadings for clinical responsibilities should also be eligible to be paid loadings based on the criteria discussed in this Chapter, and that is why I consider the 4 per cent calculations should be made by reference to *all* standard professorial salaries. However, I must make it clear that my recommendations mean that, should an individual professor be granted more than one non-clinical loading (e.g. one for special merit and another for responsibility), for funding purposes the aggregate of them should not exceed $2,000 p.a.

8.36 I conclude that my general recommendations on salaries, allied with the right of universities to pay differentials and loadings to professors within the limits I have suggested, will if adopted overcome most of the difficulties of recruitment and retention of staff. Professorial salary differentials, based on such yardsticks as scholarly distinction, outstanding research ability, the need to obtain a person of special quality in a particular field and abnormal responsibility, should be left for determination and quantification by each university. My view of the value level of a professor is reflected in my assessment of the standard professorial salary.

Smaller Universities

8.37 The government of one of the less populous States submitted that I should recommend lower salaries for professors in smaller universities. It argued that small universities cannot afford the highly sophisticated and expensive facilities economically justified in the larger universities, where there are greater numbers of post-graduate students, and that a small university cannot hope to attract professors of outstanding reputation when it is unable to provide these facilities. The question of several salary levels for professors as between universities may be outside my terms of reference. However, I am not in any case persuaded by the arguments put to me that a university which offers lower professorial salaries will be able to recruit people of sufficiently high quality. I think Sir Richard Eggleston's view in 1964, when considering a similar submission, was correct when he said that this *'would have meant condemning those institutions to suffer an inferior status'*.

Locality Allowances

8.38 Submissions from several universities and staff associations asked me to recommend special loadings for academic staff in particular localities. Thus:

(*a*) academics at the three universities in the Sydney metropolitan area asked for a special salary loading based upon higher costs of living, and in particular housing costs, relative to other places in Australia;

(*b*) members of Macquarie University asked for a special loading by reason of (i) poor public transport, which was said to necessitate the use of private transport for commuting purposes, and (ii) the stage of the University's development, its peculiar teaching demands arising from a higher proportion of evening and external students, and methods of examining which place a heavier work load upon its academics;

(*c*) the staff at the James Cook University of North Queensland asked for a special locality allowance to compensate for such matters as a lack of educational facilities for children in professional and technological areas, limited health facilities, the cost of travel to capital cities, the academic isolation of the University, inferior library facilities and unavailability of periodicals for personal research, and the comparatively higher cost of living in Townsville; and

(*d*) the academic staff of the W. S. & L. B. Robinson University College of the University of New South Wales, which is situated at Broken Hill, asked that they should continue to receive the flow-on of the climatic and disability allowance ($402 per annum, married) which is paid under the relevant public service award to the non-academic staff of the College.

8.39 I doubt whether the question of loadings based on locality is covered by my terms of reference (see also my comment in relation to smaller universities) but, in any event, I do not consider that a case has been made to warrant my recommending special loadings in the circumstances outlined above. The cost of living varies from time to time and from place to place and it is well nigh impossible to weigh the disadvantages arising from such factors as higher costs of foodstuffs, property and travel, on the one hand, against what may be termed advantages based upon climate, better working conditions, accessibility and proximity to centres of intellectual and cultural activities, on the other. Members of the academic staff at the James Cook University are paid by the University an allowance corresponding to the locality allowance prescribed by the Public Service Regulations of the State, namely $5.50 per fortnight for married males and $2.75 per fortnight for single males and females. There are small income taxation concessions applicable to the zones in which Townsville and Broken Hill are situated. It seems to me that it is a matter for each university to determine whether it will continue to pay allowances, as in the case of Townsville and Broken Hill, or whether it will institute such a scheme. We were informed in Townsville that there were, at present, no real recruitment problems apart from those areas in which all universities are experiencing some difficulties. The special loading was sought rather to alleviate fears of such a situation becoming a reality in the future, when the initial attractiveness of pioneering the establishment of a new university has gone. I believe that a general lift in academic salaries will ease these gloomy apprehensions. I am not prepared to recommend that special arrangements be made in the grants to universities to cover this situation.

8.40 The James Cook University is far from the capital cities with their larger universities, libraries and research facilities. To a lesser extent this is true of other universities, such as New England and Western Australia. Academic isolation should not be ignored but I do not think the antidote lies in a differential salary. I would like to see the staff of isolated universities afforded better opportunities to attend conferences and meetings of professional bodies, or to visit libraries and research centres in order to keep in touch with recent advances and to have better access to material for the pursuit of scholarship. This can be achieved by improved provision for conference leave and travel expenses, but this is another matter which falls outside my terms of reference.

Chapter 9: Clinical loadings

9.1 There are three broad groups of medically qualified academic staff in medical schools: clinical, para-clinical and pre-clinical. A member of the staff of a clinical department is required to teach undergraduate and post-graduate students in the medical faculties and also to accept an additional responsibility without which he cannot discharge his teaching function, namely the care of patients. Clinical staff are usually located in the departments of medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology, psychiatry and paediatrics; in the main the para-clinicians are the medically qualified persons in the departments of pathology, microbiology, biochemistry, bacteriology, radiology and pharmacology; and the pre-clinicians are the anatomists and physiologists.

The Existing Situation

9.2 With the exception of the sub-professorial clinical staff in the University of Sydney, at present all clinical academic staff in the medical faculties, from professor to lecturer inclusive, receive salary supplements. The amount of the loading varies from university to university and according to the rank of the staff member. The loadings received by clinical professors range from $1,603 to $4,045, while loadings for sub-professorial staff range from zero to $1,500. Some of these loadings are financed from endowment funds. In the para-clinical field professors receive loadings which are somewhat lower than those received by clinical professors, but not all para-clinical sub-professorial staff receive additional payments. In the pre-clinical field, some professors enjoy the benefit of small differential payments while others receive only the standard professorial salary. Some universities also pay dental loadings.

9.3 In his 1964 Report, Sir Richard said :

'It follows from what I have said that my recommendation also involves the acceptance of existing practices as to medical and dental differentials for professors and readers. The existence of clinical differentials may be thought to be justifiable on the basis of the direct responsibility of clinical professors for the care of patients. When the whole range of medical differentials is considered, one is tempted to agree with one medical professor who suggested to us that the real basis of medical differentials was that "doctors are doctors". But it is sufficient for me to say that my recommendations are made on the basis of existing practices, and do not imply any judgment as to their desirability or otherwise.'

Submissions on Clinical Loadings

9.4 The submission received from the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee made the following observations:

'It is clear that there is something special about medical Professors. In the hospital service opportunities for clinical practice and research are such that salaries there have a marked effect on the attractiveness of University posts. Because of the important role of Clinical and Para-clinical Professors in the work of the teaching hospitals, there is much to be said for a new type of arrangement whereby the Universities pay medical Professors the standard salary and the

teaching hospitals pay a supplementary salary. There are now well established arrangements for paying Visiting Specialists ("Honoraries") which could easily be adapted for this purpose. There may be greater problems in establishing satisfactory arrangements for payment for para-clinical and pre-clinical services rendered than for Clinical Professors.

'Given the current differences between States it is not likely that such a change could be made immediately, and pending such an arrangment it will be necessary for the Universities to pay higher salaries.'

9.5 The executive of the Committee, when meeting with us, suggested that a standard clinical loading of $3,000 be paid to professors, associate professors and readers, and $2,500 to senior lecturers and lecturers, in clinical departments, and that a standard loading be paid to staff in para-clinical and pre-clinical departments of between two-thirds and one-half of the clinical loading.

9.6 Although, as we have seen, the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations is opposed to loadings and differentials, representatives of the Federation and of individual staff associations recognised that the payment of differential salaries to clinical staff was a fact of life which could not be ignored, and which could create problems if it were to be done away with at present. They also acknowledged that there were certain responsibilities peculiar to the academic clinician but, in general, opposed any extension of differential payments.

9.7 We have had many lengthy submissions from all the clinical schools, the Association of University Clinical Professors of Australia, other clinical academic groups including those representing sub-professorial clinical staff, the Australian Medical Association, and from several other clinical and non-clinical academics. It would be confusing if I were to set out the points made in all these submissions, but I will attempt to summarise the main ones and so give a fair sample of the arguments.

9.8 The Association of University Clinical Professors of Australia submitted:

'The present low salaries of clinical academics contrast strongly with the high academic and professional qualifications required of them, their high standing in the profession and the breadth and depth of their responsibilities.

'Current academic incomes compare unfavourably with those available elsewhere—in full time hospital practice, private practice and in university clinical departments in Britain, the United States and Canada where many of our potential academics now work.

'Because of the long period of training, the year round commitment to patient care, teaching and research, the need to recruit the most gifted persons into academic medicine and their market value, it is proposed that the salaries of clinical academics of all grades be determined in relation primarily to those in competing medical occupations."

9.9 The Association pointed out that the financial rewards of clinical academics below the rank of professor are very much less than those of full-time hospital specialists, and argued that, as the qualifications on first appointment for a lecturer are the same as those for a hospital specialist, the salaries should be the same. Many hospital specialists in teaching hospitals also have rights of private practice which add substantially to their incomes.

9.10 The Association put the case for medically qualified academics in non-clinical and para-clinical departments in the following way:

'Experience has shown the great importance of teachers in these subjects having a medical degree and the broad education in medicine that this implies.

Science graduates, however brilliant, have no training in pathology or medicine. With rare exceptions they lack comprehension of human disease and the needs and interests of doctors in training.

'There has been a steady decline in the proportion of medically qualified teachers in Anatomy, Physiology and Biochemistry. Already they are in a minority in departments of Biochemistry and it will not be long before the same is true of Physiology and Anatomy. There is no doubt that the lower salaries in these departments are discouraging the entry of medical graduates. It is now very difficult to interest young men with a medical degree in a career in physiology or anatomy. This will not be in the interests of medical education . . .

'Pathologists in the hospital services are on the same specialist scale as clinicians. The academic pathologist is in the same situation as the academic clinician relative to hospital specialists, that is, much worse off.

'Non clinical and para clinical staff in universities do not have as a rule the same hospital commitments to patient care as clinicians. Non clinical staff do not require the same extended professional training as clinicians. Both these factors would argue against salaries as high as clinical academics. Nevertheless, we feel there is a good case for providing a sufficiently high loading to make the posts attractive as career opportunities from lecturer level up for those with a medical qualification. Clearly pathologists in the universities should not be paid less than hospital specialist pathologists of equal grade.'

9.11 Sub-professorial clinical staff argued that clinical loadings should be paid to all medically qualified university staff with clinical appointments in teaching hospitals. In one university they submitted that, having regard to relative responsibilities and the salaries of hospital specialists in different grades, all grades of clinical academic staff should receive the same loading in absolute terms ($3,816 at current levels). Both professorial and sub-professorial staff emphasised the long training period of clinical academics. They submitted that, because of the need to obtain specialist professional qualifications, higher university degrees and postdoctoral experience, the total training period may extend to some 14 to 18 years from the commencement of the undergraduate course.

9.12 In a supplementary submission, the N.S.W. Public Service Board proposed a solution as follows:

'The result of the sharp difference in salary between the academic and hospital specialist has been a significant decline in the number of medically qualified persons operating in the pre-clinical areas. It is understood that in 1957 in Australia all Professors of Anatomy, Readers and Senior Lecturers in Anatomy were medically qualified. By 1971 there had been a significant change and now a number of Professors are not medically qualified and there has been a sharp drop in the numbers of medically qualified personnel in other academic posts in pre-clinical areas.

'The Board submits that the appropriate solution is that all medical graduates in the Faculty of Medicine should get a loading to bring them into a reasonable relationship with the Medical Specialist rate under the Award. The Academic scale already makes substantial difference between the salaries for the different academic ranks. Since any loading is being given on the basis that the academics concerned are medical graduates, there does not seem to be any justification for having a sliding scale according to rank. In fact the greatest anomalies between the hospital Specialist and Academics occur at the level of Senior Lecturer.

'It is considered, therefore, that a flat loading of, say, $3,000 p.a., should be paid to all Medical Academics in the Faculty of Medicine of the rank of Lecturer and above.

'A further question is whether some distinction should be made between the pre and para-clinical medical professor and the clinical medical professor on the grounds that the latter accepts greater responsibilities and would be called for night and weekend duties.

'It is tempting to suggest that the loading for pre and para medical academics be reduced by $1,000 p.a., but this may not be justified on the following grounds—

1. If pre and para-medical academics receive lower salaries than clinical academics they become a second class group. If the extra payment is because they are medicos, then no differential is justified.

2. 'If clinical academics are called upon for a significant amount of clinical work this would obviously reduce their academic contribution. They, in addition, would have the right of private practice which would compensate them for their clinical responsibilities and any additional out of hours calls.

'It is considered that formal loadings should be restricted to medical academics, and whilst this would not prevent Universities from paying loadings in other areas as they see fit, any such other loadings should be paid out of funds provided on the basis that no additional funds will be made available for this purpose.'

The Responsibilities of Medical Clinical Staff

9.13 I am convinced that university medical schools have had great difficulties in recent years in the recruitment and retention of staff in the clinical departments, particularly as a result of the discrepancies between academic salaries and those of the full-time salaried medical officers who are employed by the teaching hospitals and who carry out similar clinical duties. The present salary structure involves serious anomalies. For example, a reader at one hospital in charge of an important renal transplant unit has been receiving considerably less than a salaried hospital doctor working under his direction. In another instance, a teaching hospital registrar with the status of tutor was receiving a higher salary than a senior lecturer appointed from overseas under whom he was working. In another university, academic staff holding appointments as senior lecturers were receiving salaries of up to $5,000 below those of hospital specialists with similar qualifications, who were working alongside them and accepting similar responsibilities. As a consequence, the university department was rapidly being denuded of staff and the teaching hospital itself was in danger of losing its accreditation.

9.14 I consider that the payment of a clinical loading can be justified by reference to the patient-care responsibility which the clinical academic is obliged to undertake by virtue of his university appointment. Patient care is a responsibility unique in the university world; it is the factor which distinguishes the work of clinicians from that of all other academics. In taking charge of a patient, the clinician assumes a heavy personal responsibility which he cannot abrogate. His accountability to the patient can be distinguished from the responsibility of another academic who engages in outside consultative practice, because the latter is a task voluntarily performed and forms no part of a person's university employment.

9.15 The unique nature of the academic clinician's work also stems from his continuing association, in the teaching hospitals, with medical specialist staff and consulting staff. The clinical academic works shoulder to shoulder alongside the hospital specialist who performs like duties and has similar responsibilities—patient-care, teaching and research. There is therefore a strong case that their

remunerations should not be significantly disparate. No other university academic works in such an environment, and no parallel situation exists in any other part of the community. The patient-care situation also means that the person in the university clinical unit is frequently on call at all hours of the day and night, while the teaching year is longer in medical faculties than in most other disciplines.

9.16 Although I do not propose to interfere with the concept of salary differentiation which has existed in medical schools for many years, the question may need to be reconsidered from time to time should circumstances change or should there be an acceptance by hospital authorities of the obligation to pay for patient care within hospitals.

9.17 In its submission to the Committee of Inquiry into Medical Schools of Australia (a copy of which has been made available to me), the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee advanced the following propositions to overcome the acute staffing problems of medical schools:

'(*i*) *Payment for patient care by university staff in teaching hospitals should be accepted and established generally, such payments to be made through the hospital authorities and not the universities;*

(*ii*) *A system of joint university–hospital appointments should be established; and*

(*iii*) *There should be appointments for university medical staff which are fixed in terms of salary and hospital status by comparison with equivalent full-time hospital appointments.*'

9.18 For a variety of reasons, the solution put forward by the Vice-Chancellors' Committee cannot be implemented at present. I must say that I am attracted to this system of 'topping up' standard academic salaries to the level of those paid to full-time hospital specialists. But until such time as hospital authorities agree to do this and all hospital specialists are paid in the same way, the universities themselves must grapple with the problem.

9.19 The Australian Government has announced its intention to implement a new national health scheme in 1974. I understand that this may provide that all medically qualified persons who perform clinical tasks in hospitals, including university teachers with appointments in teaching hospitals, will be remunerated for their clinical work by the hospitals on a sessional or other basis as determined by the hospital authorities. If and when such a scheme were to come into operation, the universities should cease to pay clinical loadings to the staff of medical schools and the level of grants recommended by the Australian Universities Commission should be revised accordingly.

Para-clinical and Pre-clinical Staff

9.20 I take the view that clinicians should be well paid because they carry heavy personal responsibilities. This does not necessarily warrant my recommending a differential payment to the non-clinicians, because some medically qualified teachers in medical schools have no, or minimal, clinical responsibilities. All the para-clinical and pre-clinical medical disciplines occupy an important place in the training of medical students and they form the basis on which clinical teaching is developed. I accept the proposition that some of the teachers in these para-clinical and pre-clinical departments should be medically qualified. If they are medical graduates, they are better qualified to assess the relative importance of various aspects of medical education. Medically qualified staff are also able to teach the applied aspects of their subjects in the early years of undergraduate

clinical training. Indeed, strong departments of basic medical science, adequately staffed with full-time medically qualified teachers, are desirable for the future development of medical schools.

9.21 Changes are taking place in the planning of courses and curricula in medical schools, and steps are being taken to narrow the gap which has existed between the early pre-clinical training and the time when a student goes to a hospital for his clinical experience. The anatomist and physiologist are being brought more and more into teaching in a clinical situation, and the clinicians are moving towards doing some teaching in the pre-clinical years. By way of illustration, we were told that the Faculty of Medicine at the University of New South Wales strongly supports a curriculum in which emphasis is placed on clinical relevance. The present course relies heavily on medical graduates for the teaching of anatomy, physiology and pharmacology. The Faculty is designing a new curriculum in which these subjects will be so closely integrated with one another, and with clinical teaching throughout all the years of the medical course, that the terms 'pre-clinical' and 'clinical' will become obsolete. It was said that without suitably medically qualified staff to teach the basic medical sciences, such curricula development would be impossible.

9.22 In the new School of Medicine being constructed at the Flinders University, all the functions of patient care, teaching and research are to be housed under the one roof. The difference between the pre-clinical and clinical phases of the curriculum is to be largely abolished; it is intended that students will meet patients from the outset of their medical course. It is envisaged that the academic heads of the diagnostic and clinical disciplines will be responsible for the relevant work of diagnostic laboratories and of patient care, so that, for instance, the teaching of biochemistry will be under the general supervision of the Professor of Clinical Chemistry, who will also supervise the diagnostic laboratory services in chemistry.

9.23 The solution to the problem of para-clinical and pre-clinical salaries would seem to lie in bringing the staff concerned into the clinical area. Members of the para-clinical university staff, such as pathologists, haematologists, radiologists (therapeutic and diagnostic), clinical microbiologists and clinical biochemists, are in a key situation in the clinical context and frequently have clinical responsibility. They may also participate substantially in advancing the teaching interests of the university in hospital activities, e.g. by conducting autopsies, reporting on morbid histology, etc. In these cases, payment for clinical responsibility can clearly be justified; indeed, para-clinicians now carry out most of their teaching in the hospital milieu. I consider that governments and universities should deal with this problem by giving hospital appointments with clinical responsibilities to certain para-clinical and pre-clinical university medical staff, on a sessional basis or otherwise. There is a definite movement in this direction in Australia, and I would like to see it continue.

Recommendations on Clinical Loadings

9.24 I recommend that in full clinical departments salary loadings of $3,000 per annum be paid to professors and associate professors (or readers), and $2,500 per annum to senior lecturers and lecturers, and that these added payments be included for purposes of superannuation. Where existing loadings exceed these amounts they will no doubt continue at their present levels, but the amounts I have recommended should be used for funding purposes.

9.25 I have recommended a slightly higher salary supplement for professors and associate professors (or readers), because I feel that as the leaders of the clinical teams they ultimately accept heavier responsibilities than senior lecturers and lecturers. I nevertheless recognise that the latter may have as much, or in certain places even more, patient contact. In determining the amounts of the loadings I have taken into consideration the standard salaries which academic staff will receive if my recommendations are implemented on the one hand, and the salaries payable to full-time hospital specialists in the States on the other (see Appendix E).

9.26 In the majority of States, hospital specialists have limited rights of private practice and we were told that the specialists generally receive the full benefit of income from this source. University staff in medical schools also have limited private practice rights. Some academic clinicians have been in receipt of considerable outside earnings, while others earn little from this source. There are wide variations in the opportunities for the staff of university clinical departments to supplement their incomes from private practice based on teaching hospitals, both within a particular university and from university to university. I have said elsewhere in this Report that it may be desirable in certain fields, including medicine, for academics to engage in limited outside consultative work. In some medical schools the right to treat private patients within the teaching hospitals may be necessary to attract an adequate number of patients for teaching purposes. Academic clinicians themselves will be assisted in maintaining and developing their skills, and it is desirable that the community should have access to expertise which may not always be readily available from independent practitioners. I emphasise that private practice by academic staff should be restricted to teaching hospitals and limited in amount, so that it will not interfere with their teaching and research commitments to the university. As in the case of other university teachers, the rules relating to independent medical practice should be strictly obeyed and enforced and written returns of income should be made to the vice-chancellor annually.

9.27 I also recommend that clinical loadings be paid to para-clinical and pre-clinical university academic staff who have clinical responsibilities in teaching hospitals. In these cases, however, the amounts of the loadings for individual members of staff should be determined by the university in relation to the extent of the clinical responsibility undertaken in the teaching hospital by the staff members concerned. In other words, in the case of a staff member who has an appointment within the teaching hospital the university will determine the loading by reference to such things as the number of hospital sessions he attends, the periods during which he may be on call from the hospital, the degree of his responsibility for diagnostic work or analysis of specimens, the nature of his teaching duties within the hospital and so on. The loading should not exceed the amounts which I have recommended in the case of staff members of equivalent academic grade in the clinical departments, that is $3,000 for professors/readers and $2,500 for senior lecturers/lecturers. I will deal with the situation in relation to funding at the end of this Chapter.

9.28 It is appropriate that a member of the non-clinical staff who undertakes clinical responsibilities on a sessional basis, for example by taking an out-patient clinic, should receive a clinical supplement on a *pro rata* basis. A university pathologist with an appointment in a teaching hospital may well be judged as being entitled to the full clinical loading, while the duties and responsibilities of other para-clinicians may be recognised as being of near equivalence to those of the

full clinician. In the view I have taken with respect to the justification of medical loadings, it is impracticable for me to quantify supplements for any staff members other than those in the full clinical departments. However, the university itself will possess or will be able to obtain the information necessary to make a proper assessment.

9.29 I believe that the general increase in academic salaries which I am recommending will go a long way towards solving the problems of the recruitment and retention of suitable staff in medical schools. It should also help to halt the movement of medically qualified staff from non-clinical departments. The calculation by the university of clinical loadings should apply also to staff vacancies, so that advertisements could indicate to prospective appointees not only the nature of the clinical duties but also the total salaries. It may well be that, in the pre-clinical departments, universities may be obliged to continue certain *ad hoc* measures, such as appointing staff higher up the incremental scale than they would otherwise do or bringing in clinicians to teach certain applied aspects of non-clinical medical science.

9.30 As I have already indicated, medical professors should also be eligible for differentials and loadings on grounds of university responsibility, academic distinction, outstanding achievement, etc.

Dental Salaries

9.31 The representatives of Australian Dental Schools submitted claims for dental loadings partly on the basis of comparisons with graduates employed in hospitals, government departments and outside practice, and partly on the basis of responsibility. The Deans of Australian Dental Schools listed the following factors in discussing the responsibilities of dental teachers: clinical responsibility, the psychological involvement of patient, dentist and student, the length of the teaching year and the continuous close supervisory teaching contact with the student.

9.32 I have given my reason for recommending a salary supplement for medical clinicians, namely patient-care responsibility. A majority of professionally qualified full-time dental academic staff are also obliged to carry responsibilities for patients. In a dental school teaching is done by clinical demonstration on patients, but mostly the teacher has an observational role except when he needs to demonstrate operative procedures or to take over in critical situations, and he accepts responsibility for the procedures carried out by students under his supervision. He has the added need to spend some time regularly treating patients in order to develop and maintain clinical skills. I consider that the dental teacher should receive a salary supplement based upon, and proportionate to, his patient-care responsibility. At present only two universities pay a small differential to dental professors.

9.33 I recommend that the maximum loadings for full-time dental teachers who have clinical responsibilities be $1,500 for professors, associate professors or readers, and $1,250 for senior lecturers and lecturers. These figures represent the upper limits of clinical loadings for dental teachers; I am conscious of the fact that not all teachers of dentistry are involved to the same extent in clinical functions. It is again a matter for each university to determine the extra payment to which a particular clinical teacher is entitled, having regard to the degree of his clinical involvement. Those who may qualify for the maximum amount are those whose commitment to clinical teaching is high in the sense that they have a number of clinical teaching sessions each week and have clinical responsibilities

in a dental hospital. I may say that I consider that the ultimate solution to dental clinical salaries corresponds to that to which I have referred when dealing with medical salaries, namely that those staff members who have clearly identified and distinct hospital commitments should be paid clinical supplements by the hospital.

9.34 In arriving at a maximum figure I have had regard to a number of factors such as: the qualifications required of dental teachers; the differences between the patient-care responsibility of the medical practitioner and of the dentist; the fact that the dental teacher is not generally working alongside a non-academic clinician with similar responsibilities; and the salaries payable to dentists who perform clinical work and who are employed in health services and allied institutions. I do not consider that the salaries of dental academics should be in parity with comparable appointments in the medical faculties.

Veterinary Salaries

9.35 I was asked to give consideration to recommending a loading for clinical academic staff in the faculties of veterinary science. It was submitted that this group has additional responsibilities and extra-curricular work involved in running and maintaining veterinary practices in conjunction with their teaching and research duties, that they are on call, including week-ends, for clinical duties, that they are responsible for their patients outside the normal working hours of non-clinical academic staff, and that they must spend a certain amount of time in clinical work in order to maintain the clinical skills needed for teaching and research. However, I am not persuaded to the view that clinical veterinarians qualify for a clinical payment in excess of the basic academic salary. The animal—veterinarian relationship does not carry the same close personal obligations and accountability as those borne by the doctor and dentist towards their human patients, nor does the veterinarian work in the hospital situation alongside the hospital specialist performing similar clinical functions. I am aware that clinical tasks, including pathological and microbiological diagnostic work, reduce the amount of time that staff can devote to teaching and research, but the gravamen of the veterinary case is really one of heavier and more time-consuming work loads in comparison with other academic disciplines. If this is indeed the situation, the answer to the problems in veterinary schools would lie in an improvement of the staffing position so that teaching, research and clinical duties can achieve a better balance. But this is a matter which falls outside my terms of reference. In order to have clinical material available for teaching and research, it is incumbent on the veterinary academic to treat animals and for the school or department to maintain a service open to the animal-owning public. Should the academic staff be obliged to spend some of their time and expertise in what is really the conduct of private practice, and if funds are received by the university from those who benefit from the application of these skills, the university may well consider compensating these people for the extra work load by granting them some payments from this source.

Funding

9.36 In the case of the full clinical loadings which I have recommended be paid to all members of clinical departments who are medically qualified and who have the usual clinical responsibilities, there is no difficulty in providing funds. I simply assume that the Australian Universities Commission will recommend supplementary grants to universities which will enable the specified amounts to be paid. In so far as the loadings for para-clinical, pre-clinical and dental staff

are concerned, the problem is different because I am recommending that it be left to each university to determine the extent of the individual staff member's clinical responsibility and the loading to be paid in the light of that responsibility. Under these circumstances, I have decided that the best course of action is for me to propose that the Australian Universities Commission base its recommendations for recurrent grants to each university on average loadings as follows:

(*a*) $1,500 per annum for each medically qualified professor and reader (or their equivalents) in the university's para-clinical and pre-clinical departments;

(*b*) $1,250 per annum for each medically qualified senior lecturer and lecturer (or their equivalents) in the university's para-clinical and pre-clinical departments;

(*c*) $750 per annum for each dentally qualified professor and reader (or their equivalents) in the university's dental clinical departments; and

(*d*) $625 per annum for each dentally qualified senior lecturer and lecturer (or their equivalents) in the university's dental clinical departments.

9.37 It will be clear that these recommended amounts are averages to be used for funding purposes. As I have already indicated, it will be necessary for each university to determine the actual amount to be paid to each staff member in the light of the criteria and the upper limits which I have recommended, namely $3,000 for para-clinical and pre-clinical professors, associate professors and readers, $2,500 for para-clinical and pre-clinical senior lecturers and lecturers, $1,500 for dental professors, associate professors and readers, and $1,250 for dental senior lecturers and lecturers. As in the case of non-medical differentials and loadings, each university will also need to determine the extent to which, if at all, para-clinical, pre-clinical and dental loadings are to be taken into account for superannuation purposes. I have already indicated that full clinical loadings are to be superannuable.

Chapter 10: Permanent review machinery

10.1 My term of reference in relation to future salary review requires me to advise on permanent machinery for reviews of academic salaries in both universities and colleges of advanced education. The method of funding tertiary education has made it desirable for academic salaries to be determined on a national basis. In the past, academics have fallen between two salaried groups in the community, those whose salaries are reviewed by ordinary arbitral processes and those who are treated as a higher salary group such as judges, heads of public service departments and members of statutory bodies, and whose salaries are reviewed from time to time by Parliament. I therefore consider that there is a great need for an independent and permanent salaries tribunal, which will be responsible for reviewing academic salaries periodically in both the university and college sectors. The levels of university salaries which I have recommended in earlier chapters have been calculated on the assumption that such machinery will be established. I did not receive one submission which did not favour the creation of a permanent tribunal, and there was no support for a continuation of the present unsatisfactory *ad hoc* reviews.

Summary of the Submissions

10.2 The major submissions received in relation to machinery may be discussed conveniently by reference to the functions of the proposed tribunal, its constitution, the frequency of reviews, the conduct of proceedings and the effect of its decisions. There was general agreement that the role of the tribunal should be restricted to that of determining salaries and salary ranges (but not conditions of employment) of members of the academic staff of universities and colleges.

10.3 The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee proposed a permanent tribunal in the form of a Commissioner assisted by two assessors. Several universities and some staff associations favoured this kind of tribunal, referring to the present Inquiry and those conducted by Sir Richard Eggleston as possible models. The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations decided, after considering a number of alternatives, to recommend a tribunal consisting of a judge of the Industrial Court or a presidential member of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, appointed for five years in the first instance. Some governments and staff associations proposed a three-man tribunal, comprising a judge or other independent chairman and two other members nominated by or drawn from the ranks of governments, staff associations or private industry. Submissions from the college of advanced education sector sometimes proposed a single presidential member but usually favoured a one-man tribunal with two assessors, one of whom should be chosen because of his knowledge of colleges. However, the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education proposed that *'the permanent machinery should consist of a deputy president of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and two federal conciliation commissioners'*. The Federation thus envisaged straight arbitral proceedings with staff associations registered as industrial unions, but did not discuss the constitutional problems implicit in such

a proposal. It was usually envisaged that the tribunal would be a continuing (but not necessarily a full-time) body and that it would have a permanent secretariat.

10.4 The Vice-Chancellors' Committee recommended that there should be an automatic review of university salaries at intervals of two years, or at such other times as the tribunal should decide. The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations also submitted that the tribunal should be required to review salaries every two years, while wishing to leave the way open for a special review if a *prima facie* case could be made to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Boards of advanced education and other groups from the college sector, where they discussed frequency of review, usually seemed to be content with three-yearly reviews. However, the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education envisaged arbitral hearings at least every two years. One State government recommended that '*reviews should be made each two years or more frequently if requested by all State Governments*'. Some of the other governments supported two-yearly reviews while others agreed in effect with reviews on request. The Australian Government submitted that, all parties having agreed that academic staff should have assured access to a wage-fixing tribunal, it may not be necessary to provide for a prescribed period of review. But it argued that, if provision were to be made for a regular two-yearly review, it would not then favour assured access to the tribunal between the periods of review.

10.5 Most parties agreed that proceedings should be as informal as possible. The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations argued that there should be provision for agreements between it and the governments. University submissions usually argued that university and college of advanced education salaries should be reviewed separately. The Australian Commission on Advanced Education considered that salary levels in universities and colleges should be reviewed concurrently but that each review should be based on evidence collected especially for each sector. Some college submissions favoured combined hearings.

10.6 The main issue which arose in relation to the tribunal's powers was whether its decisions should be determinative or advisory. Staff associations were anxious that the tribunal should have determinative powers but they did not always indicate how, given constitutional constraints, this could be achieved. Governments and some representatives from the college sector tended to see the role of the tribunal as advisory, while several representatives of university governing bodies and staff associations addressed themselves to the problem of devising machinery which would recognise Commonwealth and State constitutional powers. The Vice-Chancellors' Committee recommended that the tribunal should report to the seven Commonwealth and State governments and that its reports should be laid on the table of the Commonwealth Parliament or otherwise published within four weeks.

Review Machinery in Other Countries

10.7 In the United Kingdom, the salaries of non-clinical university staff are determined on the basis of complicated arrangements for negotiation followed, if agreement cannot be reached, by arbitration proceedings. The negotiating machinery consists of two committees. The first of these (Committee A) consists of representatives of the university authorities and the Association of University Teachers (A.U.T.), who are required to appoint an independent chairman and to seek agreement. The University Grants Committee (U.G.C.) is represented at meetings

of this Committee so that it will subsequently be able to advise the Government. It is stipulated that one proposal only goes forward from Committee A; this is formulated by the Chairman if the other parties do not agree. The second committee (Committee B) consists of representatives of government, university authorities and the A.U.T., again with the representatives of the U.G.C. present as advisers to Government. In the event of failure to reach agreement on the proposal which comes from Committee A, the salary aspects of the matter are referred to arbitration by a tribunal appointed by the Government but consisting of an independent Chairman, a member selected from a list proposed by Committee A and a member selected by the Government. Negotiating machinery does not exist in respect of clinical salaries, which are adjusted in line with recommendations of the Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration.

10.8 In New Zealand, academic salaries are controlled in a general way by the Government and the salaries so determined are included by the University Grants Committee in the calculation of quinquennial grants. The Government recognises, as its adviser on academic salaries, a University Salaries Committee which has been established by the University Grants Committee (U.G.C.). The University Salaries Committee consists of the Chairman and the four lay members of the U.G.C., a non-voting member appointed by the Government and a non-voting member appointed by the University Vice-Chancellors' Committee. The Committee is required to undertake a general review of academic salaries at least every three years and to advise the Government on any matters relating to salaries and other conditions of employment which it considers relevant. It may thus initiate further reviews at any time between the three-yearly reviews. Negotiations and discussions between the Chairman and the Government follow the reviews, and the Committee's recommendations are not necessarily accepted. Medical and dental salaries are reviewed separately. A recent change in machinery has provided for a two-tier system somewhat analogous to the British machinery, whereby an Advisory Committee (comprising an independent Chairman and representatives of the Government and the Association of University Teachers) considers the report of the University Salaries Committee. The Chairman then reports to the Government on the views of the Advisory Committee.

Proposals for Automatic Adjustments

10.9 Submissions were made that academic salaries should be adjusted annually on the basis of movements in the index of average weekly earnings. Apart from other relevant considerations, this is not a satisfactory basis for wage fixation in general, for the reason given by the Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator, Mr. J. E. Taylor (in his decision of 7 February 1973 awarding an increase to engineers):

'*I would add that it should be evident that if average weekly earnings are used to increase wages and salaries then the increases granted must increase average weekly earnings and so wages and salaries must again be increased to restore the relationship they had with average weekly earnings which itself will again rise and so the merry-go-round will continue and with ever increasing speed.*'

10.10 Further, I do not see why academics should have the privilege of automatic adjustments when most groups in the community are obliged, failing agreements with their employers, to have their claims determined by an arbitral body. A proposal for a different kind of automatic adjustment was rejected by Sir Richard Eggleston in 1964 in the following terms, with which I agree:

'During the course of this Inquiry the question of how future salary adjustments should be considered has been raised and discussed in most States. One of the proposals put forward was that university salaries should be fixed, and automatically adjusted, by reference to some appropriate scale of salaries established in an organization served by a developed mechanism for salary adjustments, for example, the C.S.I.R.O. There are several reasons, however, why I think this proposal is unacceptable. The main reason is that as I have already indicated I have not discovered any organization where staff positions over the whole range, in functions and responsibilities, are sufficiently like university positions to justify such a reference. In any case, to establish such an automatic link would profoundly alter the type of case likely to be presented to a tribunal asked to fix the primary salary, because of the significance of the proceedings in relation to university salaries. The result would be to destroy the basis upon which the automatic link had been established.'

10.11 I nevertheless recommend below that academic salaries should continue to be adjusted automatically in accordance with national wage case decisions. In the remaining sections of this Chapter, I set out my recommendations and comments on the main issues which appear to be relevant to the establishment of permanent machinery for the review of academic salaries.

Functions and Jurisdiction of an Academic Salaries Tribunal

10.12 *Recommendation 1.* A tribunal shou[illegible] established by a statute of the Commonwealth and given the function of de[illegible]ing the salaries and salary ranges for the several grades of academic staff within universities and colleges of advanced education.

10.13 It is envisaged that these salaries and salary ranges would be adopted by the Australian Universities Commission and the Australian Commission on Advanced Education for the purposes of recommending recurrent grants to be made to universities and colleges. Salary ranges should be interpreted in such a way as to include salary differentials and loadings. My terms of reference relate only to full-time members of academic staffs, so that grades of staff should be interpreted as comprising full-time teaching and research staff. Governments may, however, wish to consider the desirability of making provision for part-time teachers' salaries to be determined by the tribunal.

10.14 In my opinion, a tribunal could lawfully be established so as to give effect to the role which I hope it will play and to provide it with the functions and powers which I envisage. I will say one or two things about this which may be of assistance to those whose legal advice may be sought by governments. The necessity to have an academic salaries tribunal separate and apart from the existing Commonwealth wage-fixing machinery stems from the proposition that university work is not employment in an 'industry' within the meaning of the **Conciliation and Arbitration Act** (Commonwealth): see **Federated School Teachers' Association of Australia v Victoria** (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569; **Pitfield v Franki** (1970) 123 C.L.R. 448. It seems that a satisfactory method of dealing with the constitutional problem would be for a tribunal to be established by Commonwealth statute which would provide that the Commonwealth had no objection to the tribunal accepting powers and functions under State legislation for State purposes. This would avoid objections based on Section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The States could then be asked to pass legislation conferring on the tribunal power to determine the salaries of academic staff within their universities and colleges. In the existing system of funding universities and colleges it could be made a condition, under the legislation authorising grants to the States, that the latter

would contribute their shares of the funds in accordance with the determinations of the tribunal. In this way both the States and the Commonwealth would participate in the establishment of the tribunal. Any problem arising from the competing interests of the Commonwealth and of the States would largely disappear if the Australian Government were to assume full responsibility for financing tertiary education, as it has recently offered to do.

10.15 Apart from the Australian National University and the Canberra College of Advanced Education, universities and colleges are, and I suspect will remain, State institutions established under State legislation. State governments will naturally continue to have a close interest in the development of these bodies and will no doubt wish to have the opportunity of making submissions to an academic salaries tribunal. It must be remembered that it is each autonomous university and college, and not a State government, which is the employer of academic staff. I hope and expect that there will be no problems in Commonwealth–State relationships which will prevent the establishment of a tribunal. With the agreement of all governments it may be legally possible to designate an existing tribunal, for example the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission or the Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator. However, I think this would be unwise for at least two reasons; one that I am recommending that the procedures be informal and the other that I consider the tribunal should regulate only salaries and not other conditions of employment. I do not think it is my function to enter further into the constitutional and drafting aspects.

10.16 *Recommendation 2.* The tribunal's function should be limited to the determination of salaries.

I believe that the tribunal should not be empowered to deal with terms and conditions of employment generally. Universities and colleges differ considerably from one another, and each institution possesses, and should be able to develop further, its own distinctive character related to the policy adopted by its governing body. I hold firmly to the view that the autonomy of universities and colleges should be restricted as little as possible. Each institution should be free to initiate and develop, within accepted limits of demography and finance, policies of teaching, research and employment of staff; the experience of one institution will be useful to all. Naturally, the tribunal will be entitled to take into consideration all conditions of service and other benefits which it considers germane to the fixing of salaries, as I have attempted to do in this Report.

Constitution of the Tribunal

10.17 *Recommendation 3.* The tribunal should be constituted by one person whose qualification for appointment should be that he or she is:

(*a*) a judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court; or

(*b*) a deputy presidential member of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; or

(c) a judge of the Australian Capital Territory or any other Commonwealth superior court; or

(*d*) a judge of the supreme court of any State.

10.18 *Recommendation 4.* The person appointed to constitute the tribunal should be appointed for a term of not less than five years.

10.19 *Recommendation 5.* If requested by the tribunal the Australian Government should appoint two assessors to assist the tribunal in the performance of its functions, either generally or in relation to any particular case.

10.20 *Recommendation 6.* If assessors are requested they might conveniently be selected in the following ways:

(a) for the purposes of university salary reviews, one assessor might be chosen by the Australian Government from a panel of names furnished jointly by the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, while the other might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the State governments;

(b) for the purposes of college salary reviews, one assessor might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the Australian Commission on Advanced Education and the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education, while the other might be chosen by the Australian Government after consultation with the State governments.

10.21 *Recommendation 7.* The tribunal should be provided with a permanent secretariat.

10.22 As we have seen, opinions expressed in the submissions varied as to whether there should be assessors attached to the tribunal. The Federation of University Staff Associations proposed a permanent one-man statutory tribunal constituted by a judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court or a presidential member of the Commission. The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, among others, recommended that it be constituted in the same way as this Inquiry and the Eggleston Inquiries—a judge with two assessors. It is my opinion that any requirement for assistance from assessors should be left to the discretion of the tribunal itself. It may be that, in its first and early inquiries, the tribunal will wish to have the help of people conversant both with university and college structures and with government attitudes. After it becomes more familiar with the situation, it may prefer to act without necessarily having assessors appointed to assist. In any event, the tribunal will, of course, be able to call for submissions from all sections of tertiary educational institutions and from governments. Because I am advising that the tribunal should sit in an informal atmosphere, I do not consider it desirable that it have counsel appointed to assist it during its hearings. However, my advice to the tribunal is that, in any major case, assessors should be used. It has been my experience in the conduct of this Inquiry that they largely fulfil the function of counsel in that they put forward, for discussion and analysis, opposing points of view.

10.23 There was overwhelming (but not quite unanimous) support for the view that a member of the judiciary should constitute the tribunal. I have recommended that the tribunal should be a Commonwealth judge, a presidential member of the Commission or a State judge. I foresee difficulties in the appointment of a State judge; a State government may be reluctant to release one of its judges for a task which may involve him in spending a considerable amount of time away from his normal judicial duties extending, perhaps in broken periods, over a number of years. The tribunal will be a part-time one but it should have continuity of membership. It should be able to convene without undue delay meeting only when necessary. I think the tribunal will be enabled to discharge its functions with greater efficiency and expedition if it is constituted by a person who builds up familiarity with, and expertise in, academic salary issues over several reviews. I think that there is an advantage in having a person who is familiar with wage-fixing generally, and so I suggest that a presidential member

of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission should be appointed as the tribunal, but the choice is essentially a matter for government and there may be many considerations which could influence the selection.

10.24 I have suggested that the assessors be chosen in much the same way as in this Inquiry and the two previous ones. I am confident that this method of selection will have the support of governing bodies, vice-chancellors and principals and most university and college staff members. There is no reason why the same assessors, if chosen in the manner suggested, should not assist the tribunal in both the university and college reviews. There is no association or committee representative of the principals of all colleges corresponding to the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee. I have therefore suggested that the Australian Commission on Advanced Education be consulted by the Australian Government in lieu of such a body. If and when a committee representative of college principals is formed, the Government may see fit to request that a panel of assessors be furnished by that body jointly with the Federation of Staff Associations of Colleges of Advanced Education, as in the case of university reviews. I am not suggesting that the method of choosing assessors be enshrined in the legislation; I think it should be treated as a matter of convention or mutual understanding.

10.25 The working of the tribunal and its relationships with interested parties will be facilitated if there is continuity in the secretary as well as the person or persons constituting it. I do not envisage that the secretary will necessarily be engaged full-time in this task, but he will be responsible for keeping material on file and the records of all the tribunal's activities. Working within the appropriate government department, he will also be a ready point of contact for those who are entitled to approach it.

10.26 I have it in mind that the tribunal itself should decide whether general reviews of academic salaries in universities and colleges should be conducted as separate exercises in respect of each sector or as concurrent hearings. The question was raised whether there should be a separate tribunal to determine academic salaries in colleges of advanced education. Having regard to the relationship between university and college salaries, I am firmly of the view that it is desirable to have a single tribunal. Nevertheless, I consider that the differences between the two types of institutions are so distinctive as to make it likely that the tribunal will usually need to perform separate inquiries in relation to each of them. As I have already indicated, it may also be necessary to have different assessors for the different sectors. If separate inquiries are conducted, it would be an advantage if one followed the other or was not carried out in isolation from the other. Much material submitted in one case will be relevant in the other and duplication of time and effort should be avoided as far as possible.

Frequency of Reviews

10.27 *Recommendation 8.* The tribunal should convene for the purpose of conducting a general review of academic salaries in universities, or in colleges, or in both, at regular two-yearly intervals, if so requested by any of the bodies set out below:

University Review

The Australian Government
A State Government
The Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee
The Australian Universities Commission
The Federation of Australian University Staff Associations

The Australian Government
A State Government
The Australian Commission on Advanced Education
The Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education

10.28 *Recommendation 9.* Notwithstanding the requirement of a two-yearly review in accordance with recommendation (8), the tribunal should be empowered to initiate salary reviews at any time in relation either to all the full-time academic staff in universities and colleges of advanced education or to any sections of groups of such persons in either kind of institution, if any of the bodies mentioned in recommendation (8) can satisfy it that there are special circumstances which warrant such a review.

10.29 I have suggested a regular two-yearly review provided a government or a university (or college) federal body seeks it. The history of the past decade persuades me that a period of three years between reviews has been too long and has led to academic salaries lagging unduly behind other salaries in the community. Salaries in both the public and private sectors are now generally reviewed at more frequent intervals.

10.30 Many submissions pressed for a regular review every one or two years; others endeavoured to make a case for any interested party to be entitled to activate the tribunal at any time. Although I am attracted to the idea of a regular review, there may exist circumstances when none of the interested parties will think it desirable to have a review at the expiration of a particular two-yearly period. This has led me to recommend that the tribunal should convene every two years only if so requested by one of the parties. At the same time, I foresee that circumstances may arise from a number of causes, for example strong inflationary pressures or rapid salary movements in other areas, which could justify a review at a more frequent interval than two years. I also suspect that there may be a need for the tribunal to convene for the purpose of determining salaries in particular areas, such as sub-lecturer staff in universities or staff in colleges who hold positions above the senior lecturer level.

10.31 Colleges of advanced education are so diverse in function and size and are expanding so rapidly that it may be necessary for the tribunal to consider differential salaries among those institutions at one or more staff levels. On 14 September 1972, when speaking about this Inquiry in the Parliament, the Minister said: *'When the recommendations of the inquiry into university salaries are known, the Commonwealth and State governments will give further consideration to the question of academic salaries for colleges of advanced education.'* Following this Inquiry, I do not foresee that there will be a need or demand for a full work-value inquiry for many years. In recommending two-yearly reviews I have in mind that most reviews will involve only assessments based upon comparative wage justice, although work-value judgments may on occasions be necessary in determining the salaries which should be paid to certain groups.

10.32 For the above reasons, I consider that the tribunal should be empowered to operate at any time if it can be satisfied that special circumstances warrant it so doing. The legislation could spell out that the tribunal may refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the matter is trivial or if it considers that it is not in the public interest. I believe that if frequency of review is attained, approaches by institutions and staff associations will be made only in exceptional circumstances.

I agree with the opinions expressed in the 1964 Report that there is no reason why it should be necessary to make periodical reviews coincide with the triennium adopted by the Australian Universities Commission and by the Australian Commission on Advanced Education. Indeed, from a treasury viewpoint governments may prefer to make supplementary grants to tertiary institutions during the triennium, as they presently do in the case of adjustments following national wage decisions.

10.33 In my opinion, it would be undesirable to permit an individual university or college or an individual staff association to have the right to set the review machinery in motion; this could lead to frivolous and fragmented applications. I think that only governments and national associations representative of universities, colleges or their academic staffs should have this right, but all tertiary institutions and individual staff associations should be entitled to put material and submissions before the tribunal (see the following recommendation).

Conduct of Proceedings

10.34 *Recommendation 10.* The hearings should be conducted in an informal manner in the discretion of the tribunal; it should be empowered to make inquiries and to obtain information in any manner and from any source it might deem fit, and to request and receive submissions from the parties mentioned in recommendation (8) and from the governing bodies and staff associations of all universities and colleges of advanced education.

10.35 There was very little support for the proposition that the tribunal should operate in a formal arbitral sense with parties being represented by advocates, witnesses obliged to give sworn testimony, etc. The informal hearings have worked well in the past and the clear impression I have is that governments, as well as universities, are prepared to make fuller and freer disclosure of material and of their own ideas in an atmosphere of informality than in formal hearings. In the 1964 Report, Sir Richard said: '. . . *much of the information we have received would probably not have been available if a more formal approach had been adopted*'. It follows from what I have said that the sittings should be held in private and not in public.

Implementation

10.36 *Recommendation 11.* When a determination has been made by the tribunal it should send a certified copy of the determination, together with its reasons (if any), to the Prime Minister, the State Premiers, the Commonwealth Minister for Education, the Australian Universities Commission and the Australian Commission on Advanced Education.

10.37 *Recommendation 12.* The legislation should provide that the determination and the reasons (if any) be laid before both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament.

10.38 *Recommendation 13.* Unless either House of Parliament, within a specified number of days after a determination has been laid before both Houses, passes a resolution disapproving the determination (or any part thereof), then:

(a) the determination, or the part not disapproved, should be used by the Australian Universities Commission for the purpose of recommending grants for recurrent expenditure for universities, and by the Australian Commission on Advanced Education for the purpose of recommending similar grants for colleges of advanced education;

(b) the Australian (and State) Governments should make grants in accordance with and giving full effect to the determination, or the part not disapproved, as the case may be; and

(c) all universities and colleges of advanced education should pay salaries to academic staff at rates not less than those determined by the tribunal.

10.39 The last three recommendations have been formulated so as to give effect to my opinion that the decisions of the tribunal should be determinative rather than purely advisory, or recommendatory, in character. In accordance with the principle of independent wage fixation, statutory pay tribunals in Australia generally have determinative powers, and I cannot see why academic staff should be placed in a dissimilar position. I believe that failure to make the tribunal's decisions binding would lead to some erosion of the confidence of academics in the equity of salary review and in the stability of their position relative to that of other groups in the community. This could have unfortunate effects on the recruitment and retention of suitable staff. It would be difficult to have an appeal procedure in the case of an informal inquiry, quite apart from the constitutional problems involved in bringing the academics within the existing legal arbitral framework or of establishing a separate appellate body, but the absence of an appeal is one factor which has led me to advise that the Commonwealth Parliament should have the power to disallow the determinations. Although I am conscious of the interests of the States in this matter I believe that, if the tribunal's decisions are to be determinative, it would be impracticable for State Parliaments all to have similar powers of veto.

10.40 *Recommendation 14.* Provision should be made in the legislation for salary agreements to be made between the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations (or the Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education in a college salary agreement) and governments, and for such agreements to be lodged with the tribunal. Any such agreements should be made only after consultation with the governing bodies of universities or colleges, as the case may be.

10.41 It is desirable that academic staff should have opportunities to seek agreement on salary adjustments so as to avoid a hearing by a wage-fixing tribunal, as can other salaried groups in the community. Agreements of this kind should be made only after full consultation with the governing bodies of all universities or colleges, presumably through the medium of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee or a body representative of college principals.

10.42 *Recommendation 15.* Governments should continue to accept the obligation to make automatic adjustments to academic salaries in accordance with national wage case decisions.

Conclusion

10.43 I should not like it to be thought that the recommendations in this Chapter concerning the method of establishing the review machinery and its procedures constitute other than a convenient method for me to express advice to governments. They are intended to provide guidelines for those who may be entrusted with the task of giving expression to my proposals in legislation acceptable to parliaments.

APPENDIX A

Form of advertisement calling for submissions

The advertisement set out below appeared in the following newspapers, with the exception of the *Financial Review*, on Saturday, 30 September 1972. The *Financial Review* carried the advertisement on Monday, 2 October 1972.

Age
Sydney Morning Herald
Canberra Times
Courier Mail
Australian (national)
West Australian
Advertiser
Mercury
Illawarra Mercury
Townsville Daily Bulletin
Newcastle Morning Herald
Armidale Express
Financial Review

INQUIRY INTO ACADEMIC SALARIES

The Commonwealth Government has appointed Mr Justice W. B. Campbell of the Supreme Court of Queensland to conduct an inquiry into academic salaries in universities. Mr Justice Campbell will be assisted by Professor R. L. Mathews, Professor of Accounting and Public Finance at the Australian National University, and Mr M. C. Timbs, Executive Member of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, as assessors. The terms of reference of the inquiry are as follows:

(a) To advise governments on the salaries or salary ranges for full-time members of the teaching staff of universities which the Inquiry considers should be adopted by the Australian Universities Commission for the purpose of recommending grants to be made to universities, including the Australian National University, for recurrent expenditure. The Inquiry shall make its recommendations with respect to the grade of lecturer, senior lecturer, reader or associate professor and professor. In coming to its conclusions, the Inquiry shall have regard to:

(i) the rates of salary in other occupations in Australia which have previously been taken into consideration, or may be regarded as relevant, in the determination of academic salaries;

(ii) the requirement to attract and retain a sufficient number of persons of the needed quality;

(iii) the qualifications, functions, responsibilities and other attributes or factors required in the performance of the various levels of academic work;

(iv) the desirability or otherwise of establishing several salary levels for professors to take account of special merit, responsibility or the requirements of particular disciplines.

(b) To advise governments on the percentage increases which the Inquiry considers appropriate in the salary ranges for full-time members of the teaching staff of universities in sub-lecturer grades.

(c) To advise governments on the establishment of permanent machinery for future reviews of salaries for full-time members of the academic staffs of universities and colleges of advanced education and on the nature of such machinery, its powers and its procedures.

Interested persons are invited to provide written submissions and any relevant information which should be forwarded to:

Mr D. Fooks,
Secretary,
Inquiry Into Academic Salaries,
P.O. Box 826,
Woden, A.C.T. 2606

The closing date for submissions is Monday, November 13, 1972.

Further information is available on request from the Secretary, telephone Canberra 817211.

APPENDIX B

List of written submissions

Advanced Education Conference
Association of Professional Engineers, Australia
Association of Teachers in Schools of Social Work in Australia
Association of University Clinical Professors of Australia
Professor J. J. Auchmuty
Dr K. J. Ausburn
Australian Commission on Advanced Education
Australian Dental Association (Inc.), W.A. Branch
Australian Dental Association, Victorian Branch
Australian Government
Australian Medical Association
Australian National University Council
Australian National University Staff Association
Australian Union of Students
Australian Veterinary Association
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee
Emeritus Professor G. M. Badger
Professor A. G. Baikie
Professor R. J. Bearman
Mrs J. Belfrage
Professor L. M. Brown and Professor A. A. Hukins
Professor R. Butterfield
Professor D. B. Cheek
Mr D. A. Cole and Miss P. F. Ryan
Committee of Deans of Australian Dental Schools
Council of Advanced Education, Tasmania
Council of Teachers Colleges Staff Associations (Victoria)
Dr R. C. Cross
Professor H. Dudley
Associate Professor R. A. Eade (2 submissions)
The Hon. Mr Justice R. Else-Mitchell
Professor P. B. English
Federation of Australian University Staff Associations
Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education
Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education, Queensland Division (2 submissions)
Flinders University of South Australia Staff Association
Mr J. R. Forbes
Professor J. Francis
Mrs L. O. Frappell
Professor W. E. Glover
Gordon Professional Staff Association
Professor S. Griew
Griffith University Council
Government of Tasmania
Government of Queensland
Professor A. S. Hall

Mr W. D. Hardy
Dr A. M. Healy
Dr C. F. L. Hinrichsen
Dr K. Hirschfeld
Professor A. M. Horsnell
Institution of Engineers, Australia
Institution of Metallurgists (Australian Region)
James Cook University of North Queensland Council
James Cook University of North Queensland Staff Association
Mr S. John
Mr A. M. Kearns
La Trobe University Staff Association
Law Teachers of the Universities of New South Wales and Sydney
Professor A. Lazenby
Professor I. C. Lewis
Dr J. F. Lindsay
Professor J. Ludbrook
Associate Professor M. McCall
Associate Professor R. B. McKern
Macquarie University Council
Macquarie University Staff Association
Professor D. Maddison
Mr L. W. O. Martin
Dr J. A. L. Matheson
Monash University, *ad hoc* Committee
Monash University, Departments of Medicine and Surgery
Monash University, Professor A. W. Linnane *et al.*
Monash University Staff Association
Professor J. P. Morgan
Dr D. M. Myers
Professor R. H. Myers
Professor J. W. Nevile and Professor A. S. Carrington
New South Wales Public Service Board
Professor G. J. V. Nossal
Dr J. J. J. Pigram
Professor A. H. Pollard
Associate Professor J. B. Polya
Mr R. Procter
Professors of Pathology of the State Universities with Medical Schools
Queensland Agricultural College Staff Association
Queensland Professional Officers' Association
Dr T. I. Quickenden
Dr A. G. Serle
Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital Board of Management
Professor L. E. Smythe
South Australian Board of Advanced Education
Sub-Professorial Clinical Academics in New South Wales
Sydney Association of University Teachers
Mr E. Szomanski
Professor E. O. P. Thompson
Mr G. Tilly *et al.*

Treasury of Victoria
University Clinical Medical Staff Association (Queensland)
University of Adelaide Tutors' Association
University of Melbourne Council
University of Melbourne, Faculty of Dental Science
University of Melbourne Staff Association
University of New England, *ad hoc* Committee
University of New South Wales Council
University of New South Wales, Professors in the Faculty of Medicine
University of New South Wales Staff Association
University of Queensland Council
University of Queensland, Engineering Academic Staff
University of Queensland Staff Association
University of Sydney, *ad hoc* Committee
University of Sydney, Faculty of Dentistry
University of Sydney, Professorial Board
University of Tasmania Council
University of Tasmania, Department of Surgery
University of Tasmania, Sub-lecturing Staff
University of Western Australia, Faculty of Agriculture
University of Western Australia, Faculty of Dental Science
University of Western Australia, Faculty of Medicine
University of Western Australia Senate
Professor H. R. Vallentine
Victoria Institute of Colleges
Victoria Institute of Colleges Staff Associations Council
Victorian Teachers' Union, Teachers Colleges Staffs Branch
Dr V. W. Vodicka
Warrnambool Institute of Advanced Education Staff Association
Dr A. I. Webb
Professor M. J. Webb
Western Australian Institute of Technology
Emeritus Professor R. F. Whelan
Professor B. R. Williams
Dr K. Woldring
Wollongong University College, Heads of Departments
Wollongong University College, Sub-lecturing Staff
Professor J. F. D. Wood
W. S. & L. B. Robinson College Academic Staff

APPENDIX C

Persons interviewed or consulted

University sector

Co-ordinating bodies

Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee—
- Emeritus Professor G. M. Badger
- Professor D. P. Derham
- Mr F. S. Hambly
- Mr W. S. Hamilton
- Professor B. R. Williams

Federation of Australian University Staff Associations—
- Mr A. W. Anderson
- Mr P. Byers
- Mr P. Chopra
- Associate Professor S. J. Prokhovnik
- Mr G. W. F. Smith
- Dr van der Poorten
- Dr J. W. Watson
- Professor C. P. Wendell-Smith

Universities

The University of Western Australia—
- Mr A. W. Anderson
- Mr J. A. Appleyard
- Dr L. A. G. Aylmore
- Dr B. Balme
- Professor A. R. Billings
- Mr N. T. Bodycoat
- Professor A. J. F. Boyle
- Professor P. Brown
- Mrs B. C. Bubna-Litic
- Dr B. Clegg
- Dr J. Gentilli
- Mr T. G. Goodall
- Professor H. E. Hallam
- Mr R. Harding
- Sir Laurence Jackson
- Professor G. Gordon Lennon
- Associate Professor L. Little
- Associate Professor J. F. Loneragan
- Mr R. M. C. Lourens
- Associate Professor I. W. P. McCall
- Associate Professor M. G. McCall
- Associate Professor P. McGushin
- Dr E. H. Morgan
- Dr T. Quickenden

Professor J. P. Quirk
Dr P. D. Tannock
Associate Professor A. B. Vivian
Professor M. N–I. Walters
Professor H. Waring
Professor M. J. Webb
Professor R. F. Whelan
M. J. G. White
Professor A. J. Yates

Murdoch University—
Professor N. Bayliss
Mr D. D. Dunn
Professor S. Griew
Sir Stanley Prescott

Flinders University of South Australia—
Professor B. Abrahamson
Mr D. Allcock
Dr B. A. Barlow
Mr J. Blanford
Professor P. F. Bourke
Mr H. J. Buchan
Professor W. J. Cherry
Professor A. M. Clark
Professor J. W. Clark-Lewis
Dr K. E. Dixon
Professor R. W. V. Elliott
Professor G. J. Frankel
Mr J. W. Hayles
Professor K. J. Hancock
Mr G. J. Harrison
Mrs N. Knight
Dr L. C. Lack
Professor R. W. Russell
Mr R. J. Stimson
Dr P. J. O. Teubner

University of Adelaide—
Emeritus Professor G. M. Badger
Mrs G. Dunstan
Mr V. A. Edgeloe
Mr A. N. Goss
Professor A. M. Horsnell
Dr I. John
Professor J. Ludbrook
Dr H. J. Rodda
Professor E. A. Russell
Dr M. R. Sims
Mr J. C. Thonard
Mr A. Vicary
Mr J. G. Waterson

University of Sydney—
Mr G. Ball
Dr A. B. Basten
Mr W. M. Costello
Mr B. Deneny
Professor A. J. Dunston
Dr G. Edgar
Mr J. H. Elliott
Professor D. W. George
Mr J. Gerofi
Associate Professor R. J. Hunter
Mr G. E. Lewer
Mrs J. A. Lynch
Mr H. G. McCredie
Professor C. B. A. McCusker
Mr J. M. Mack
Dr J. C. Mackie
Mr W. H. Maze
Professor H. Messel
Emeritus Professor W. M. O'Neil
Professor R. G. H. Prince
Mr I. Pike
Mr B. A. Taylor
Professor M. G. Taylor
Mr G. J. Tilly
Associate Professor E. L. Wheelwright
Professor B. R. Williams
Professor P. R. Wilson
Miss O. Wood

University of Melbourne—
Mr J. Anwyl
Mr K. G. Armstrong
Mr A. T. J. Bell
Professor H. Bolotin
Professor P. Brett
Mr L. Brewster
Professor A. S. Buchanan
Professor D. E. Caro
Professor T. C. Chambers
Mr T. J. Cummins
Professor D. P. Derham
Miss D. Dyason
Mrs B. Falk
Mr J. Fogarty
Mr J. C. Habersberger
Professor M. E. Hargreaves
Professor A. Heron
Mr D. J. Hibberd
Dr K. C. Hines
Mr A. W. Hodgart

Mr E. McL. Holmes
Sir John Knott
Mr R. D. Marginson
Professor C. K. Moorehouse
The Hon. Mr Justice J. C. Norris
Professor J. R. Poynter
Mr R. R. Priestley
Sir Lance Townsend
Dr J. W. Watson
Mr L. Weickhardt
Emeritus Professor R. D. Wright

Monash University—
Professor R. R. Andrew
Professor J. Bornstein
Mr J. D. Butchart
Professor A. C. L. Clark
Mr A. G. Dunstan
Professor S. Faine
Professor B. G. Firkin
Associate Professor E. F. Glasgow
Dr W. A. Howard
Professor W. Ironside
Mr F. H. Johnson
Miss J. M. Jones
Professor D. A. Lowther
Dr I. McCance
Dr J. A. L. Matheson
Professor R. C. Nairn
Dr P. A. Riach
Dr G. A. Ryan
Professor W. A. G. Scott
Professor J. M. Swan
Professor J. McK. Watts
Associate Professor W. A. W. Walters
Dr I. Wilson

La Trobe University—
Dr N. L. Arthur
Dr B. Bessant
Professor S. P. Burley
Professor K. D. Cole
Professor D. E. Davies
Miss P. M. Edgar
Professor B. D. Ellis
Mr J. M. FitzGerald
Professor R. J. Goldman
Mr D. A. C. Griffith
Mr A. Hyslop
Mr J. C. Janicke
Mr L. A. Kilmartin
Dr C. A. Lamp

Professor H. J. McCloskey
Professor J. I. Martin
Professor B. Mond
Dr D. M. Myers
Mr R. Newton
Mr S. Oates
Dr K. R. Pearson
Mr R. J. Pinkerton
Professor J. A. Salmond
The Hon. Mr Justice R. A. Smithers
Mr G. Stecher
Dr B. R. Stewardson
Professor B. A. Stone
Major-General T. S. Taylor
Mr K. H. Vial
Professor A. B. Wardrop

University of Tasmania—
Mr M. C. Atkinson
Dr A. J. Blackman
Mrs G. Blain
Dr P. J. Boyce
Mr G. T. Briggs
Mr J. H. Brodie
Mr P. C. Byers
Sir George Cartland
Mr N. K. Chick
Professor A. F. Cobbold
Mrs J. L. Crowley
Dr P. E. Doe
Mr A. J. T. Finney
Mr K. R. Harmer
Mr D. A. Kearney
Dr P. S. Lake
Sir Peter Lloyd
Mr M. O. McRae
Dr K. L. Madden
Dr R. C. Menary
Professor R. M. Mitchell
Mr S. C. Nicol
Dr B. V. O'Grady
Mr W. H. Perkins
Rev. P. J. Rushton
Dr B. I. H. Scott
Professor G. C. Wade
Professor P. R. C. Weaver
Professor C. P. Wendell-Smith

Wollongong University College—
Mr P. G. Abotomey
Mr N. Adams
Mr. B. Andrew

Dr K. J. Ausburn
Professor K. A. Blackey
Associate Professor S. E. Bonamy
Professor G. Brinson
Mr P. T. Castle
Mr. C. G. Cupit
Mr D. J. Dillon-Smith
Professor R. Duncan
Professor C. A. M. Gray
Mr H. H. Hartley
Mr J. C. Hazell
Dr B. V. Hill
Mrs R. Hutton
Mrs J. Irving
Professor A. Keane
Dr F. Kennon
Mr C. Nightingale
Mr J. Panter
Mr D. E. Parry
Mr R. J. Pearson
Associate Professor A. W. Roberts
Professor B. H. Smith
Mr J. C. Steinke
Mr R. K. Wilson

University of New South Wales—
Mr P. J. Blizard
Professor A. S. Carrington
Mr D. A. Cole
Associate Professor R. A. Eade
Professor W. E. Glover
Professor F. M. Katz
Mr L. Lobb
Professor D. M. McCallum
Professor H. Muir
Professor R. H. Myers
Associate Professor S. J. Prokhovnik
Dr A. P. Prosser
Miss P. F. Ryan
Professor L. E. Smythe
Professor J. B. Thornton
Professor G. D. Tracey
Professor D. L. Wilhelm
Dr K. H. Woldring

Macquarie University—
Dr H. Adamson
Professor G. A. Barday
Mr P. Carroll
Dr S. W. Cohen
Dr. W. G. Coppell
Professor A. Delbridge

Professor N. T. Drane
Professor K. H. Goesch
Mr M. F. Hammond
Dr M. Kelly
Mr W. G. Lewis
Dr A. J. McHugh
Professor B. E. Mansfield
Emeritus Professor E. G. Mitchell
Professor A. H. Pollard
Professor A. J. Rose
Professor R. Seddon
Professor G. B. Sharman
Professor J. C. Ward
Professor I. K. Waterhouse

University of Newcastle—
Professor J. J. Auchmuty
Mr P. Chopra
Dr J. R. Giles
Mr L. W. Harris
Professor B. L. Johns
Mr J. A. Lambert
Mr W. G. Warren

University of New England—
Mr R. A. Boyd
Associate Professor R. B. Cumming
Associate Professor F. H. Hibberd
Miss M. E. Kelly
Professor A. Lazenby
Dr B. A. Mitchell
Mrs E. B. Moon
Mr P. Nicoll
Dr J. J. J. Pigram
Mr B. F. Reece
Mr E. B. Robenson
Miss L. Robilliard
Professor C. Tatz
Mrs D. A. Wright

University of Queensland—
Mr J. A. Barton
Dr V. A. W. Blunt
Professor W. Burnett
Professor Z. Cowen
Professor J. G. Dare
Dr J. de Jersey
Mr G. E. Docwra
Professor D. F. Dowling
Professor P. D. Edwards
Professor P. B. English
Mr F. D. O. Fielding
Professor J. Francis

Professor R. C. Gates
Mr A. H. Glad
Dr H. M. D. Hoyte
Mrs J. Huddleston
Professor C. S. de V. Kidson
Professor K. W. Knight
Dr B. R. Knowles
Mr T. V. Krok
Mr L. N. Livingston
Professor S. Lipton
Professor E. V. Mackay
Dr N. D. S. May
Professor D. J. Nicklin
Professor C. O'Connor
Mr H. G. Osborne
Dr S. A. Rayner
Mr J. E. Ritchie
Professor K. W. Ryan
Dr J. A. Sagar
Professor B. S. Saini
Professor E. G. Saint
Mr K. H. Sheffield
Dr L. V. Skatterbol
Professor J. H. Tyrer
Professor E. C. Webb
Dr J. M. Whyte
Mr R. C. Yeates
Professor B. Zerner

Griffith University—
Mr T. C. Bray
Professor C. F. Presley
Mr J. Topley
Professor F. J. Willett

James Cook University of North Queensland—
Dr K. J. C. Back
Mr N. R. Baker
Associate Professor E. T. Brown
Dr R. Burns
Professor R. S. F. Campbell
Mr K. N. Chester
Dr D. B. Copeman
Professor C. P. Harris
Mr I. M. Hunter
Associate Professor R. H. Johnson
Dr P. W. Ladds
Dr L. F. Lindoy
Professor J. Oliver
Mr H. T. Priestley
Mr R. J. Pryor
Professor G. N. Richards

Mr. G. V. Roberts
Mr H. Qualls
Professor K. P. Stark
Mr G. T. Steadman
Professor R. T. Sussex
Professor D. H. Trollope
Miss P. White

Australian National University—
Professor A. J. Birch
Professor W. D. Borrie
Mr K. H. J. Bryant
Dr L. T. Carron
Sir Norman Cowper
Professor D. N. F. Dunbar
Professor F. J. Fenner
Dr A. R. Hall
Professor A. N. Hambly
Mr W. S. Hamilton
Mr R. A. Hohnen
Professor R. StC. Johnson
Sir Anthony Mason
Dr J. R. Niland
Professor J. D. Ovington
Mr D. L. Pape
Dr J. W. Perram
Mrs T. Reid
Sir Rutherford Robertson
Professor I. G. Ross
Mr D. W. Smith
Mr C. Walsh
Sir Frederick White
Dr R. M. Williams

Advanced Education sector

Australian Commission on Advanced Education—
Mr L. P. Fricker
Mr T. B. Swanson

Advanced Education Conference—
Dr S. I. Evans
Mr P. P. Jackson
Dr P. G. Law
Mr R. E. Parry
Dr S. S. Richardson

Board of Advanced Education, Queensland—
Dr A. M. Fraser
Mr C. Gilmour
Professor D. J. Nicklin
Mr S. G. Stormonth
Mr W. Wood

Council of Advanced Education, Tasmania—
Air Commodore J. W. Black
Mr V. G. Burley
Mr A. V. Gough
Sir Allan Knight
Dr P. Wisch

Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education—
Mr D. McBeath
Dr W. L. Walker
Mr M. Williamson

Federation of Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education (Queensland Division)—
Dr A. Bailey
Mr R. F. Bange
Mr R. G. Black
Mr P. Chippendale

South Australian Board of Advanced Education—
Mr L. A. Braddock
Dr C. Campbell

Victoria Institute of Colleges—
Sir Willis Connolly
Dr P. G. Law
Dr R. W. R. Muncey
Mr R. E. Parry
Mr G. A. Richards

Victoria Institute of Colleges Staff Associations Council—
Mr R. C. Colgan
Mr R. D. McMullen

Government sector

Australia—
The Hon. K. E. Beazley
Mr P. Bowler
Mr K. N. Jones
Mr J. F. Limbrick
Mr J. O'Shea
The Hon. E. G. Whitlam

New South Wales—
Mr G. Gleeson
Mr W. E. Plunkett

Queensland—
Mr G. F. Berkeley
Mr C. Gilmour
Mr R. J. Howatson
Mr J. Leech

South Australia—
Mr R. D. Barnes
Mr G. F. Seaman

Tasmania—
Mr L. V. Bellis
Mr K. J. Binns
Mr D. Goodwin

Victoria—
Mr F. Brooks
Sir Ernest Coates
The Hon. L. H. S. Thompson
Mr P. Wade

Western Australia—
Mr H. Dettman
Mr R. Doig
Mr K. Townsing

Professional groups

Association of Teachers in Schools of Social Work in Australia—
Professor T. Brennan
Mr A. S. Colliver
Mr M. Cornwell
Professor R. J. Lawrence
Miss M. McLelland

Association of University Clinical Professors of Australia—
Professor R. C. Bennett
Professor R. B. Blacket
Professor R. R. H. Lovell

Australian Medical Association—
Mr M. V. Brown
Associate Professor F. O. Stephens
Dr E. S. Stuckey

Law Teachers of the Universities of New South Wales and Sydney—
Mr M. Bilinski
Mr R. Hayes
Mr J. Mackinolty
Professor P. Nygh
Professor R. Sackville
Professor J. H. Wootten

Professors of Pathology of the State Universities with Medical Schools—
Professor R. C. Nairn

Other

Mr A. S. Cooley
Emeritus Professor Sir John Crawford
Mr J. Q. Ewens
Emeritus Professor P. H. Karmel
Mr J. K. Kaye
New Zealand University Grants Committee
Mr F. C. Nordeck
Professor G. J. V. Nossal
Dr J. R. Price

Dr B. Shea
Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital Board of Management—
Mr L. G. Cox
Dr R. Kilgour
Mr A. F. T. Thomson
United Kingdom University Grants Committee
Western Australian Tertiary Education Commission—
Mr B. Durston
Mr E. Jones
Professor C. Sanders

APPENDIX D

Facilities inspected

Australian National University—
- John Curtin School of Medical Research
- Department of Forestry

Flinders University—
- Flinders Medical Centre

James Cook University of North Queensland—
- Department of Tropical Veterinary Science
- Department of Marine Biology
- M.V. *James Kirby*

Macquarie University—
- Experimental science teaching laboratories (for internal and external students)
- Observation of enrolment procedures

Monash University—
- Monash Medical School, Alfred Hospital

University of Adelaide—
- Medical School
- Departments of: Chemistry
  Dentistry (including Dental Hospital)
  English
  Physics
  Political Science

University of Melbourne—
- Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Royal Women's Hospital
- Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research

University of New South Wales—
- Tertiary Education Research Centre

University of Queensland—
- University Farm, Moggill
- Veterinary School

University of Sydney—
- Medical School (interface between the School and the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital)
- Departments of: Chemistry
  Engineering
  Psychology

University of Tasmania—
- Faculty of Agricultural Science (including University farm)
- Medical School, Royal Hobart Hospital

APPENDIX E

Salaried hospital medical officers

SALARIES AND PRACTICE RIGHTS, BY STATE—1 MAY 1973
(The figures in brackets indicate the number of increments in each range)

Classification	*New South Wales*		*Victoria*		*Queensland*	
	Annual Salary $	*Practice Rights*	*Annual Salary $*	*Practice Rights*	*Annual Salary $*	*Practice Rights*
Resident Medical Officer	5628 – 8779 (4)		6500 – 13260 (5)		6451 – 7808 (2)	
Senior Resident Medical Officer or Registrar	9112				9989 – 11194 (3)	
Assistant Specialist			11518 – 12719 (2)	20%		
Specialist	13180 – 16600 (4)	16%	13322 – 15725 (4)	20%	13693 – 16550 (non-incremental)	
Senior Specialist or Supervisor	18260	16%	16624	20%	18012	
Senior Specialist in Charge or Director			17529		18012 – 18335 (non-incremental)	

Classification	*South Australia*		*Western Australia*		*Tasmania*	
	Annual Salary $	*Practice Rights*	*Annual Salary $*	*Practice Rights*	*Annual Salary $*	*Practice Rights*
Resident Medical Officer	5600 – 7100(*a*) (2)		5890 – 7240 (2)		5930 – 7190 (2)	None [but see foot-note (*b*)]
Senior Resident Medical Officer or Registrar	8100 – 9600(*a*) (3)		7945 – 9365 (2)		7541 – 8945 (2)	
Assistant Specialist			11380 – 13410	$2000	11645 – 12770 (3)	
Specialist	11604 – 13104 (2)	25% of Director's rate	14345 – 17355 (4)	$2000	13229 – 14609 (2)	
Senior Specialist or Supervisor	13604 – 15104 (2)	25% of Director's rate	17355 – 18750	$2000	15713	
Senior Specialist in Charge or Director	16104	25%				

(*a*) Salary based on rostered time worked up to and including 54 hours in any week or 216 hours in any four-week cycle.

(*b*) Present policy is not to extend the right to private practice. However, where a particular officer is the only person practising a speciality in an area, he is permitted to practise privately without any limit on earnings being imposed.